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ABSTRACT 
 Hurricanes, tsunamis, and terrorism, are visible catastrophes that disrupt 
continuity for many organizations. Yet behind the curtain, there are multitudes of smaller 
events that cause supply chain disruptions. For example, quality issues, shipping delays, 
information system malfunction, demand spikes, and inventory mismanagement can 
quickly ripple from one supply chain to another. Practitioners work feverishly to contain 
small interruptions, while large disruptions can upset the supply chain for multiple 
organizations and depress an organization’s financial valuation by up to 40%.   
 This study extends risk management thinking by exploring behavioral-based 
practices, rather than buffer inventory, redundant capacity, or financial countermeasures, 
as these behavioral tactics affect employees and emanate from the culture of the 
organization. We specifically, research competencies that improve an organization’s 
structure and orientation. Internal integration, information sharing, and training reflect 
antecedent competencies that provide structure and encourage internal connectedness. 
Common vision, supply chain disruption orientation, organizational learning, and routine 
rigidity represent competencies that influence the organization’s orientation, a proxy for 
culture. Previous operations research has investigated these antecedents, but rarely have 
they viewed them from a risk management perspective.  
 We also determine how organizations use risk management capabilities to 
understand supply chain disruption. To do this, we develop a conceptual disruption 
management framework that seeks to align the probability of disruption and the 
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predictability of consequences with an organization’s supply chain strategy. The model 
should help practitioners select an appropriate supply chain strategy from among several 
alternatives. The output is a risk management strategy grounded in supply chain 
flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, agility, or resilience. 
 We also operationalize two new risk management measures: warning and 
recovery capability. Warning capability refers to an organization’s ability to scan for and 
communicate information about potential and actual supply chain threats. When properly 
developed, this capability should enable organizations to better identify supply chain 
threats. Recovery capability represents an organization’s pre-emptive and reactive 
response capacity. Developing these capabilities allows practitioners to effectively 
position and utilize resources to speed up supply chain recovery.  
 The evidence indicates that organizations can develop behavioral-based 
competencies and capabilities as a method to better anticipate and combat supply chain 
risk. When studying orientations that influence the culture of an organization, we found 
that managers should develop their common vision, supply chain disruption orientation, 
and organizational learning competencies as a way to address supply chain risk. The 
evidence tells us that each competency positively influences the organization’s risk 
management capabilities and overall performance. Additionally, the data implies that 
organizations must manage their routine rigidity and information quality levels; 
otherwise, they may experience a degradation of their risk management capabilities. 
Structurally, we found that internal integration and training affect an organization’s 
warning and recovery capabilities and leads to improved performance. While recovery 
iv 
 
capability directly improves performance, we find that an organization’s warning abilities 
affect performance only when recovery serves as an intermediary. The benefit of this 
approach is that managers develop the employees and the organization itself, rather than 
investing in resources that may never be used.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
 Hurricanes, tsunamis, and terrorism, are visible catastrophes that disrupt 
continuity for many organizations. Yet behind the curtain, there are multitudes of smaller 
events that cause supply chain (SC) disruptions. For example, quality issues, shipping 
delays, information system malfunction, demand spikes, and inventory mismanagement 
can quickly ripple destructively from one supply chain to another. Practitioners work 
feverishly to contain small interruptions, while large disruptions can upset the SC for 
multiple organizations and depress an organization’s financial valuation by up to 40% 
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2005). Organizations need to develop less resource intensive 
tactics to manage and mitigate supply chain risk. 
 To address SC risk, organizations develop strategies to lower the probability of 
occurrence, reduce the impact of disruption, and improve recovery times so a SC can 
quickly return to a steady state. While risk management requires comprehensive 
strategies, we find most academic research addresses SC risk with redundant inventory 
and/or capacity. If overdone, these mitigation techniques are costly and force 
organizations to idle valuable resources, which they will not effectively turn until the next 
SC disruption.   
 This study extends risk management thinking by exploring behavior-based 
practices, rather than buffer inventory, redundant capacity, or financial countermeasures. 
Behavior tactics affect employees and emanate from the culture of the organization 
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(Zsidisin, 2003; Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi, 2010). This research follows 
the advice of experts who suggest that risk management tactics be embedded in day-to-
day activities as part of the organization’s culture (Simchi-Levi, 2010). Albeit, few 
researchers have empirically tested these behavior-based strategies within current 
literature.(Sohdi, Son & Tang, 2012). Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) focused on the 
magnitude and the probability of supply disruption within the automotive industry and 
Tucker (2004) categorizes the dimensions of failure within the nursing environment. 
While informative, neither research investigates capabilities and competencies 
simultaneously. To fill this gap, we operationalize two risk management capabilities, 
warning and recovery, and test empirically the antecedent competencies that enhance 
organizational risk management capabilities. 
 In this research, we investigate whether organizations can develop behavior-based 
competencies and capabilities to reduce SC risk and the resulting disruption 
consequences. We specifically research competencies that improve an organization’s 
structure and orientation. Structural competencies include internal integration, 
information sharing, and training. These structural antecedents encourage internal 
connectedness. Orientation competencies encompass a common vision, SC disruption 
orientation, organizational learning, and routine rigidity. These antecedents influence the 
organization’s orientation, a proxy for culture.  
 We also determine how organizations use risk management capabilities to 
understand SC disruption. To do this, we operationalize the warning and recovery 
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capability measures proposed, but never tested, by Craighead et al. (2007). Warning 
capability refers to an organization’s ability to scan for and communicate information 
about potential and actual SC threats (Craighead et al., 2007). When effectivley 
developed, this capability should enable organizations to better identify potential and 
actual SC threats. Recovery capability represents an organization’s pre-emptive and 
reactive response capacity (Craighead et al. 2007). Developing these capabilities allows 
practitioners to effectively position and utilize resources to speed up SC recovery.  
 By developing measures for warning and recovery capabilities and then 
investigating how they relate to antecedent competencies and organizational 
performance, we provide practitioners a new way to think about and manage SC risk. 
Rather than buffering with costly resources, we advocate behavior-based risk 
management tactics. These practices enhance the organization and the practitioners 
running the processes, save money, and broaden the tactics used to manage supply chain 
risk.  
Approach 
 Using three essays, this research investigates (1) how to align the SC and risk 
management strategies, (2) measure an organization’s warning and recovery capabilities, 
and (3) develop antecedent competencies to mitigate SC disruption. This offers a 
practical approach for managing SC risk, which helps reduce costs and improve the 
interconnectedness and culture within an organization.  
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The first essay develops a conceptual disruption management framework that 
seeks to align the probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences with an 
organization’s SC strategy. We believe disruption consequences are an important 
component of SC disruption that has been overlooked by previous research. Most risk 
management models focus on risk sources or the cause of a disruption as part of their 
strategy (e.g. Norrman and Jansson, Kleindorfer and Saad
,
. Knemeyer et al.'s
). 
  Since 
disruptions, with a common cause, can manifest in many different ways, this approach 
lacks depth. Alternatively, by focusing on disruption consequences, managers can 
address many SC threats more effectively. Specifically, our model helps practitioners 
select an appropriate SC strategy from four quadrants (Figure 1). The output is a risk 
management strategy grounded in SC flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, agility, or 
resilience. We also incorporate warning and recovery capabilities into the framework and 
discuss how an organization can leverage these capabilities to improve it’s overall risk 
management process.  
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Figure 1: Disruption management framework 
 The second essay develops psychometrically valid measures for risk 
warning and disruption recovery capabilities. Craighead et al. defined these capabilities 
in 2007; however, no one has developed measures or a measuring instrument, as of today. 
Following Noar’s (2003) validation procedures, which provides a roadmap from 
literature review to validity testing, we developed new valid and reliable measures. 
Evidence from this study will help practitioners understand the relationships between 
four organizational orientations (common vision, SC disruption orientation, 
organizational learning, routine rigidity), the proposed capabilities (warning and 
recovery), and performance. (See Figure 2)  
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In addition, we also test the effect of a mediating variable, information quality on 
competency-capabilities relationships. This includes the direct linkage between common 
vision and the warning capabilities construct (1A), the direct effect between common 
vision and recovery (1B), and the indirect relationship of common vision and recovery, 
which is mediated by warning capabilities (1C). Additionally, hypothesis 1D, 2C, 2D, 
3C, and 3D test the moderating effect of information quality on the relationships between 
the four competencies and the two risk management constructs. Practitioners can use the 
new measurement tool to benchmark their own risk management capabilities and assess 
the preparedness of their organization to counter a SC disruption.  
 
Figure 2: Proposed model for dissertation essay 2 
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 The third essay investigates the effectiveness of structural competencies as a 
method to improve internal connectedness and communication. Similar to essay 2, we 
leverage Craighead et als’ definition of warning and recovery capability and test a new 
model with the newly validated measures. Specifically, we develop and test a model that 
examines the relationships between the three organizational competencies ( internal 
integration, information sharing, and training), two risk management capabilities 
(warning and recovery), and performance (Figure 3). The model is tested using data from 
the healthcare industry. The healthcare industry provides an excellent research venue, as 
most organizations are actively seeking ways to improve service and cut costs, especially 
given that 40% of a hospital’s budget is dedicated to SC expenditures (Sweet, Hamilton, 
and Willis, 2005). We also investigate a moderating relationship, which represents an 
interaction between training and organizational size. Licensed beds (BEDS) is a proxy for 
organization size. Hospital managers and SC professionals should use the new measures 
to enhance their connectedness and improve the organization’s disruption management 
capabilities. 
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Figure 3: Proposed model for dissertation essay 3 
 In all three essays, we leverage high reliability theory (HRT) as it describes how 
organizations can design and develop highly reliable supply chains to stave off accidents 
and the consequences of disruption (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). Unlike other operations management theories, HRT encourages 
organizations to value simultaneously both safety and profitability. By studying SC risk 
and SC management with this lens, we illustrate how organizations can improve their 
internal competencies and organizational risk management capabilities by learning from 
environmental cues and then transforming the that knowledge and existing resources into 
new capabilities. 
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 Each essay fills a gap within the existing SC and risk management literature. Our 
disruption management framework ( essay 1), provides a new perspective concerning the 
mitigation of SC disruption. Existing models focus on the sources of risk or seek to 
differentiate between the causes of disruptions. In 2012, Sohdi, Son, and Tang asked 
researchers to clarify and seek consensus around the SC risk management definition. By 
studying disruption consequences, rather than just the cause alone, we add depth to and 
help clarify the SC risk management definition. In addition, Manuj and Mentzer (2008) 
stated that there was limited research into risk management moderators. By conducting 
research on the moderating and mediating affects within the risk management paradigm, 
we fill an existing gap.  
 Lastly, the second and third essays investigate mediating and moderating effects. 
the second and third essays provide empirical evidence about behavior-based risk 
management techniques within organizations. Sohdi, Son, and Tang (2012) argue that 
there is a dearth of empirical SCRM research within OM literature. Our research, 
therefore, is designed to provide empirical evidence concerning the linkages between the 
antecedent competencies, newly operationalized risk management capabilities, and 
performance. This evidence should assist managers as they develop a more 
comprehensive SC risk management strategies. Besides inventory and/or capacity, we 
envision that organizations will enhance connectivity and develop the organization’s 
culture as a means to combat SC risk. 
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Methodology 
 To understand the effectiveness of the proposed behavior-based risk management 
practices, we employ both exploratory and confirmatory techniques. This allows us to 
triangulate our findings and improve their nomological validity. Initially, we examine 
existing SC risk and risk management literature. This provides a foundation from which 
we build the disruption management framework and the two structural models used 
within essay 2 and 3. We also explored complementary topics including crisis 
management, SC resiliency, SC agility, and disruption management. Each topic provides 
insight on how to combat threats and recover once a disruption occurs. 
 We then used an item-to-construct sorting procedures (Q-sort) and asked 
respondents to link survey questions to latent construct definitions (Menor and Roth, 
2007, p 831). During the Q-sort process, respondents also indentified incomplete 
definitions and misleading concepts. This process allowed us to establish construct and 
face validity for the proposed models and the two survey instruments (Anastasi, 1988). 
We developed questions and definitions, for each competency, capability, moderator, 
mediator and performance construct. 
 To corroborate construct measures, the primary author then conducted interviews 
with SC and risk mangement professionals. The interview protocol was discovery 
oriented and focused on the appropriateness of the proposed model, construct definitions, 
and survey questions. We also asked interviewees to review the survey instrument. The 
primary investigator directed these interviews and asked clarifying questions. We 
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recorded the interviews and made changes to the final survey instrument based on the 
experts’ input.  
 For the confirmatory phase, we collected pilot, pretest, and two full data sets, as 
suggested by Noar (2003). The primary investigator collected pilot data from professional 
MBA students (evening program) and pretest data from procurement directors associated 
with university hospitals. We then collected the final data set for essay #2 from 
procurement professionals across industries. Data for essay #3 was collected from 
material managers within US hospitals. Multiple data collections from several 
demographics improves both the validity and reliability of the survey measures. 
 We then used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the scale’s 
unidimensionality, construct reliability, and criterion validity. While most data 
characteristics were within acceptable parameters, we found that data for essay #2 
exhibited common method bias. This occurred because we collected only one respondent 
per organization. Once identified, we controlled for this bias in subsequent analysis using 
a method factor. We also found that the warning and recovery capabilities constructs 
within essay #2 did not exhibit discriminant validity. Thus, we amended the conceptual 
model to reflect a single multidimensional construct called disruption sensing and 
response capability (See Figure 4). The new construct reflects four risk management 
dimensions: scanning, communication, proactive response, and reactive recovery.  
12 
 
 
Figure 4: Amended model for essay 2 
Managerial Implications 
 As supply chains expand and become more complex, organizations must realize 
that the probability of disruptions also increases. To offset an inevitable disruption, 
managers must develop risk management tactics that lower occurrence probabilities, 
reduce potential impact, and/or shorten recovery times so a SC can return to a state of 
normalcy. In this study, we suggest that behavior-based risk management techniques 
enable managers to embed risk management competencies and capabilities into the 
organization’s culture.  
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 This research helps practitioners in three ways: first, by developing new measures 
for warning and recovery capabilities, organizations have a method to quantitatively 
measure and benchmark their SC risk management capabilities. Second, by investigating 
the antecedent competencies of the warning and recovery capabilities, we help 
practitioners understand how behavior-based competencies can bolster an organization’s 
risk management capabilities. Specifically, we provide guidance as managers develop 
both organizational orientations and internal connectedness structures. Third, by teasing 
out the effects of information quality and organization size, we illustrate the importance 
of moderators and mediators on competency and capability development. From this 
research, we anticipate that mangers will include behavior-based competencies and 
capabilities in their arsenal of SC risk management tools. 
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INCORPORATING THE PREDICTABILITY OF CONSEQUENCES INTO A 
DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Abstract 
 We introduce a disruption management framework that incorporates both the 
probability of disruption and predictability of the resulting consequences. The resulting 
model prescribes one of four supply chain strategies: flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, 
agility, and resilience. We also discuss how organizations can exploit warning and 
recovery capabilities to improve the selected supply chain strategy. Managers can 
leverage our framework within a comprehensive risk management process to develop 
tactics aligned with risk management, supply chain, and overall operating strategies to 
overcome a range of disruption consequences. 
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Introduction 
Researchers recommend developing a risk management strategy that includes the 
consequences associated with supply chain disruption (Greenberg & Cramer, 1991). Yet, 
existing models focus primarily on the sources of supply chain (SC) threats. Managers 
generally identify the source of a risk in the early stages of the risk management (RM) 
process, which allows them to categorize threats for further assessment. This approach 
fails to incorporate the consequences of disruption into either the assessment and 
mitigation processes or even the broader organizational RM strategy. Hence, practitioners 
should consider not only the source of a disruption, but also the resulting consequences 
when evaluating SC risk.  
When evaluating SC disruptions based on the predictability of the consequences, 
practitioners are better able to select appropriate mitigation tactics. For instance, the 
Chinese New Year holiday is a predictable SC disruption, which shuts down production 
facilities for a specified period. Managers confidently select countermeasures, as they 
know how and when the consequences will manifest. i.e. the organization can reasonably 
estimate inventory shortages. Early shipments and temporary inventory buffers are 
logical and financially prudent. This strategy is preferred, as it will generally cost less to 
fund preventative countermeasures, rather than responding to the disruption afterwards.  
On the other hand, a hurricane (risk source) is unpredictable because it is difficult 
to articulate when a storm will appear or where it will actually make landfall. Further, a 
hurricane can manifest into a Katrina-type disaster (category 4), or alternatively a 
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category-one storm, with little aftereffect. Experts need to understand wind intensity, 
expected rainfall, and the inland storm surge, before assessing these risk sources. Yet, 
consequences of different grades of hurricanes can be better calculated. i.e. insurance 
companies are able to predict the probability of loss for various hurricane types. 
There are also situations where consequences overlap or stem from multiple 
sources of risk. For example, a machine may shut down due to a shortage of raw 
materials, a break in the electrical current, or a component within the machine actually 
failing. In this case, vendor failure, an electrical outage, and component breakage are the 
sources of a risk, while the machine shutting down is the actual consequence. The 
consequence is predictable, because practitioners can determine the time between failures 
and the time associated with repair (e.g. mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and mean-time-to-
repair (MTTR)). With this knowledge, managers are able to identify countermeasures, 
such as inventory or redundant capacity, which keeps the production line up and running. 
This also streamlines the RM process, because one safeguard, rather than three, can 
mitigate the consequence of a disruption.  
Existing RM frameworks emphasize risk identification, probability assessment, 
countermeasure evaluation, and countermeasure deployment (Knemeyer, Zinn & Eroglu. 
2009). Researchers design these models to balance the probable losses of an identified 
threat with the financial costs of countermeasures. To compute potential losses, 
assessment algorithms multiply the probability of disruption by the loss estimates of a 
corresponding SC disruption. With this equation, the annual losses associated with 
18 
 
frequent minor disruptions can theoretically equal the losses of a low 
probability/infrequent disruption with severe consequences.  
Our framework accounts for the predictability of consequences, so practitioners 
can better understand the manifestations of a SC threat. We propose a disruption 
management framework that evaluates the probability of disruption and the predictability 
of consequences, to prescribe a SC strategy that fits best with the risk characteristics of 
disruption threats faced. We also incorporate warning and recovery capabilities into the 
framework and discuss how to leverage these capabilities to improve an organization’s 
comprehensive RM process. When taken together, practitioners can use our framework to 
align the organization's SC, RM, and overall operating strategies.   
 After reviewing existing supply chain risk management (SCRM) frameworks, we 
find three gaps worth investigating. To address these deficiencies, this article proceeds in 
the following manner. First, we review the dimensions of existing SCRM frameworks. 
We appraise the seminal RM frameworks to understand their contributions and limitation. 
This includes defining and assessing the four key terms relevant to most RM models: risk 
identification, assessment, mitigation, and responsiveness. Second, we introduce our own 
disruption management framework, which includes both the probability of disruption and 
the predictability of consequences. We discuss four SC strategies: supply chain flexibility, 
risk and loss mitigation, agility, and resilience. We illustrate the utility and advantages of 
our framework through representative examples. Third, we discuss how warning and 
recovery capabilities support the SC strategies derived from our model. This includes a 
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discussion on how our framework addresses the gaps identified within the SC and RM 
literature. After reviewing the appropriate gaps, we predict how managers may use our 
model to mitigate SC risk, whereby consequence assessment versus risk cause 
assessment, can help organizations save money, reduce inventory levels, as well as 
induce better preparation for SC disruptions.  
 
Key Contributions of Existing Supply Chain Risk Management Frameworks  
 When reviewing current SC risk and business continuity planning (BCP) 
frameworks, we find five key contributions to be particularly informative. Together, these 
models delineate areas important to models of risk preparation, impact reduction, 
developing SC partners, BCP, and response best practices. We illustrate the contribution 
of each model, as well as highlight how each alone might leave a gap because they focus 
on the sources of SC risk rather than disruption consequences. Accordingly, we provide 
our model, predicated on the latter later in this paper. 
To start, Norrman and Jansson (2004) offer a framework that advocates a 
proactive RM process. This suggests that organizations develop a RM process before the 
actual disruption occurs. In their research, Ericson, a Swedish telecom company, 
develops a multi-step process that combines risk identification, assessment, treatment, 
monitoring, incident handling, and contingency planning. Utilizing this framework, 
Ericsson has been able to improve communications with its supply base during both 
preparation and post incident stages. While, we embrace the proactive nature of this 
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model, it focuses on the cause or sources of risk (Norrman and Jansson, 2004, p 438). By 
adding a step that proactively assesses disruption consequences, managers can develop 
specialized RM tactics. We expect both mitigation and response activities to be different 
for a category 1 versus a category 5 hurricane.   
 Next, Kleindorfer and Saad (2005), in one of the most cited RM models, 
describe two risk categories: risks associated with the uncertainty of supply and demand 
coordination and risks linked to events such as terrorism and natural disasters. Within this 
model, they propose that organizations engage in a two-front battle when managing SC 
risk. First, managers should work to reduce the frequency and severity of all types of SC 
risk. Second, both the organization and its SC partners need to improve their capacity to 
handle uncertainty. This represents a call to arms, which demands that organizations 
focus on the entire SC, not just their own facilities. However, the first step of their SAM 
model (S)pecifies that manager should seek out risk sources and vulnerabilities by 
thinking about operational contingencies, natural hazards, and events such as political 
instability and terrorism (p 54).  
By incorporating, a process to identify how consequences manifest themselves, 
we argue that managers could improve the SAM model. For example, Kleindorfer and 
Saad use the August 14, 2003 grid blackout as an example of an equipment failure. We 
believe that an organization, along with its SC partners, would prepare for a large-scale 
blackout, like the August 14 event, much differently that they would a small transistor 
that knocks out the electricity for a single building. The only way to (A)ssess and 
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(M)itigate (the last two steps of the SAM process) these differences is to discuss different 
disruption manifestations. We put forth, that mangers can improve the overall SAM 
process by assessing the consequences associated with a SC disruption.   
Third, Handfield, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and Craighead (2008) compare 
executive responses to benchmark risk and mitigation practices. By studying the actions 
taken during actual disruptions, the authors identify best practices to manage and mitigate 
threats. Their key takeaway is that organizations may have to redesign the SC or pursue 
external partnerships to overcome certain risks.  
While the Handfield’s. framework focuses on discovering pinch points where a 
SC disruption could occur, it does not call out either the source or the consequences of a 
SC disruption. Specifically, the article urges managers to screen for vulnerabilities and 
then quantify an organization’s level of SC risk. What is interesting is that within the 
formula for SC risk are parameters for revenue loss and the cost to stabilize the SC 
disruption. We assert that managers will need to understand the consequences associated 
with a SC disruption in order to generate these estimates. For example, the revenue loss 
estimates for a category 5 hurricane should be significantly higher than for a category 1 
storm. By including a step to screen for disruption consequences, managers should be 
better informed when attempting to quantify the level of risk for a specific SC node. 
 Fourth, the Knemeyer et al. (2009) catastrophic risk framework encourages 
organizations to manage disruption even when they have low occurrence probabilities. 
Their work offers insight into implementation issues and suggests five alternative 
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approaches to countermeasure selection (1) assume the risk, (2) purchase insurance to 
offset the potential losses, (3) dependency reduction, (4) invest in a location to minimize 
the consequence of disruption, or (5) relocation of targeted facilities. This framework 
contributes to our understanding of RM by considering low probability threats.  
 Within this process, Knemeyer and colleagues argue that managers need to 
initially identify the location of potential threats” (p 147) and then estimate the 
probability and dollar loss associated with a location-disruption combination. Managers 
should discuss potential disruption consequences during the identification process to 
improve their estimation process. This can be achieved by working through possible 
consequence scenarios early in the assessment process. 
 Finally, Zsidisin, Melnyk, and Ragatz (2005) offer a framework to helps 
practitioners develop business continuity plans (BCP) as a mechanism to manage 
catastrophic risks. The authors draw from case studies and build a BCP framework by 
thinking about low probability and difficult to predict events. Key to this article is that 
practitioners should create awareness towards risk and threat prevention within the 
organization. Stated differently, managers can develop organizational countermeasures, 
competencies and capabilities, to mitigate catastrophic supply risks.  
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Dimensions of a Supply Chain Risk Management Framework 
 While the above models use a number of different categories in their RM models, 
there are essentially four common elements within existing RM frameworks: risk 
identification, assessment, mitigation, and responsiveness (Sodhi, Son, and Tang, 2012). 
In their conclusion, Sodhi and colleagues suggest that organizations should incorporate 
these steps into any comprehensive RM process. Accordingly, we provide a more 
detailed review of each term as it is typically defined and applied by SC practitioners, and 
the possible limitations of such applications. Whereby, in contrast, a model predicated on 
disruption consequences, our model, might fill the gap the standard risk-source 
predicated model leaves. 
 
Risk Identification 
During the initial step within most RM processes, the management team identifies 
a list of threats or sources of risk, which they believe threaten the supply chain, i.e., risk 
identification. This includes risks such as machine breakdowns, vendor failures, labor 
strikes, fires, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. Practitioners should use the risk 
identification step to identify potential threats to their organization and extended SC. In 
order to improve the identification process, risk-mapping methods such as event tree 
analysis and fault tree analysis are available (Norrman & Jansson, 2004). However, 
generally speaking, identifying risks is difficult, and therefore, managers avoid making 
decisions about risky events when possible. Bounded rationality describes how humans 
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employ simple models to make decisions when unclear or unfamiliar information is 
present. This is the case, since the managers involved throughout the identification 
process tend not identify risks proactively, logically they may also not foresee or 
comprehend the consequence associated with a SC disruption. 
We envision the risk identification step alternatively. To populate our disruption 
management framework, team members, should identify both the source of and the 
consequences associated with a SC disruption. For example, the management team may 
identify a logistic provider’s labor issues (possible Fed Ex strike) as a potential threat. In 
this case, the source of the disruption is the labor issue, while the resulting consequence 
is the lack of overnight transportation services. By including information about the 
resulting consequences, managers can utilize our disruption management framework and 
select an appropriate SC strategy that complements the resulting mitigation tactics. We 
believe this qualitative process benefits from brainstorming sessions and SC disruption 
experience. The outcome of this initial step is list of risk sources and consequences that 
the RM team believes can threaten the organization’s SC. With a broad list of SC threats 
and potential consequences, practitioners have the information necessary when working 
through the balance of the RM process. 
  
Assessment 
 Traditionally, the next step in RM includes assessment, whereby managers 
analyze information about threats identified in the first portion of the RM process and 
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create a priority ranking based on their understanding of the probabilities and disruption 
likelihood. Regardless of how robust an assessment process is, organizations typically 
attend to only the low-impact, recurrent risks and ignore catastrophic events with low 
probabilities (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004). This occurs, because the individuals participating 
in the assessment process struggle to envision or understand the probabilities associated 
with ambiguous risks. Stated differently, managers are reluctant to utilize objective data 
such as probability estimates to evaluate infrequent risks. In addition, there is also 
evidence that the RM process itself may push managers towards a conservative tack. 
Barth (2010), for example, identifies several barriers to risk assessment, including a lack 
of resources and the management’s reluctance to invest in events that may never 
materialize. Further, when analyzing the statistical probabilities associated with a 
disruption event, most practitioners have been trained (in a good number of basic 
statistics and Master of Business Administration (MBA) classes) to remove outliers from 
the analysis. 
 To overcome the conservative bias, some organizations use a catastrophic risk 
management matrix (Figure 1) to assess the probability of a disruption event (Knemeyer 
et al., 2009). Frameworks such as these are important because not considering 
catastrophic risk creates a host of issues within the assessment process. Consider for 
example 100-year floods. Generally, managers will exclude these outliers from a 
comprehensive flood-plain analysis and bias the probability estimates. 
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Figure 1: Catastrophic Risk Management Matrix – Adopted from Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu, 
2009 
 
We recommend a revision of the assessment step that introduces a more 
calculable predication of disruption consequences. We argue that such a model is more 
effective in preparing organizations for all types of risks, but also eliminates the more 
difficult mathematics of risk probability (consequence size assessment is simply easier as 
it is more predicatble), and in turn, risk assessment improves, saving the organization 
money overall. Using our framework, practitioners evaluate the consequences associated 
with a SC disruption scenario and then create a priority list. Practitioners should exploit 
the assessment process to evaluate how an identified risk will affect an organization and 
the extended SC (Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, & Cavinato, 2004). Initially, information feeds 
a quantitative analysis process and provides probability estimates on the frequency and 
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impact of various disruptions. Only then can topic experts superimpose qualitative 
information into the analysis process to improve understanding. 
 Managers assess the predictability of the resulting consequences along with the 
probability of occurrence. With these dimensions, the assessment team can draw different 
conclusions than they would with a traditional framework that focuses on the cause of a 
SC disruption. For example, a traditional analysis will consider a financially unstable 
vendor to be a significant source of risk. In addition, if the vendor happens to be a large, 
by either volume or dollar spend, the analysis team will assign a large 
impact/vulnerability factor and further increase the threat priority. However, with our 
framework, the assessment team teases out the predictability of the consequences and can 
theoretically draw different conclusions. Using the example of a financially unstable 
vendor, the consequence associated with the threat is the shortage of specific raw 
materials, not the vendor’s financial instability. It is predictable, because the focal 
organization can specify the items and quantity needed. With this new information, 
managers are able to reduce the level of uncertainty and the priority ranking associated 
with a specific SC consequence. In addition, information about the resulting 
consequences should make future decisions about countermeasures and mitigation tactics 
easier to comprehend. Specifically, a backup supplier could be qualified. By identifying 
the consequences associated with a SC threat rather than just a broad risk cause, 
practitioners should be better able to understand SC risk. This occurs as practitioners 
think about previous SC experiences and develop a SC disruption orientation.  
28 
 
Mitigation 
 The third step common to existing RM processes is the mitigation procedure, 
which practitioners employ to evaluate the functionality and cost associated with risk 
reducing or recovery efforts, including countermeasure evaluation and selection. For 
example, when the RM team has prioritized quality issues of a specific supplier, it has a 
number of options to address the risk source.   
1. The focal organization can incentivize the supplier to inspect 100% of all 
outbound shipments.  
2. The receiving organization can sample and inspect a percentage (<100%) of 
all inbound shipments from the failing vendor.   
3. The focal organization and supplier can work together and develop a better 
production system at an alternative location.  
4. Qualify and employ an alternate vendor. 
While not a complete list of alternatives, the objective is to evaluate various safeguards to 
determine if any are an appropriate method to mitigate the prioritized risk source. Below 
we discuss various mitigation tactics: operational, financial, and organizational 
countermeasures. 
Operational countermeasures, such as inventory buffers and redundant capacity, 
allow organizations to offset the impact of many categories of disruption. Most 
practitioners and academics consider operational tactics appropriate when risks and 
decisions about the various options are understandable. Research indicates that 
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operational countermeasures facilitate mitigation of catastrophic risks when both the 
probability of disruption and the estimated losses are high (Knemeyer et al., 2009).
 
 (e.g. 
The American Red Cross prepositions drinking water and medical supplies before large 
hurricanes make landfall) Such mitigation tactics are appropriate and commonplace 
within many industries.  
 Second, financial countermeasures specify monetary compensation for lost sales 
resulting from a SC disruption. Within the agriculture industry, farmers regularly 
purchase crop insurance to guarantee revenues against wind and hail damage. While less 
common than operational countermeasures, financial mitigation techniques provide 
insurance within certain contexts.  
 Third, RM experts argue that certain organizational practices may be useful as 
mitigation techniques (Simchi-Levi, 2010). This strategy suggests incorporating a SC 
disruption orientation into daily work routines and purposefully aligning an 
organization’s business and RM strategies. For instance, a recent study found the use of 
training, quality certification programs, and long-term alliances helped reduce supply 
uncertainty within purchasing organizations (Smeltzer & Siferd, 1998). By employing 
organizational countermeasures, executives are able enrich their organization by 
developing internal competencies and external capabilities, rather than investing in RM 
countermeasures that may never be used.   
We recommend that risk managers should evaluate each mitigation tactic to 
determine its utility as a risk-reducing mechanism against both the risks and 
consequences evaluated in the assessment step. We argue the mitigation phase needs to 
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be robust enough for use with both major and minor disruption scenarios and allow 
practitioners to mitigate various threats with three types of countermeasures: operational, 
financial, or organizational.   
 Using our proposed methodology, practitioners should evaluate each ranked 
consequence against the disruption management framework. For example, a manager 
would categorize a disruption such as a machine breakdown (risk source)/line down 
(consequence) in the risk and loss mitigation quadrant because both the probability of 
occurrence and the predictability of the consequences are high. After categorizing the 
various threats, practitioners may address the risks and consequences individually or as a 
group. For example, if seven out of ten threats align with the agility quadrant, managers 
may assess and select a mitigation strategy simultaneously for the subgroup of seven. 
Grouping threats by consequential outcome allows mangers to identify generic 
countermeasures that are applicable to multiple disruption scenarios. This would include 
countermeasures such as a command center, satellite phones, or robust emergency 
response protocols.   
 We expect that most organizations will have ranked consequences that fall into 
multiple quadrants within our framework. When this occurs, managers should adopt 
multiple SC strategies. For example, safety stock can offset regular power outages, while 
production flexibility can mitigate scenarios such as floods. Production lines, locations, 
or divisions within a company may require separate SC strategies. Further, in some case a 
single facility may require multiples strategies.  
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Responsiveness 
 In a typical risk management process Response or Responsiveness represents the 
last step, during which organizations develop methods to respond to disruptions once 
they occur and to reduce the amount of time the supply chain is affected (Sodhi et al., 
2012; ).  Practitioners use responsiveness or response capabilities to coordinate and 
deploy resources to overcome the slowing or stoppage of operations (Craighead, 
Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007). As an illustration, switching from 
foreign to local suppliers, when a disruption has slowed the SC, allows organizations to 
move, raw materials quickly into production and reinstate operations. Some companies 
do not develop their recovery capabilities proactively, because they do not plan for SC 
consequence, but instead only focus on risk sources, and thereby oversee the options in 
terms of consequence response.  
Consequently, we agree that when organizations develop their response 
capabilities, they should be able to reduce the amount of downtime due to a disruption. 
Utilizing our framework, the RM team will have explained the various disruption sources 
and consequences in detail. Practitioners then can utilize our enhanced disruption 
management framework to choose an appropriate SC strategy that is directly based on the 
probabilities and resulting consequences of various disruption scenarios. Therefore, 
respondents can develop procedures in advance and refine them with practice and 
feedback. For example, when employing a strategy of SC flexibility, organizations must 
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learn how to move production capabilities between locations.  Practitioners can practice 
change-outs (movement between lines) to determine the most cost effective and efficient 
method. 
 After reviewing the four key steps found within most RM processes along with 
the contributions of seminal articles covering SC risk and BCP, we propose a model to 
manage and mitigate SC disruption risk. In particular, our framework investigates how 
the predictability of consequences affects the supply chain strategy utilized to offset 
disruption risk. Adding this dimension to a RM framework is important, because, while 
the sources of a risk may be predictable based on available probability estimates, the 
variation associated with the consequences may render specific mitigation tactics 
ineffective. For example, the United States Army Corps of Engineers built levees around 
New Orleans based on the size of potential hurricanes (risk source), not the tidal surge 
(disruption consequence). With insight into the consequences of flooding, the Corps of 
Engineers may have developed a different disruption management strategy.  
 
Disruption Management Framework 
 We introduce a disruption management framework that incorporates both the 
probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences (Figure 2). While the 
probability of disruption is standard amongst many RM models, the predictability of 
disruption consequences (vertical axis) represents the inherent variation of consequences 
that result from a SC disruption. By incorporating these two dimensions within a single 
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framework, we evolve the conventional RM model and encourage practitioners to learn 
about the manifestations of a SC disruption and then incorporate that perspective into 
future countermeasure selection and mitigation processes.  
Managers can then navigate between the two dimensions (probability of 
disruption and the predictability of consequences) and select one of four SC strategies: 
supply chain flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, supply chain resilience, and supply 
chain agility.  
  
Figure 2: Proposed disruption management framework.  
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Supply Chain Flexibility 
 Supply chain flexibility explains how organizations react and change the direction 
of operations without affecting (or minimally affecting) the amount of time, effort, or 
performance required (Upton, 1994). This definition suggests that practitioners can 
quickly reconfigure SC to support new offerings, partnerships, and market demands.  
In our model, the upper left quadrant of our framework reflects scenarios where 
the probability of disruption is low and the predictability of the resulting consequences is 
high. Examples of such disruptions sources include a flood or the failure of a commodity-
providing vendor. Both events result in consequences such as the closing of a distribution 
center or the shortage of key components. When the probability of disruption is low, 
practitioners regularly take a conservative tact towards RM and may avoid making 
decisions about mitigation tactics. Committing resources to offset infrequent events is 
inherently risky from a financial perspective. There is a good chance that managers are 
wasting both time and money to assess and deploy countermeasures, since the mitigating 
resources may never be used.  
 However, because managers can predict the consequences of disruption, 
organizations are able to develop flexible back-up systems that engage only when 
needed. In a situation such as a flood (risk source), managers are able to accurately 
discern the consequences to an organization’s supply chain. For example, if flooding is a 
concern for a production facility, the resulting consequence is that production may have 
to cease if a flood occurs. Likewise, if flooding is a concern for a distribution center then 
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trucks will be unable to pick up products and deliver them to customers. In both 
situations, the consequences are predictable, that is specific items will be unavailable for 
a limited amount of time (we assume that most floods are short-term events). With this 
knowledge, managers can build flexibility into the SC and maintain a smooth flow of 
goods. Research has shown that a small amount of flexibility helps the SC garner much 
of the benefits of 100% flexibility (Cachon and Terwiesch, 2009). Honda does this by 
building the Civic at their Alliston, Ontario and East Liberty, Ohio production plants 
(Niedermeyer, 2008). Even if one of the locations is more economical, the redundancy 
allows Honda to protect the production capabilities of one of their best selling 
automobiles.   
 The failure of a commodity supplier is also a type of disruption suitably addressed 
by SC flexibility. In this situation, the probability of failure is lower for a commodity 
supplier than for an innovative supplier, yet the consequences associated with the 
disruption are more predictable. That is, practitioners need to replace commodity 
products. When the focal firm creates SC flexibility, by qualifying alternate vendors, it is 
able to regain quickly a smooth flow of the part. 
 Demand shaping represents a marketing driven form of flexibility used to offset 
the consequences of a SC disruption. Specifically, when an organization runs short of 
inventory, customer service representatives incentivize customers towards the 
manufacturers’ interests. Computer companies, for instance, will offer a deal on an 
alternate component, such as a larger hard drive, rather than pushing the delivery date 
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out. Following this logic, we argue that flexibility is the best strategy for SC facing a low 
probability of disruption and a high predictability of the consequences. The practitioner’s 
conservative stance towards mitigation changes when the predictability of the disruption 
consequences is included within the risk evaluation process. As managers are able to 
better discern how the SC will be impacted by a disruption, they can justify investing in 
certain countermeasures, such as flexibility, with relative confidence. 
 
Risk and Loss Mitigation 
 (Knemeyer et al., 2009) used the term risk and loss mitigation to describe 
activities designed to mitigate catastrophic disruptions. While we like this application, we 
also believe that risk and loss mitigation tactics are appropriate for less severe SC 
disruptions. There is precedence within the RM literature that supports mitigating threats 
with lower probabilities. Norrman and Jansson (2004) affirm that mitigation is 
appropriate when the degree of risk is “medium” or “high," not just “very high.” The 
elevated probabilities imply that the disruptions and the resulting consequences occur 
frequently enough to establish probability estimates. Disruptions such as machine 
breakdowns, power outages, and raw material shortages have predictable consequences 
within an organization’s SC.  
 We advocate the risk and loss mitigation strategy when both the probability of 
disruption and the predictability of the consequence are high. We argue, however, that 
this mitigation strategy is also applicable to minor disruptions such as erratic demand. To 
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address these frequently occurring and highly predictable situations, we suggest that 
organizations need to adopt a SCRM process that encourages managers to collect and 
analyze previous disruption data. Accordingly, our framework’s upper right quadrant 
characterizes situations where both the probability of disruption and the predictability of 
the resulting consequences are high. Because the probability of disruption is high, 
information and frequency data about disruptions is available. Therefore, managers can 
evaluate various safeguards (e.g. inventory and/or redundant capacity) and choose 
countermeasures that support the organization’s risk management strategy. In addition, 
since managers can better predict how the consequences will manifest, they can 
confidently choose the types and quantities of specific countermeasures’. In the case of a 
machine breakdown, information about uptime and downtime allows practitioners to 
calculate appropriate buffer levels, which enable machines to achieve both service level 
and production cost targets. Many SC textbooks offer strategies to establish exact safety 
stock targets (Bowersox, Closs & Cooper, 2002). With a SC strategy focused on risk and 
loss mitigation, an organization is able to address various threats as well as consequences 
and develop a highly efficient system simultaneously. Thereby, managers can change the 
way we prepare for frequently occurring disruptions. 
 
Supply Chain Agility 
 Supply chain agility refers to “the ability to cope with unexpected challenges, to 
survive unprecedented environmental threats, and to take advantage of changes as 
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opportunities.” (Sharifi & Zhang, 1999). From the RM paradigm, organizations should 
use SC agility to cope and adapt to environmental changes created because of a SC 
disruption. We suggest that when operating in the agility paradigm, managers should 
account for disruption consequences. Although, the consequences of disruptions are also 
unpredictable, taking them into account means forcing organizations to design systems 
and processes so they can be amended when the environment changes. Furthermore, 
training activities should empower and encourage employees to adjust systems and 
amend processes when necessary.
 
Therefore, we recommend that SC agility is an appropriate strategy when the 
probability of disruption is high and the predictability of consequences is low. An 
unplanned information technology (IT) outage represents a risk source, while 
email/communication interruptions, delayed orders, and poor customer service are the 
resultant consequences. When the probability of disruption is high, practitioners 
confidently commit resources to offset specific disruption consequences, since 
information about the frequently occurring events is readily available. Frequency data 
enables managers to evaluate the costs and benefits of specific safeguards.  
 To address these unpredictable consequences, we also argue that organization 
should invest in generic countermeasures and organizational adaptation capabilities. 
Backup generators and redundant communication systems are generic safeguards, while 
practices such as integration and cross training enhance adaptation capabilities. Dell 
Computer uses integration to connect with customers and learn about their needs rather 
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than invest in redundant inventory (Magretta, 1998). Integration, by way of agility, 
allows organizations to link with partners and learn about customer needs from the 
relationship. 
 
Supply Chain Resilience 
 The lower left quadrant of our framework exemplifies situations where both the 
probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences are low. Cyber attacks, 
mad cow disease, and terrorist attacks are examples of rare unforeseeable risks that can 
decimate an organization or negatively affect an entire industry.  In these situations, it is 
difficult to predict any sort of resulting consequence (try to identify the consequences of 
the 9/11 terrorist attack). 
 To address these unforeseeable and unpredictable consequences, experts suggest 
that organizations engage in a high level of cooperation and collaboration, i.e., to share 
risks with other SC partners (Christopher & Peck, 2004).
 
Such partners might include 
government agencies and direct competitors, not just suppliers and customers. In 2008, 
when the craft brew industry faced a worldwide shortage of hops (a main ingredient used 
in beer production), the Boston Beer Company established a hop sharing program, 
whereby the company sold hops at cost to the competition(Kroph, 2011). This 
collaborative relationship supported a budding industry through a potentially devastating 
period.  
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 When both the probability of disruption and the predictability of the resulting 
consequences are low, mitigation evaluation techniques fail, as costs will likely surpass 
any perceived benefits. Therefore, managers will rarely invest in inventory buffers or 
redundant capacity, since the safeguards may never be used. We believe both the low 
occurrence probabilities and consequence unpredictability will undermine practitioner’s 
decision confidence.  
 Recent literature suggests that SC resilience may be the appropriate methodology 
to address unforeseeable risks, as traditional RM techniques struggle to deal with hard to 
predict vulnerabilities (Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010). To illustrate, during a cyber 
attack, an organization may have to muster both internal employees and external 
contractors to restore a severely damaged SC. Resilience is the appropriate approach 
since managers may not understand where or how to deploy countermeasures 
(proactively or reactively) within the supply chain. 
 Following this logic, we assert that SC resilience is a preferred strategy when both 
the probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences are low. The term 
resilience reflects the ability of a SC to bounce back or quickly adapt to a new standard 
after a disruption (Rice & Sheffi, 2004). The 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that 
damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor constitutes such a disaster that wreaked 
havoc for numerous supply chains. Resiliency is favored since these types of disruption 
will occur infrequently and when they do, it is difficult to predict the effect of the 
resulting consequences. The disruption characteristics, both infrequent occurrences and 
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uncertain consequences, create a dearth of information about how to mitigate these 
disruptions. To address, we argue that managers should develop organizational 
countermeasure and incorporate a RM perspective into daily work activities. An 
orientation towards disruption prevention and recovery, prepares employees for the 
unknown. By purposefully aligning the business and RM strategies, the organization can 
reinvent itself around its core values (Christopher & Peck, 2004). 
 
Discussion 
Turbo-Charging the Disruption Management Framework: Warning and Recovery 
Capabilities 
 To improve the fit between the recommended SC strategy and the organization’s 
overall RM policy, we suggest leveraging warning and recovery capabilities to 
complement our framework’s prescribed SC strategy. Warning and recovery are two risk 
management capabilities that enable an organization to mitigate the impact of a 
disruption, altogether eliminate a threat, or potentially capitalize on opportunities that 
develop because of a SC disruption (Craighead et al., 2007). 
 
Warning Capabilities 
 Warning capabilities represent the ability both to identify a threat and to 
communicate information about potential or actual disruptions to appropriate parties 
42 
 
(Craighead et al., 2007). Each dimension, identification and communication, requires 
specific resources and practices to enable the capability. Identification involves scanning 
the horizon for the sources of a risk or the consequences resulting from a disruption. In 
certain circumstances, practitioners can identify threats months or years in advance. For 
example, most organizations that import goods from China are aware of and have plans 
to mitigate the effects of the 2-week long national Spring Festival (Chinese New Year). 
The dates of this annual event are set in advance allowing practitioners to plan around 
this disruption. When an extended warning period is present, existing RM frameworks 
perform well. 
 However, other threats, such as a hurricane, are identifiable only days in advance, 
if at all. The real test for an organization’s identification acumen is to recognize a threat 
and its consequences before the disruption occurs. In December 2009, several US airlines 
identified a winter storm (risk source) that threatened the holiday travel season. In this 
case, identifying the threat a few days in advance provided the airlines additional time to 
assess the situation and devise an appropriate mitigation strategy. 
In the best-case scenario, organizations develop identification (identify) abilities 
that allow them to categorize risks and consequences before they happen. To increase the 
amount of time between identification and disruption, practitioners must identify threats 
early by scanning the SC horizon for potential sources of risk. A longer warning period 
provides organizations the opportunity to address, in many cases, both the sources and 
consequences of a SC disruption. Alternatively, in the worst-case scenario, an 
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organization discovers a disruption after it occurs.  This is the reality when organizations 
cannot preemptively identify disruptions such as a fire or an earthquake. In this situation, 
the best possible outcome is to detect the consequences of disruption immediately after it 
occurs. Stated differently, the best the organization can do is to shorten the time between 
when a disruption occurs and when someone detects it. Advanced detection capabilities 
allow an organization time to mitigate the consequences of disruption. Businesses, for 
instance, can monitor the bond rating and stock market price of suppliers to determine the 
risk of bankruptcy. If managers predict that a supplier has financial difficulty, alternative 
vendors can be qualified and selected before the consequences of an actual disruption 
affects the SC or its partners. 
 The second dimension associated with warning capabilities is the ability to 
disseminate information (communicate) about a potential threat or the consequences of an 
actual disruption to all affected parties. Risk managers must communicate information so 
internal and external partners can understand the context of a disruption and initiate 
response activities. Internally, organizations need processes and linkages that 
communicate decisions about credible threats and mitigating actions to others within the 
organization. The objective is to ensure that all employees are working towards the same 
goal.   
Organizations must also be capable of disseminating information about credible 
threats and action plans to customers and external partners. Using the airline/winter storm 
illustration from above as an example, most major carriers flying to the region waived 
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ticket change fees for customers potentially affected by the storm. In this situation, the 
airlines communicated their intentions through postings on their website, network 
television announcements, and direct email notifications, when feasible. This allowed 
customers to adjust travel plans before the storm actually manifested.  
Further, regulatory and other governmental agencies may also require attention 
during certain SC disruption. Organizations may need additional resources and 
communication processes in place to ensure compliance when the law mandates a 
product recall or some such specific action.  
By developing appropriate scanning and communication abilities, an organization 
can enhance its warning capabilities, which reduces the time it take to address properly 
the consequences of a SC disruption. Within the context, we believe that enhanced 
warning capabilities, will improve all four SC strategies recommended by our disruption 
management framework. Scanning provides information so managers can quickly make 
decisions about response activities. Then once a decision has been made, communication 
abilities allow managers to communicate with practitioners responsible for mitigation and 
recovery.  
 
Recovery Capabilities 
 Recovery capabilities are either pre-emptive or reactive interventions designed 
to return the SC to normal (Craighead et al., 2007). Normal refers to pre-disruption levels 
where additional personal and resources are no longer required or when managers 
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reconstitute operations into a new steady state. Pre-emptive recovery happens before 
consequences actually manifest. For example, in 2002, a labor issue halted operations at 
29 west coast ports. When Dell’s management concluded that the port closings were 
imminent (risk source), the company’s logistics team chartered eighteen 747-jet liners. 
Because Dell reacted earlier than its competitors, the company kept its SC moving at a 
cost lower than organizations that did not react as quickly (Breen, 2004. Accordingly, 
pre-emptive recovery efforts allow organizations, like Dell, to mitigate disruption 
consequences. 
 Reactive recovery occurs after a SC disruption actually occurs. A good example 
of this is when, in March 2000, a small fire (risk source) and the resulting smoke and 
water damage (consequences) shut down a plant that supplied microchips to both 
Ericsson and Nokia (Norrman & Jansson, 2004). Nokia immediately contracted with 
alternate vendors and began re-engineering efforts to accommodate substitute chips. 
Ericsson, adopting a different strategy, accepted vendor guarantees that the fire would not 
disrupt shipments. Consequently, Nokia was able to minimize the consequence of the SC 
disruption and return to a steady state. Ericsson, however, was devastated and could not 
return to normal for many months. Here, reactive recovery capabilities enabled Nokia, in 
contrast to Ericsson, to assess the disruption scenario and develop a recovery strategy 
minimizing the consequence.  
When practitioners develop outstanding reactive recovery capabilities, an 
organization can quickly activate and deploy resources immediately after a disruption 
occurs. Moreover, managers, in some case, may be able to initiate response efforts before 
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consequences actually manifest. By deploying the appropriate recovery capabilities, 
managers can potentially reduce the time between the actual disruption and full recovery.  
 
Warning and Recovery Timeline 
To illustrate how warning and recovery capabilities operate within the RM 
continuum we introduce a disruption event timeline (Figure 3). The warning window is 
the period between when practitioners authenticate a credible threat and when the 
disruption occurs. By identifying threats earlier, organizations can increase the warning 
window. This will extend the opportunity to address the sources of risk and/or respond to 
the consequences of disruption. 
 
Figure 3: Disruption Event Timeline 
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We note that, in certain circumstances, there may be no warning window. For 
example, in March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck Japan. In this case, there was 
no warning and hence no warning window. Furthermore, an organization may fail to 
identify a threat altogether. Similar to the situation above, there will be no warning 
window as no one can authenticate the threat before it occurs. In such scenarios, the only 
option available to the organization is recovery. 
Alternately, we define the recovery window as the time between when the 
disruption occurs and when practitioners achieve full recovery. Full recovery is the 
threshold where the organization’s operations return to pre-disruption levels or aligns to a 
new normal.  
We argue that when an organization develops outstanding recovery capabilities, it 
can quickly activate and deploy resources after a SC disruption occurs. Managers, in 
certain situations, may be able to deploy resources before the consequences of disruption 
manifest. In this case, pre-emptive recovery capabilities allow managers to ready 
resources and mitigate the consequential affects of a disruption. Further, when 
practitioners are unable to muster recovery resources before a disruption event, they can 
deploy them immediately following. By positioning the appropriate recovery resources 
and protocols, the organization can potentially reduce the time between when an actual 
disruption event occurs and when achieving full recovery. Both pre-emptive and reactive 
response activities allow organizations to reduce the size of the recovery window. 
Hendricks and Singhal (2003 & 2005) have shown that SC disruptions can negatively 
affect organizations by up to 40% and linger for years. By developing recovery 
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capabilities, managers may be able to show that they quickly returned SC operations to 
normal. Hence, they may be able to lessen the disruptions financial impact.  
 
Enhancing the Chosen Supply Chain Strategy with Warning and Recovery 
Capabilities  
 We suggest that managers use our disruption management framework to select 
one of four SC strategies: supply chain flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, supply chain 
resilience, and supply chain agility. We now describe how managers can enhance their 
SC and RM strategies by developing an organization’s warning and recovery capabilities. 
 
Warning and Recovery with Supply Chain Flexibility 
 In the SC flexibility paradigm, organizations face a situation where the probability 
of disruption is low and the predictability of consequences is high. This suggests that 
disruptions are infrequent events, yet managers have a good understanding of the 
resulting consequences. Previously, we indicated that organizations enable SC flexibility 
by building alternative states into the production and service systems. This is possible, 
because the consequences of disruption are predictable, and therefore managers can 
confidently develop redundant capabilities.  
 Additionally, since the probability of occurrence is low, organizations will prefer 
to invest in redundancy across the SC, rather than costly buffers such as inventory. This 
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is the case, since the probability of utilizing the buffer is low enough to undermine any 
cost/benefit analysis.  
 Warning capabilities provide organizations a method to identify and categorize 
infrequent disruptions/consequences. Practitioners scan reports and the SC horizon for 
warning signals indicating that threat is building or an actual disruption has occurred. 
Additionally, recovery capabilities, allow the organization to switch production capacity 
via standard processes with little loss of time, cost, or performance. Organizations rely on 
pre-emptive recovery practices to optimize the activities associated with moving 
resources between various states when an actual disruption occurs. Together, both 
warning and recovery capabilities strengthen the effectiveness of the flexibility strategy 
to counter infrequent disruptions with predictable consequences.  
 
Warning and Recovery with Risk and Loss Mitigation   
When the probability of disruptions is high and the resulting consequences are 
predictable, our framework recommends a strategy of risk and loss mitigation. In this 
state, both warning and recovery capabilities allow organizations to mitigate the effects 
of a disruption and reduce the amount of time needed for the SC to return to normal. 
Scanning activities such as exception reports provide warning signals specific to potential 
risk sources and actual disruption consequences. These reports act as alerts for out of 
control conditions and function like a statistical process control system. When warning 
signals are unavailable, after-action reports and post mortems provide necessary 
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information to improve pre-emptive and reactive recovery efforts. These practices allow 
practitioners to accumulate and understand data on the sources of disruption and their 
resulting consequences. The frequency data and corresponding probability estimates of 
various consequential scenarios allow managers to make investment decisions about 
countermeasures and response protocols.   
 Further, detecting disruption signals is not difficult, due to the relative stability of 
various threats and consequences. Manager can tune sensing system to recognize specific 
warning signals in both pre- and post-disruption identification scenarios. For example, 
the organization can use exception reports and regularly scheduled teleconferences to 
identify delivery issues with troublesome vendors.   
 Recovery capabilities reflect the organization’s ability to utilize resources and 
lessen the impact of a disruption and/or reduce the amount of time the SC is affected. 
Pre-emptive recovery allows the organization to position inventory at predetermined 
levels before disruption consequences manifest. For example, companies regularly shut 
down machines to clean and perform maintenance. By pre-positioning buffer inventory, 
organizations can maintain sales volume during this planned disruption.   
 Reactive recovery capabilities enable the organization to respond rapidly to a 
disruption and return the SC to a steady state. These abilities are particularly important 
when little or no warning period is available. An emergency command center coordinates 
on-site recovery activities and maintains communications with various parties, including 
51 
 
first responders and government agencies. When linked to a policy of risk and loss 
mitigation, both warning and recovery capabilities are present 
 
Warning and Recovery with Supply Chain Agility 
 Our disruption management framework suggests an agile SC when the probability 
of disruption is high and the predictability of consequences is low. This recommendation 
is particularly sage for innovative organizations that frequently introduce new products or 
have products supported by novel processes. In this paradigm, the customer’s evolving 
requirements and accelerated technological change force organizations to prepare for 
uncertainty by embedding agility into the organization’s culture (Sharifi & Zhang, 1999). 
To accomplish this task, we argue, that organizations should develop both their warning 
and recovery capabilities. Initially, managers should develop efficient processes that 
provide end-to-end visibility. Given the unpredictable nature of disruption consequences, 
practitioners are unable to tune identification and sensing systems to specific parameters. 
Rather, they must design a screening system that captures a spectrum of potential 
exceptions that require additional assessment. Once data is collected, analysts can tease 
out details and make the information compatible with the organization’s learning and 
knowledge transfer systems. This sharing of information allows the organization to 
become more synchronized and agile as it replaces buffers with information. 
 Once organizations enable a spectrum of warning capabilities, then they can 
develop recovery capabilities. Key to both pre-emptive and reactive recovery is the 
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concept of velocity.  As managers identify response strategy, the entire organization may 
need to adapt systems and/or quickly deploy resources. To enable this, managers should 
convey the message that agility requires personal flexibility and small batches, rather 
than economies of scale (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Hamel & Valikangas, 2003). 
 When embracing a strategy of SC agility, the organization also needs to develop 
both their waning and recovery capabilities. However, as agile firms work with 
innovative products that may be more prone to SC disruption, we suggest organizations 
develop higher levels of warning capabilities as compared to recovery capabilities. This 
is the case, as employees will regularly leverage identification and communication 
practices as they work to understand what is happening and which recovery actions are 
necessary.  
 
Warning and Recovery with Supply Chain Resilience 
 Our disruption management framework recommends a strategy of SC resilience 
when both the probability of occurrence and the predictability of the resulting 
consequences are low. We suggest that organizations need both their warning and 
recovery capabilities in order to face unpredictable scenarios with unforeseen 
consequences.   
 When faced with low probability disruptions that manifest unpredictable 
consequences, organizations should leverage their warning capabilities to identify and 
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educate the employees about specific disruption events. Because these events are 
infrequent, practitioners will find it difficult to predict the circumstances surrounding the 
source of a threat or their resulting consequences, as statistical data is unavailable. In 
addition, once identified, risk experts will continue to expend time and resources to 
discern the root cause and resulting consequences. Organizations must also utilize their 
warning capabilities to communicate information about threats to SC partners. Pertinent 
information should be accurate, visible, and accessible to suppliers, customers, 
government agencies, and employees throughout the organization (Christopher &Lee, 
2004).  
 Organizations also need to develop and enable a variety of recovery capabilities. 
Resiliency experts advocate a strategy where employees continuously anticipate, adjust, 
and reinvent the organization based on core values (Hamel &Valikangas, 2003). This 
implies that managers marshal financial, physical, and human resources to minimize the 
negative impact of the resulting consequences. Taken together, practitioners can bolster 
the SC resiliency strategy by developing both warning and recovery capabilities across 
the organization. When aligned with the overall operating strategy, managers can 
leverage these capabilities to strengthen the resilience tactics and mitigate the effect of 
infrequent disruptions with hard to predict consequences. 
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Conclusion 
 After reviewing the relevant SC and RM literature, we identify three gaps 
associated SC disruption management. First, practitioners need a framework that 
incorporates the predictability of disruption consequences. There is scant reference within 
RM literature that explores how disruptions manifest themselves.  By including the 
consequences of disruption, practitioners are better able to understand threats to their 
supply chain. 
 Second, practitioners need a methodology, which aligns the organization’s risk 
characteristics and SC strategies. This follows the advice of several experts who suggest 
developing a RM strategy based on the characteristics of the SC environment (Juttner, H. 
Peck, & Christopher, 2003; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005, Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). We 
believe that by aligning the RM and SC strategies, organizations can better leverage 
existing resources.  
 Third, practitioners can use warning and recovery capabilities to bolster the 
organization’s SCRM strategy. Aligning specific RM capabilities with the SC strategy 
speaks to the “fit” between the organization’s decision environment and the mitigation 
and recovery strategies used throughout the supply chain (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005).  
 In order to address these gaps and develop a comprehensive SCRM process, 
organizations should develop strategies to mitigate the risks associated with a threat and 
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reduce the amount of downtime after a disruption occurs. Most models explore SC risk 
by investigating the sources of disruption or risk drivers identified. While informative, 
these frameworks fail to incorporate a key aspect of SC risk. In particular, few models 
seek to understand the consequences associated with the actual SC disruption.  
 Our framework provides a method to understand SC risk by incorporating both 
the probability of disruption and predictability of the resulting consequences. 
Practitioners may utilize the model to identify an appropriate SC strategy, which offsets 
the inherent nature of uncertainty associated with a specific risk profile. We then discuss 
how managers should develop warning and recovery capabilities as a method to improve 
the fit between the RM process and the organization’s SC strategy. When incorporated 
into a comprehensive RM process, our framework provides guidance on how to approach 
disruption threats and helps organizations align their RM, SC, and overall operating 
strategies.  
 If managers work to align their SC and RM strategies and then develop an 
organizations warning and recovery capabilities, they will bolster an organizations 
overall RM capabilities. In essence, they are creating an organizational culture that 
encourages practitioners to consider SC threats and disruptions regularly.  
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MEASUREING WARNING AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES: CONSTRUCT 
DEVELOPMENT AND MEASUREMETN VALIDATION 
Abstract 
 Risk management experts suggest developing a comprehensive supply chain risk 
management strategy that lowers occurrence probabilities, reduces the impact of 
disruption, and minimizes recovery times so the supply chain can quickly return to a 
steady state. However, after an extensive review of existing risk management literature, 
we find most academic research addresses supply chain risk with redundant inventory 
and/or capacity. While these buffers are appropriate with some supply chain disruptions, 
both practitioners and academics familiar with risk management techniques agree that 
organizations should use a variety of techniques to mitigate supply chain risk as threats 
manifest in various manners. Besides inventory, redundant capacity, and insurance, the 
literature suggests embedding behavior-based risk mitigation tactics into the 
organization’s culture. 
 The purpose of this study is to examine how four behavior-based competencies 
affect the organization’s risk management and performance capabilities. We posit that 
these antecedent competencies improve the organization’s risk management and 
performance capabilities by strengthening the employees’ orientation towards supply 
chain risk. We also develop psychometrically valid measures for two new risk 
management capabilities: warning and recovery. Using qualitative interviews, a 
judgment-based item-to-construct sorting process, and confirmatory factor analysis, we 
establish the reliability and validity of the new measures.   
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 Empirical results indicate that a common vision, organizational learning, and 
supply chain disruption orientation enhance an organization’s warning and recovery 
capabilities. Therefore, managers should develop these cultural competencies as a method 
to improve the organization’s risk management acumen. The evidence also suggests that 
managers must manage routine rigidity; otherwise, the competency may undermine the 
practitioner’s ability to sense and respond to supply chain disruptions. We also find that 
organizations with heightened recovery capabilities have enhanced performance. 
Together, this indicates that organizations can develop behavior-based risk management 
techniques and include them as part of the overall supply chain risk management strategy. 
We argue that this a better way of managing SC risk because it broadens the risk 
management approach and works to develop the employees’ abilities, rather than just 
investing in rarely used buffers and capacity.  
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Introduction 
While research supports the use of behavior-based practices (e.g. Choi and Liker, 
1995; Krause, 1999; Braunscheildel and Suresh, 2009), we find that most RM literature 
leverages mathematical models or conceptual frameworks. Risk management (RM) 
experts assert that organizations can use any number of techniques including buffers, 
capacity, insurance and/or behavioral tactics to manage and mitigate supply chain risk 
(SCR)., whereby each factor has its advantages and limitations, we argue that behavior-
bases practices are the most often undervalued, and yet fill a gap that other RM strategies 
leave open. Behavior-based practices refer to processes, activities, and management 
initiatives designed to lessen a threat’s impact (Eisenhardt, 1989). Managers design the 
practices to influence behaviors not outcomes. Basically, a process should incentives 
practitioners to seek out operational outcomes that are aligned to a higher-level strategic 
objective (Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003).   
 Experts suggest that academics are reluctant to investigate behavior-based SCR 
practices because it is “perceived to be riskier than conceptual or mathematical research” 
(Sohdi, Son and Tang, 2012, p11). We explore these behaviors because we believe they 
can be used to augment most other RM strategies including ones where inventory and 
redundant capacity are not cost effective. For example, a disruption like the 9/11 terrorist 
attack is both rare and catastrophic in nature. Here behavior-based RM techniques, as 
compared to a buffer such as inventory, enable practitioners to adjust to the 
circumstances of specific disruption consequences and drive towards returning the SC to 
a steady state.  
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 We also believe a lack of valid and reliable measures makes it difficult to conduct 
behavior-based RM research. Only a few operations management researchers have 
developed reliable risk measures, including Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) who 
operationalized measures for the magnitude and probability of supply disruption. 
Likewise, Tucker (2004) categorized interruption, delay, risk, and losses as dimensions of 
failure and measured actions that affect nursing patient outcomes. By developing new 
measures, we fill this gap and allow managers to benchmark their RM capabilities against 
established targets.  
 Therefore, we investigate behavior-based competencies and capabilities as a 
method to manage SCR. These techniques allow managers to develop the processes and 
practitioners associated with SC and RM activities. When properly embedded, these 
tactics influence the processes associated with an activity, rather than just the outcome(s) 
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987). Thus, when managers develop their RM strategy they are 
investing in the organization’s employees and structures, not just resource intensive and 
rarely used measures like inventory or capacity.   
  We also aim to operationalize two empirically valid RM measures: warning and 
recovery capabilities. Warning capabilities speak to the organization’s ability to scan the 
SC horizon for threats and then communicate information about those threats to partners 
(Craighead et al., 2007). Recovery refers to pre-emptive and reactive response tactics 
enabling the organization to return to the SC to normal (Craighead et al., 2007). After 
operationalizing the measures, we answer three research questions: First, do warning and 
recovery capabilities explain organizational performance? Second, do certain 
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competencies affect the behavior-based warning and recovery capabilities? Finally, does 
information quality mediate the relationship between the antecedent competencies and 
the RM capabilities? By answering these questions, we intend to show that managers can 
develop behavior based competencies and capabilities as a means to enhance an 
organization’s RM acumen and performance. 
 To address these questions, we develop measures for warning and recovery 
capabilities. We empirically validate the questions and the survey instrument using 
qualitative feedback multiple item-to-construct sorting procedure (Q-sort), confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA), and survey data collected from procurement professionals. 
 Once measures are developed, we examine the linkages between the four 
competencies: common vision, supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO), 
organizational learning, and routine rigidity, and the two RM capabilities, warning and 
recovery. By investigating both the direct and indirect linkages between the internal 
competencies and external facing capabilities, we provide evidence about the affect of 
specific behavior-based competencies as RM devices. For the indirect effects, we look at 
the mediating variable information quality. By researching how the information quality of 
messages affects the relationship between the competencies and RM capabilities, we 
provide guidance for managers as they communicate with practitioners throughout the 
organization. 
 Lastly, we investigate the relationships between the warning and recovery 
capability constructs and organizational performance. Specifically, we establish a linkage 
from the four competencies, through the two RM capabilities, to organizational 
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performance. This provides evidence about how the RM capabilities affect the overall 
organization. Without evidence supporting this relationship, managers may not value 
behavior-based practices as part of their RM strategy.   
 
Outline of the manuscript  
 We review the extant RM, SC, and high reliability theory literature and define our 
terms in section 2. In section 3, we introduce an initial model and specific hypotheses. 
Within section 4, we attend to the methodology and statistical analysis. In section 5, we 
introduce an alternate model supported by concise hypotheses. We devote section 6 to 
our research findings and a discussion of pertinent limitations. Finally, in section 7, we 
conclude with future research opportunities and predictions of how our theory changes 
the culture of SCRM. 
 
Literature Review 
 In the following section, we establish the theoretical foundation for our study of 
behavior based SCRM practices. We introduce high reliability theory and then discuss 
risk, supply chain risk, and supply chain risk management. Lastly, we review warning 
and recovery capabilities and converse about the various dimensions reflected within the 
two RM constructs.       
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High reliability theory (HRT) 
 We leverage high reliability theory (HRT) as our theoretical lens as it provides a 
framework on how to operate a complex system such as a SC safely and profitably. 
Proponents of HRT theory argue that organizations can stave off accidents indefinitely by 
designing and managing systems that emphasize reliability rather than just efficiency. 
Rochlin, LaPorte, and Roberts (1987) coined high reliability theory when describing how 
aircraft carriers could operate safely in the face catastrophic risks. Early high reliability 
researchers investigated aircraft carriers (Rochlin et al., 1987; Weick and Roberts, 1993), 
submarines (Bierly and Spender, 1995), and nuclear power plants (Roth, 1997).  Now 
researchers use the theoretical frame for lean management (Marley, 2006), emergency 
decision-making (White, Turoff, and Van de Walle, 2007) and SC safety research 
(Speier, Whipple, Closs, and Voss, 2011).   
 Researchers classify an organization as highly reliable when it is able to maintain 
an exemplary safety record over long periods (Roberts, 1990). Hence, highly reliable 
organization’s “are complex systems in which many accidents and adverse events that 
could occur within those systems or at the interfaces with other systems are actually 
avoided or prevented” (Bagnara, Parlangeli , and Tartaglia 2010, 713). While reliability 
from an engineering perspective refers to a component or system that performs 
repetitively, high reliability focuses on the continuous management of fluctuations 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 1999). Hollnagel (1993) views this formulation of 
reliability as an extension of adaptive human cognition and action research. 
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 While some advocates stress systems reliability above all else, for most highly 
reliable organizations the goal is a combined state of performance and safety (La Porte 
and Consolini, 1991). The danger associated with these systems force organizations to go 
to great lengths to avoid failure. To achieve this goal, managers design the organization 
around resiliency and redundancy, manage in a decentralized manner that encourages 
improvisation, and develop a culture that encourages employees to make decisions when 
necessary (Weick et al., 1999). In addition, mindful practitioners manage these systems 
by learning from errors/near misses and avoiding simple interpretations that lead to 
mishaps (Weick et al., 1999). 
 Several of the theory’s characterizations align with the aims of this investigation. 
Initially, we seek to understand how antecedents, such as common vision, supply chain 
disruption orientation, organization learning, and routine rigidity, affect the proposed 
warning and recovery capabilities. We believe these competencies are similar to key high 
reliability theory characterizations. Common vision and SCDO, for instance, speak to the 
beliefs the management embed into the organization’s culture. Common vision represents 
the management’s view on strategic goals, while SCDO reflects the SC operational 
objectives. When embedded correctly, employees derive energy and purpose to pursue 
strategic (common vision) and operational (SCDO) objectives (Braunscheidel and 
Suresh, 2009). 
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Supply chain risk 
 Before we can talk about SCR, we need to define risk itself. Risk refers to the 
probability and significance of a loss that affects an individual or organization (Harland, 
Brenchley, and Walker, 2003). Managers should note risks “that can modify or prevent 
part of the movement and efficient flow of information, materials and products between 
the actors of a supply chain within an organization or among actors in a global supply 
chain” (Lavastre, Gunasekaran, and Spalanzani, 2012, p. 830). 
 Tangential to the notion of risk is the concept of risk taking. Ho (1996) 
investigates risk taking to understand how managers perceive risk (risk taking, risk 
neutral, or risk averse) when making decisions about manufacturing strategy. Risk taking 
reflects the manager’s beliefs about the riskiness of the environment. Similarly, 
Jambulingam, Kathuria, and Doucette (2005) measure strategic risk taking in the service 
environment. Here, risk-taking represents the manager’s orientation towards taking action 
to achieve organizational goals. The researchers, in both investigations, assume that the 
risk taking posture of managers influences the organization’s strategy and future 
direction. We support this logic and argue that the perceptions of risk, rather than just 
objective measures, drives behavior when making decisions about future operations (Ellis 
et al., 2010). 
 Supply chain risk (SCR) refers to unplanned and unpredictable events that 
negatively affect one or more parties within a supply chain (Deloitte, 2004). These 
variations can affect “the information, material, and product flows from original supplier 
to the delivery of the final product for the end user” (Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003, 
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p.203). Risks are classified in many forms including natural and manmade (Sheffi, 2009), 
low probability-high consequence (Knemeyer, Zinn, and Eroglu, 2009) and internal and 
external (Christopher and Peck 2004). Furthermore, some researchers categorize SCR 
into risk types: organizational, network, and environmental (Jüttner et al., 2003). 
Organizational risks result from information technology, labor, and production 
uncertainties. Network risks develop because of poor integration between SC partners. 
Environmental disruptions result from natural disasters and socio-political uncertainty.  
 
Supply chain risk management  
 Supply chain risk management (SCRM), describes how organizations and SC 
partners manage risks through a coordinated approach to reduce the impact of threats 
(Cranfield,2003). RM experts suggest developing systems that avoid, postpone, mitigate, 
hedge, control for, or transfer risk to others (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Organizations 
must also account for the risk-seeking or risk-adverse attitude of practitioners managing 
SC processes (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Research suggests that risk attitudes affect the 
RM strategy selected and the risks taken by an organization. For example, Pablo (1999) 
found that managers view and interpret risk differently depending on industry. When 
taken together, an organization’s SCRM strategy should attempt to both reduce the 
probability of occurrence and the impact of disruptions. After reviewing the extant 
literature, we believe there is not a single strategy to mitigate all SC risks. Therefore, we 
recommend that managers should develop several strategies that address potential risk, 
complexity, and overall SC goals.  
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Warning capability 
 One of the key SC capabilities we focus on in this study is warning capability, 
which refers to coordination of resources to scan for, detect, and communicate 
information about pending or actual SC disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007). When 
practitioners scan for and identify threats, they should use available time to assess the 
probability of occurrence and the impact of resulting consequences. Organizations can 
then deploy the appropriate mitigation and recovery resources and communicate actions 
to other SC partners.   
 Communication capabilities speak to the organization’s information sharing 
abilities. We suppose that communication activities are important as they enable 
practitioners to prepare for and recover from a SC disruption. This occurs as the 
organization and its SC partners are able to initiate response strategies or communicate 
changes about specific actions to partners.  
 
Recovery capability 
 The second capability pivotal to our study is recovery capability, which reflects 
an organization’s ability to mitigate the impact of a disruption and to decrease the time it 
takes to return supply-chain functions to normal. Normal refers to a state where 
operations return to pre-disruption levels or a new standard brought about by 
circumstances and managerial directive. Further, Craighead et al. (2007) divide recovery 
capabilities into two components: pre-emptive and reactive. Pre-emptive recovery extols 
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collaboration and coordination efforts before a SC disruption occurs, while reactive 
recovery alludes to post-event response efforts.  
 
Pre-emptive recovery 
 Organizations can identify threats before a SC disruption manifest, which defines 
pre-emptive recovery strategies. When this occurs, managers may be able to mitigate the 
impact of a disruption or eliminate a threat altogether. We define mitigation as actions 
designed to reduce the consequences of a disruption. The reduction potential depends on 
the type of disruption, consequences anticipated, resources marshalled, and the amount of 
time until the disruption occurs. We note that pre-emptive recovery differs from warning 
capability, as the later speaks to identification or communication capabilities..  
 
Reactive recovery 
 Craighead et al. (2007) define reactive recovery capabilities as the coordination of 
physical and human resources to overcome the slowing or stoppage of the supply chain. 
After a disruption occurs, we submit that organizations actively work to return their SC 
operations to normal. Thus, practitioners will collaborate with SC partners and coordinate 
recovery resources, in efforts to minimize recovery times.   
 The consequences of disruption can occur immediately after a disruption 
manifests or after some time has passed. Hurricane consequences, for example, occur in 
phases. Initially wind generates damage before the actual storm makes landfall, while 
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storm surge inundates the shoreline as the hurricane moves from ocean to land. Finally, 
depending on the movement of the storm, additional inland flooding can occur. 
 
Proposed Model and Hypothesis Development 
 The conceptual tenets of high reliability theory frame the hypothesized 
relationships found within our proposed model (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1- Base Model 
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Theoretical model 
 We develop a theoretical model that has four antecedent competencies, one 
mediating variable, two RM capabilities, and organizational performance. The four 
antecedents, common vision, SCDO, organizational learning, and routine rigidity, 
represent competencies that inform the organization’s orientation and culture. Warning 
and recovery reflect organizational RM capabilities. Information quality mediates the 
relationship between the intra-organization competencies and the organizational RM 
capabilities. Lastly, organizational performance serves as a proxy for financial and 
operational performance. 
  
Proposed relationships 
 We will now define these terms within the literature to gain a conceptual foothold 
to better understand what is to follow, our proposed relationships and mediations between 
the competencies, capabilities, and performance. 
 
Common vision (CV)  
 A common vision is collection of high-level objectives, which provide employees 
with purpose and energy to pursue the organization’s goals (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 
2009).  Executives should embed the common vision into the organization’s culture, so 
employees can commit to these high-level objectives without direct incentives. To do so, 
executives communicate the common vision and their beliefs about why the vision 
important on a regular basis. “Sharing and communicating a common vision is the first 
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step in lasting change, but to be more than just words, it must be married with proper 
support and regular monitoring” (Dillon, 2010, p. 18). 
 
Supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO) 
 A supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO) speaks to an attitude or 
organizational characteristic concerning how thinking about and managing risks can 
minimize downtime and improve performance during SC disruptions. Bode, Wagner, 
Petersen, and Ellram (2011) refer to SCDO when describing an organization’s general 
awareness, concern for, and recognition of SC disruptions. Pertaining to the warning 
construct, SCDO reflects an employee’s alertness and preparedness. This includes the 
way practitioners seek out and communicate information about SC threats. For recovery 
efforts, SCDO feeds response practices both before and after disturbances occur. 
 
Organizational learning (OL) 
 Organizational learning refers to the way internal employees learn from 
experiences (Sinkula, 1994). Said differently, as positive and negative interactions occur, 
organizations use learning routines to transform their experiences into knowledge, so new 
understanding alters the way the organization conducts itself in the future.  
 
Routine rigidity (RR) 
 Gilbert (2005) discusses routine rigidity when decomposing organizational 
inertia. The concept suggests that during periods of disturbance, the inertia of the 
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organization inhibits adaptation and undermines employee’s response efforts.  
Zimmermann (2008), for instance, describes how the New York Stock Exchange 
executives refused to change when electronic trading threatened the exchange’s 
existence. Zimmermann found that managers clung to traditional routines, rather than 
embracing automated electronic trading.  Hence, employees entrenched themselves and 
adhered to what they knew, rather than developing strategies to address threats. Said 
differently, practitioners hesitate as they are uncertain about how to respond, or if they 
have the authority to respond. 
 
Information quality 
 Information quality refers to the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, reliability, 
and adequacy of data and/or information (Monczka, Petersen, Handfield, Ragatz, 1998; 
Li and Lin, 2006). Instruments measuring information quality seek to understand 
message quality as they pass between two entities such as employees (Zhou and Benton, 
2007). Research has shown that information quality degrades as time passes between 
creation and consumption (Feldmann and Müller, 2003; Mason-Jones and Towill, 1997). 
Opportunism drives practitioners to distort, disguise, or otherwise obfuscate transaction 
information (Williamson, 1985). “To reduce information distortion and improve the 
quality of information shared, information shared has to be as accurate as possible and 
organizations must ensure that it flows with minimum delay and distortion” (Li and Lin, 
2006, p. 1643). 
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 The four competencies, common vision, supply chain disruption orientation, 
organizational learning, and routine rigidity, reflect organizational orientations and 
represent the social learning mechanisms that help align the top management’s view to 
lower level operational activities. (Atuahene-Gima and Ko, 2001). With high reliability 
theory as our theoretical lens, we suggest managers can manipulate the competencies to 
affect an organization’s ability to learn from mistakes and near misses (Weick et al., 
1999). Hence, we submit that managers can direct the organization’s orientation and 
influence business outcomes. By extension, we reason that learning enables a positive 
change in behavior (Sinkula, 1994). 
 
Formal hypotheses: Relationships with SCRM capabilities  
Leveraging the generally accepted paradigm that competencies are antecedents to 
capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Roth and Jackson, 1995), we hypothesize that 
three competencies, common vision, SCDO, and organizational learning, positively 
influence warning and recovery capabilities. We further suppose that routine rigidity 
negatively influences both of the organization’s RM capabilities.  
 Within our model, we include information quality as a mediating variable that 
affects the relationship between three antecedent competencies and the proposed RM 
capabilities. McDowell and Karriker, (2009) insist that further research is necessary to 
understand the mediating effect of information quality, as it is an important component of 
communication and performance practices.  
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 Lastly, model #1 illustrates how the two RM capabilities positively affect 
performance. We put forth that organizations should develop behavior-based RM 
capabilities, like warning and recovery capabilities, in order to improve performance. Our 
perceptual measures serve as a proxy to performance. We now introduce our formal 
hypothesis and the rational underpinning our arguments. 
 
Relationship between common vision and the organizational SCRM capabilities 
(H1A-B) 
 We suppose that the common vision provides guidance on how employees should 
conduct themselves. This applies to established routines used during non-disruptive 
periods and to situations where practices must be adapted to address an unfamiliar 
environment caused by a SC disruption. Thus, we postulate that a well-communicated 
and properly embedded common vision will positively affect both an organization’s 
warning and recovery capabilities.  
 
Warning capability 
 When considering warning capability, the common vision should shape how 
employees scan for and communicate information about SC threats. By emphasizing 
these characteristics in daily activities and messages, employees can commit time and 
resources to developing these abilities. However, if managers do not call attention to SC 
threat detection within the common vision, then employees will be less invested and lack 
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the capabilities to identify or communicate information about SC disruptions. Hence, we 
propose:  
H1A-Organizaitons with higher common vision levels of will have higher warning 
capability levels.  
 
Recovery capability 
 For recovery capabilities, a common vision cultivates the organization’s response 
efforts by encouraging employees to return the SC to normal in the shortest possible time. 
Additionally, managers should use the common vision to guide employees when they 
face unfamiliar conditions that manifest because of a SC disruption. Specifically, if 
management emphasizes that recovery is important to the organization, employees will 
develop adaptive methods to speed response efforts. This follows Hays and Hill (2001), 
who suggest that employees embrace experimentation and risk taking when 
management’s guidance is unavailable. High reliability theory proponents highlight the 
organization’s resiliency and its ability to adapt during recovery. However, if managers 
fail to emphasize response objectives, we believe practitioners will prepare less for SC 
disruption consequences. Thus, we propose the following: 
H1B-Organizaitons with higher common vision levels will have higher recovery 
capability levels. 
 
Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and the 
organization’s RM capabilities (H1C-D) 
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 We investigate information quality as messages pertaining to the organization’s 
vision, move from executives to employees. Typically, executives communicate their 
beliefs both verbally and in written form (Baum, Locke, and Kirkpatrick, 1998). If the 
messages carrying the common vision are high quality, employees will better understand 
the organization’s needs both before and after a SC disruption. Prior research indicates 
that practitioners will have improved confidence and decision-making capabilities 
(Raghunathan, 1999). However, if the common vision conveying message has poor 
information quality, then practitioners may misunderstand their directive. This may delay 
communication and response activities. 
 
Warning capability 
 In the warning capability context, high information quality should improve a 
practitioner’s understanding of objectives as they pertain to scanning for and 
communicating information about SC threats. We hypothesize that managers can 
influence an employee’s understanding of goals by improving the quality of the warning 
capability messages. In other words, managers can strengthen the relationship between 
common vision and warning capability by enhancing the quality of communications. 
Hence, we offer the following: 
H1C-Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and warning 
capability. 
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Recovery capability 
 We also put forward that information quality affects the relationship between the 
common vision and recovery capability constructs. In this context, recovery capability 
speaks to an organization’s ability to respond to a SC disruption. If the information 
quality of the recovery messages is high, employees will think about and incorporate 
previous lessons learned into future response tactics. With pertinent information about 
incidents, practitioners can quicken resource deployment. In addition, clear messages 
outline the objective of rebuilding the SC in a timely manner. Hence, employees develop 
practices to hasten response. From this foundation, we offer the following hypothesis: 
H1D-Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and recovery 
capability. 
 
Relationship between supply chain disruption orientation and the organizational 
SCRM capabilities (H2A-B)  
 To improve the organization’s ability to deal with SC disruptions, research 
suggests that managers should develop a RM strategy that includes an understanding of 
the dimensions of SC risk and tune the mitigation approaches to the organization’s 
environment and culture (Chopra and Sohdi, 2004; Faisal, Banwet, and Shankar, 2006). 
This implies having an orientation towards understanding SC threats and the techniques 
to mitigate actual disruption. To embed a SCDO into an organization, managers should 
incorporate a SCRM perspective into operational communications and activities. This 
includes threat scanning, disruption analysis, and response processes. In addition, the 
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SCDO should encourage the organization to develop partnerships to deal with risk 
cooperatively rather than take on SC risk by themselves. Like portfolio theory, in which 
financiers seek to minimize risk by selecting a variety of offsetting stocks, a group of SC 
partners can address risk cooperatively. When viewed through the high reliability theory 
lens, this is designing the SC for resiliency and thinking about SC risks. 
 When an orientation toward considering SC disruption exists, everyone from the 
Chief Executive Officer to the mailroom clerk, develops a risk posture and is mindful of 
potential disruptions. At high levels of SCDO, organizations are active and strive to learn 
from experiences (Daft and Weick, 1984). Proponents suggest that highly reliable 
organizations will learn from mistakes by digesting previous experiences and using the 
knowledge to prepare for future disruptions (Roberts, 1990). Conversely, organizations 
with low SCDO levels are passive and slow to respond to disruption. 
 Evidence suggests that by developing their SCDO, organizations can improve 
their level of preparedness. Bode et al. (2011), for instance, found that a SCDO motivates 
the organization to seek out buffering and bridging relationships with SC partners. They 
also found that prior disruption experience affects the SCDO level within an 
organization. Prior experience refers to the occurrence of a SC disruption within the past 
12 months (Bode et al., 2011). Therefore, as the number of events increases, so does the 
experience level. 
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Warning capability 
 We argue that when SCDO levels are high, that organizations are motivated to 
act. This motivation empowers employees to seek out and make sense of anomalies 
within the SC (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). In the warning context, this occurs when 
employees communicate regularly with partners or seek to understand information. In 
essence, SCDO enhances the organization’s scanning and communication practices. 
Hence: 
H2A-Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher warning capability levels. 
 
Recovery capability 
 With respect to recovery capability, a SCDO encourages employees to minimize 
damage and downtime. From this perspective, we suggest that SCDO allows 
organizations to respond and adapt to the resulting consequences of a SC disruption. 
Leveraging high reliability theory thinking, practitioners use practice and simulation to 
refine emergency protocols. Refinement includes better resource placement and the 
identification of timesaving steps within processes. With infrequently used response 
processes, practice provides the only hands on experience until an actual disruption 
occurs.  
 A key aspect of high reliability theory is a culture that promotes responsiveness 
and vigilance (Weick et al., 1999). We see this cultural imperative similar to the cautious 
and observant attitude embodied with the SCDO competency. We believe this posture 
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allows organizations to respond to and recover from SC disruptions. Hence, we 
hypothesize the following. 
H2B-Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher recovery capability levels. 
 
The mediating effect of information quality on the relationship between SCDO and 
the organization’s RM capabilities (H2C-D) 
 As the SCDO provides awareness of, concern for, and recognition of SC 
disruptions (Bode et al. 2011), managers should develop specific goals and objectives on 
how to address certain SC disruption scenarios. This provides employees a standard to 
strive for during their daily work activities. Previous research illustrates that when 
management addresses specific hazards, the larger organization is willing to think about 
and see hazards (Westrum, 1988). 
 Additionally, managers should state their support for individual improvisation and 
employee empowerment. This shows that practitioners can act, without retribution, 
during a disruption. “If people are blocked from acting on hazards, it is not long before 
their ‘useless’ observations of those hazards are also ignored or denied, and errors 
cumulate unnoticed” (Weick et al., 2008, p.37. 
 
Warning capability 
 In order for practitioners to understand the SCDO, management should regularly 
communicate their views about the SC and SC disruption. We state that if the quality of 
these messages is high, then practitioners who are mindful will have an enriched 
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awareness and distinctive concern for their organization (Weick et al, 1999). However, if 
the information quality of these communications is poor, then practitioners may fixate on 
routine activities without concern for SC disruptions (Weick et al, 1999). From this 
perspective, we offer the following hypothesis: 
H2C-Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and warning 
capability. 
 
Recovery capability 
 We also put forward that information quality mediates the relationship between 
the SCDO and recovery capability construct.  In this case, a message of SC resilience 
should flow from management to employees (e.g. purchasing, logistics, warehousing, 
etc.). We define resiliency as the “capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they 
have become manifest” (Wildavsky, 1991, p. 77).   
 From the high reliability theory perspective, resiliency suggests that organizations 
and their extended SC absorb the shock of disruption. Organizations do this by forming 
ad-hoc groups that solve problems when they arise. Management activates these informal 
groups during periods of uncertainty and allows them to supplement the normal hierarchy 
(Rochlin, 1989; Bourier, 1996). These groups “allow for rapid pooling of cognitive 
knowledge to handle events that were impossible to anticipate” (Weick et al, 2008, p. 47).   
 If the resiliency message from management has poor information quality, then 
practitioners may fail to form these ad-hoc groupings when necessary. Likewise, 
potential members, with specific talents and/or knowledge may hesitate to join. 
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Conversely, if the information quality of messages is high, the ad-hoc groups will form 
and dissolve as needed. This occurs because employees believe they have management’s 
support to improvise and recombine available recourses to address a SC shock. Hence, 
we propose the following: 
H2D-Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and recovery 
capabilities. 
 
Relationship between organizational learning and the organizational SCRM 
capabilities (H3A-B)  
 Organizational learning enables practitioners to collect new information and then 
use the knowledge to change future behaviors so the organization can survive and 
succeed (Klimecki & Lassleben, 1998).When viewed through an high reliability theory 
lens, a preoccupation with failure and learning from mistakes/near misses enables 
practitioners to prepare for SC disturbances by planning for and thinking about 
disruptions. When managers believe that new practices will benefit the organization, the 
employee’s organizational learning should be nurtured (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Using 
this frame, we argue that organizational learning also represents the ability to modify 
behavior, based on new knowledge and/or novel insight. 
 In the SC disruption context, practitioners leverage organizational learning when 
new information about disruptions becomes evident. Simulation and stress tests are 
techniques used to gather information about SC disruptions. Managers utilize output of 
these tests to develop new approaches for both warning and recovery efforts.  
85 
 
 Organizations also learn from actual occurrences, including mistakes. 
Practitioners analyze after-action and post-mortem reports to understand what efforts 
worked and what led to suboptimal outcomes. When practitioners analyze these data, the 
findings provide information that makes organizations more confident about future 
actions (Bell, Whitewell, & Lucas, 2002). Therefore, we hypothesize the following:  
H3A-Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher warning 
capability levels. 
H3B-Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher recovery 
capability levels. 
 
The mediating effect of information quality on the relationship between 
organizational learning and the organization’s RM capabilities (H3C-D) 
 The concept of organizational learning suggests that organizations extract 
information from the environment, integrate it into the organization, and then change 
future behavior. When considering the relationship between organizational learning and 
the RM capabilities of warning and recovery, we believe that the level of information 
quality will affect both the speed and depth of which an organization learns. When high 
information quality is available, we affirm that practitioners can better identify, 
communicate information about, and respond to SC threats, because they can confidently 
connect data pertaining to a SC disruption from multiple sources. By improving an 
analyst’s confidence, they are able to make decisions earlier and provide more detail to 
response agents. This affords time to develop and deploy an appropriate response 
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strategy, which may mitigate or even eliminate the SC threat altogether.  When 
information quality is poor, we assert that practitioners will hesitate to amend current 
warning or recovery practices. From a high reliability theory perspective, information 
quality is an important antecedent to “evidence based decision making” and “individual 
improvisation.”  Without quality information, practitioners may hesitate at the most 
crucial moment. From this position, we offer the following hypotheses:  
H3C-Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and 
warning capabilities. 
H3D-Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and 
recovery capabilities. 
 
 We note that the base model also contains additional relationships that we do not 
explore at this time. For example, there is a three-path relationship from common vision 
to INFOSHR to WARN and then to PERF. Both INFOSHR and WARN mediate the 
relationship. 
 
Relationship between routine rigidity and the organizational SCRM capabilities 
(H4A-B) 
 Next, we discuss routine rigidity, a term coined, along with resource rigidity, as a 
dimension of organizational inertia (Gilbert, 2005). In this context, routine rigidity 
described how practitioners within organizations were unable to change behaviors when 
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faced with change (Gilbert, 2005). We extend the concept into our research and suggest 
that practitioners, when facing a SC disruption, are exposed to routine rigidity.  
 
Warning capability 
 We emphasize that routine rigidity inhibits the organization’s ability to identify 
and communicate information about threats to SC partners (internally and externally). 
This occurs as employees adhere to existing protocols, rather than create unique 
approaches when faced with the uncertainty of a SC disruption. From this reasoning, we 
offer the following hypothesis.      
H4A-Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower warning capability 
levels. 
 
Recovery capability 
 Recovery capability speaks to how an organization responds to a period of 
discontinuity such as a SC disruption. Routine rigidity is present when employees have 
difficultly deviating from existing processes. We believe routine rigidity goes beyond 
individuals pushing back from change.  Rather, employees within an organization refuse 
to experiment with existing processes. Therefore, when discontinuities are present, 
employees find it difficult to adapt (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Therefore, we offer 
the following: 
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H4B-Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower recovery capability 
levels 
 
Relationship between warning capability and recovery capabilities (H5) 
 According to Craighead et al., (2007) when organizations properly uses their 
warning capability to detect and communicate pertinent information about disruptions, 
they may be afforded time to inoculate themselves from the negative effects of a SC 
disruption. Essentially, there is time to develop a mitigation strategy and deploy resources 
to offset disruptions. Therefore, warning capability also affects the organizations ability 
to respond to a disruption. Hence, we offer a hypothesis linking the two organizational 
RM capabilities. 
H5-Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher recovery 
capability levels. 
 
Relationship between the organizational RM capabilities and performance (H6A-B) 
 We evaluated organizational performance with three perceptual measures: market 
share, operating cost, and service quality. The interviewees involved in the qualitative 
interviews process confirmed that procurement professionals would be able to respond to 
perceptual questions about these concepts. Most practitioners consider market share to be 
a primary business success measure, while operating cost reflects practices designed to 
improve asset availability, efficiency, and quality (Challis and Samson, 1996). In 
addition, service quality is a common measure within most organizations. We ask 
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respondents to rate their organization’s market share, operating cost, and service quality 
as compared to the competition. 
  
Relationship between warning capabilities and organizational performance (H6A) 
 The high reliability theory literature suggests that by quickly adjusting practices 
that an organization can maintain its competitive advantage. In this context, warning 
capability reflects the organizations ability to seek out SC threats and communicate 
information about the threats to partners. Scanning provides information about 
disruptions and educates practitioners on how to best respond. This includes the 
immediate positioning of resources and the long-term development of new capabilities.  
In addition, organizations communicate information about upcoming disruptions to 
employees within the organization and to external partners that are unfamiliar with 
existing strategies and practices.  The information embedded within messages should 
contain enough detail to insure comprehension by the receiving partner. 
 From this perspective, if an organization has high waning capability levels, we 
believe that they will be able to scan the SC horizon and allow for the early threat 
identification.  Early identification provides time in which the organization can 
reconfigure tactics and reposition resources in the effort to thwart pending SC 
disruptions.  Further, we believe that once an organization identifies a threat, that 
managers can use their communication skills to exchange information about upcoming 
threats to relevant partners.  Therefore, we incorporate the scanning and communication 
abilities into the waning capability construct and offer the following:  
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H6A-Organizations with higher waning capability levels will have higher levels of 
performance. 
 
Relationship between recovery capabilities and organizational performance (H6B) 
 Practitioners should use recovery capability to deploy human and physical 
resources and develop tactics to mitigate the effects of a SC disruption. Pre-emptive 
recovery occurs before an actual disruption, while reactive recovery occurs after the 
disruption becomes evident. According to the literature, high reliability theory enables 
organizations to learn from previous accidents and near misses and to change future 
behaviors.  To this end, the organization can build and defend its competitive advantage 
by developing recovery capability better than the competition. 
 When organizations are able to identify threats before a disruption occurs, they 
are afforded time to respond.  Pre-emptive recovery allows organizations to reduce or 
eliminate the impact of a SC disruption altogether. Practitioners seek to understand how a 
threat is manifesting itself and then alters the configuration of resources and operational 
tactics.  
 Reactive recovery capabilities enable organizations to react to SC disruptions 
after they occur.  The ability to react quickly is important when a SC disruption event 
offers no warning or when practitioners are unable to foresee the occurrence. During 
reactive periods, practitioners evaluate how a threat is manifesting and marshal the 
appropriate resources to counteract specific consequences. For example, in 1989, work 
crews repaired the eastern span of the Bay Bridge  after the Loma Prieta earthquake 
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damaged it just over a month earlier (Citizendia.org).  The California Department of 
Transportation executives worked with contractors to determine the quickest way to 
repair and reopen the earthquake-damaged bridge that transported thousands of 
commuters daily between San Francisco and Oakland, California.  
 We incorporate both pre-emptive and reactive response capabilities into the 
recovery capability construct and offer the following hypothesis.  
H6B-Organizations with higher recovery capability levels will have higher levels of 
performance. 
 
 We summarize the proposed hypotheses in Table 1 and then describe the 
methodology employed to operationalize the various constructs and test the related 
hypotheses. 
Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses- base model 
Item Hypothesis
H1A Organizations with higher common vision levels of will have higher warning capability levels
H1B Organizations with higher common vision levels of will have higher recovery capability levels
H1C Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and warning capability.
H1D Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and recovery capability.
H2A Organizations with higher SCDO levels will have higher warning capability levels 
H2B Organizations with higher SCDO levels will have higher recovery capability levels 
H2C Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and warning capability.
H2D Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and recovery capability.
H3A Organizations with higher organizational learning levels will have higher warning capability levels
H3B Organizations with higher organizational learning levels will have higher warning capability levels
H3C Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and warning capability.
H3D Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and recovery capability.
H4A Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower warning capability levels 
H4B Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower warning capability levels 
H5 Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher recovery capability levels.
H6A Organizations with higher waning capability levels will have higher levels of performance.
H6B Organizations with higher recovery capability levels will have higher levels of performance
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Instrument Development 
 We leverage Noar’s (2003) construct development process. Starting with existing 
definitions and measures, we adapt multiple questions for each construct. TABLE 2 
identifies the dimension and originating authors. See appendix A for a complete list of 
survey questions. 
 
Common vision 
 For the common vision measurement items, we draw from existing SC (Spekman, 
Kamauff, and Myhr, 1998) and logistics research (Stank, Keller, and Closs, 2001/2002). 
To reiterate, a common vision reflects the strategic alignment of an organization and its 
suppliers. Managers can improve the organization’s common vision by improving clarity 
within planning activities and developing mechanisms to share responsibility. From this 
starting point, we adapt our survey questions to reflect the common vision concept within 
organizations. See questions 1-4 in appendix A.  
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Table 2- Constructs, dimensions, and originating authors. 
Construct Dimension Authors
Common Vision Strategic vision
Spekman, Kamauff, and Myhr, 
1998 
Strategic vision Stank, Keller, and Closs, 2001
Strategic vision Stank, Keller, and Closs, 2002
Organizational 
Learning 
Learning environment, learning processes, 
and reinforcing leadership
Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino, 
2008
Supply Chain 
Disruption 
Orientation (SCDO) Encouraging employees to act
Bode, Wagner, Petersen, and 
Ellram, 2011
Routine Rigidity Organizational rigidity Gilbert, 2005
Organizational inertia Viellechner and Wulf, 2010
Information Quality
Accuracy, adequacy, completeness, 
reliability, and timeliness
Li, Rao, Ragu-Nathan, and Ragu-
Nathan, 2005
Warning Capabilities Identify and communicate Craighead et al., 2007 
Early and late warning Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998 
Discovery Hays and Hill, 2001 
Monitoring Grover and Malhotra, 2003 
Communication Chen and Paulraj, 2004 
Communication Chen, Paulraj, and Lado, 2004 
Proactively detect, interpret, and report Hall and Citrenbaum, 2009
Identify/mitigate threats in advance Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2009 
Recovery 
Capabilities Proactive and reactive response Craighead et al., 2007 
Engaging responses, assets and capabilities Olavarrieta and Ellinger, 1997
Response agility Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998
Recovery expectations and performance
McCollough, Berry, and Yadav, 
2000
Early involvement
Koufteros, Vonderembse, and 
Doll, 2001
Practice recovery behaviors de Jong and de Ruyter, 2004
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Supply chain disruption orientation 
 We adapt measurement items for SCDO from a study that investigates response 
efforts during periods of disruption (Bode et al., 2011). SCDO works as a motivating 
force encouraging employees to act when there is mismatch between information needs 
and what is available. We envision that this construct is similar to learning from mistakes 
and near misses, a base construct from high reliability theory. If an organization cannot 
overcome the cultural barrier of learning from their mistakes, then practitioners will limit 
their problem solving potential. See questions 5-8 in appendix A. 
 
Organizational learning 
 Questions pertaining to the organizational learning construct originate from 
Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino (2008). In this article, the authors provide a tool kit to 
determine “if yours is a learning organization.” We phrase questions to tap three key 
organizational learning dimensions: supportive learning environment, learning processes, 
and reinforcing leadership. See questions 9-12 in appendix A. 
 
Routine rigidity 
 Gilbert (2005) conceives routine rigidity along with the resource rigidity 
construct. Measures attempt to understand why employees are reluctant to change 
processes and routines when transformation is necessary. Within the literature, few 
questions reflecting routine rigidity are available. Therefore, we generate statements 
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based on Viellechner and Wulf’s (2010) work as they sought to understand inertia within 
the airline industry. In their work, Viellechner and Wulf investigate the causal factors of 
routine rigidity. See questions 13-16 in appendix A. 
 
Information quality 
 We adapt measurement items for the information quality construct from Li et al. 
(2005). These researchers use five items to evaluate the quality of information shared 
with partners. We interpret this as external trading partners such as raw material suppliers 
and outside service providers. From this research, information quality dimensions include 
accuracy, adequacy, completeness, reliability, and timeliness. We alter the original 
questions to address information quality from an intra-organization perspective. See 
questions 17-19 in appendix A. 
 
Warning capability 
 We adapt the measures for warning capability from the concept of discovery 
(Hays and Hill, 2001) and monitoring (Grover and Malhotra, 2003) to tap the construct’s 
identification dimension. Also, we derived questions concerning communication from 
Chen and Paulraj (2004) and Chen, Paulraj, and Lado (2004).  The communication 
measurement items focus on “events or changes that may affect the other party.”  We 
adapt them to refer to the internal communication between the disaster command center 
and other intra-organization departments and employees. See questions 20-23 in 
appendix A. 
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Recovery capability 
 We develop the measures for recovery capabilities based on McCollough, Berry, 
and Yadav’s ( 2000) work on recovery expectations, Koufteros, Vonderembse, and Doll’s 
(2001) work on early involvement, and de Jong and de Ruyter’s (2004) work on 
proactive recovery behaviors.  To insure that we capture both the pre-emptive and 
reactive dimensions of recovery, we create items that looked at pre- and post-disruption 
response efforts. We also add control measures pertaining to the organization’s command 
center, to determine how these entities affect SC disruption management.   
 When designing warning and recovery practices, managers need to keep four 
overarching principles in mind. First, the organization’s communication infrastructure 
significantly affects how practitioners communicate information internally and across the 
supply chain. Managers should design warning and recovery systems to insure quick 
communication of pertinent information to appropriate personnel. This includes methods 
of transmission, protocols on how to categorize and handle SC threats, and escalation 
procedures for unexpected threats.  Second, practitioners should refine their scanning, 
communication, and recovery activities with real-world testing. While training and 
practice may be the only opportunity for rare events, actual use during a SC disruption 
with structured feedback is the best method to improve capabilities. Smith (2011) 
suggests that scenario planning and simulations are important techniques to test strategies 
and plans. Third, while there is no way to eliminate all false positives, managers should 
attempt to minimize their effect (Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998). This requires extensive 
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communication and a keen understanding about disruption probabilities. Without 
sustained communication efforts, organizations will experience a loss of faith as false 
positives undermine the entire SCRM strategy. Finally, individuals involved with both 
warning and recovery efforts should be free of organizational inertia or the influence of 
the corporate culture (Smith, 2011). When biased by management or political initiatives, 
information about SC disruptions may degrade and slow warning and recovery efforts. 
See questions 24-27 in appendix A. 
 
Research Methodology 
Expert review 
 To establish face validity of the study’s definitions and measures, we reviewed 
concepts with several practitioners and academic experts (Anastasi, 1988). These 
informants validate our thinking with item-to-concept sorting procedures (Q-sorts) and 
qualitative feedback on measure wording and model design. During Q-sorting 
procedures, respondents spoke to incomplete definitions, misleading concepts, and the 
Qualtrics.com survey instrument. After adjusting questions based on the Q-sorts, we then 
asked procurement professionals to review the survey instrument. This study’s primary 
investigator directed the interviews and asked clarifying questions. We recorded the 
interviews and made changes to the final survey instrument based on the experts input.  
 Between April and November 2012, we interviewed six procurement 
professionals from several industries. We asked interviewees about the hypothetical 
model, survey questions, and proposed hypotheses. Procurement director #1 works at in a 
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large medical center, procurement director #2 and #3 are employees at a large retailer. 
Procurement director #4 works at a medium-size university and procurement professional 
#5 is a supply corps officer. Additionally, we were able to interview a procurement 
manager from a large retailer.  
 
Unit of analysis 
 For this study, the unit of analysis is the strategic business unit (SBU). We 
postulate that while managers develop RM strategies at the organizational level that 
employees within the SBU shape the strategy for deployment and execution. Therefore, 
we collect survey data from one respondent within the SBU. In particular, procurement 
directors and buyers provide data about the intra-organization competencies, RM 
capabilities, and their perception of performance.  
 
Data collection 
 We collected pilot data from procurement directors at university-affiliated 
hospitals. Initially, we sent an email survey and a gift card incentive to 938 hospital 
professionals. This netted 49 useable responses or 5.2% of the sample frame. Based on 
the results we reduced the number of questions and amended several unclear statements.   
 For the full survey, we sampled 2,700 procurement professionals from multiple 
industries. A breakdown of the respondents is included in Figure 2. Empanelonline.com, a 
market research company, administered the survey and collected 358 responses. Market 
research panels allow researchers to control their data collection efforts, by screening and 
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validating panel participants (Ayyagari, Grover, and Purvis, 2011; Carter, 2012). “When 
used in conjunction with appropriate screening questions, these features help prevent 
sampling and statistical conclusion errors by ensuring that researchers have access to 
appropriate sample frames for their studies and can acquire adequate sample sizes and 
response rates” (Carter, 2012, p. 208). See appendix B for a full description of 
Empanelonline.com’s data collection procedures. 
  
Figure 2: Respondent profile  
 Of the 358 responses, 137 respondents were not eligible to complete the survey 
because they could not adequately respond to the survey’s themes (less than 50 percent of 
respondent’s time was devoted to procurement/purchasing activities) or their organization 
Yes 165 < $100,000 8
No 43 $100,000 - $499,999 27
$500,000 - $1 Million 50
$1-10 Million 61
VP or above 41 $10-25 Million 34
Director 52 $25-99 Million 17
Manager 72 >$100 Million 11
Senior Buyer 12
Buyer 14
Analyst 8 < $5 Million 14
Other 5 $5-49 Million 41
$50-99 Million 37
$100-499 Million 49
< 1 Year 0 $500-999 Million 30
1-5 Years 22 $1-10 Billion 26
6-10 Years 69 >$10 Billion 10
11-15 Years 48
15-19 Years 38
20-25 Years 19
>25Years 9
Annual Total Revenues (REVENUE)
Annual Purchasing Spend (SPEND)
Years of Experience (TENURE)
Command Center (COMMAND)
Position with the Firm (RANK)
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was too small (less than 50 employees within their organization). This left us with 221 
survey responses. 
 
Sample size 
 Before collecting any data for this research, we calculated the sample size to 
ensure adequate power to detect the relationships within this study. Initially, we followed 
the standards set by Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001). Their calculations require three 
key inputs: alpha level (t), estimate of standard deviation in the population (s), and an 
acceptable margin of error for mean being estimated (d). We selected an alpha level of 
0.01. This conservatively accounts for the level of risk that the researcher is willing to 
accept. We used the standard deviation estimate suggested by Bartlett of 1.167. This 
conservative figure estimates the standard deviation for a 7-point scale. Lastly, we used 
0.21 as the acceptable margin of error for the estimated mean. This represents the number 
of options within a scale multiplied by the acceptable margin of error a researcher is 
willing to accept. 
   = 
           
    
 = 
                   
         
 = 204.925 or approximately 205 respondents. With 206 
valid responses, we have exceeded the minimum suggested requirements. 
 
Missing data  
 We tested the original data to determine if the omitted variables are missing 
completely at random (MCAR). Using Little’s test, we conclude the data is MCAR (Chi-
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Square = 410.366, DF = 432, Sig. = 0.766). Hence, we replace any missing data using 
EQS version 6.1. With less than 1 percent, we follow the advice of Tabachinek and Fidell 
(2007) and use expectation-maximization (EM) imputation to estimate missing variables. 
 
Preliminary analysis 
 We screened the data to identify unusual responses, which resulted in the 
rejection of thirteen (13) responses (eight were excluded due to “straightlining,” two were 
excluded for unusually short response time (less than 40 seconds), and three were 
excluded because the majority of the questions were unanswered. Then, using 
Mahalanobis distance values to evaluate multivariate outliers, we removed two responses. 
Using EQS 6.1, we confirmed that the degree of multivariate skewness (Mardia, 1970) 
was also excessive. A normalized Mardia’s estimate of 52.07 indicates positive and 
significant multivariate kurtosis. When we removed two (2) outliers, and the Mardia 
estimate dropped to 47.36. We conducted a preliminary analysis on the remaining data, 
including tests for outliers and kurtosis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The final sample 
resulted in 206 responses or 12.98 percent of the potential respondent pool. 
 Even with two outliers removed, we consider the data non-normal. Therefore, we 
use the robust estimates available in EQS 6.1. This method allows users to analyze non-
normally distributed data with covariance based SEM techniques. Robust methods use 
Satorra-Bentler  
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Chi-square estimates (Satorra and Bentler 1988). In addition, we provide standard errors, 
CFI, and RMSEA from SEM output based on Bentler’s (1995) calculations. Byrne (2006) 
insists the robust methodology is valid, even though the data violates the normality 
assumption. Chou, Bentler, and Satorra, 1991) have confirmed, via simulation, that 
robust methods yield accurate estimates. 
 
Common method bias 
 Podsakoff, McKenzie, and Podsakoff (2012) refer to common method bias 
(CMB) when describing the systematic variance introduced into research by the 
measurement method. Researchers should address this phenomenon as it can affect the 
relationship between constructs. In particular, CMB can distort construct reliability 
estimates (Bagozzi 1984) and the relationship parameter estimates (Podsakoff et al. 2012) 
 Researchers should attend to the CMB phenomenon during measurement design. 
When done proactively, investigators are able to lessen the influence of the measurement 
method. Initially, we employ multiple rounds of Q-sorting and pretesting to eliminate 
wording ambiguity associated with specific questions.  Procedurally, we changed the 
anchors within the survey instrument in order to eliminate common scale properties 
(Podsakoff et al., 2012).  
 Further, as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2012), we also tested the measurement 
instrument statistically. We employed both the latent factor and marker variable test to 
identify method bias. (See Appendix C for full results.) Using the method factor test, we 
identified four items, organizational learning1, warning capability-1, information quality-
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1, and SCDO1, indicating potential bias. For each item, the method factor accounted for 
21.2 percent, 31.1 percent, 28.9 percent, and 32.9 percent of the total variance, 
respectively. We further assess these findings by comparing the S-B X
2
 of the original 
model as compared to the model where the method factor was included (Byrne 2006). 
We found the change in S-B X
2
 to be significant at p<0.001. This indicates that additional 
common variance was accounted for, when the method factor was included. 
 The marker variable test showed similar results. In this case, we compare the 
average variance extracted (AVE) of the original model to the AVE of the model where 
the marker variable is included. In total, the AVE decreased from 0.677 (original model) 
to 0.594 (model with marker variable). Thus, both the method factor and marker variable 
test indicate that common method bias is present within our data set. We, therefore, take 
the conservative approach and control for the method bias in subsequent analyses. 
 
Non-response bias 
 Non-response bias occurs when respondents that failed to answer a survey 
provide significantly different answers than respondents that did complete a survey. 
Applying the logic of Armstrong and Overton (1977), we compare early and late 
responders. For this, we compare the means for three control variables: years of work 
experience (WORK), annual revenue spent (SPEND), and annual revenue (REVENUE). 
Table 3 below indicates that we did not find discernible differences between early and 
late respondents. We conclude that non-response bias is not a significant problem. 
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Table 3: Tests of Non-Response Bias 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis 
 Using Menor and Roth’s (2007) methodology, we employ confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) to assess the unidimensionality, reliability and validity (convergent and 
discriminant) of the proposed measures. Table 4 illustrates the unidimensionality and 
reliability of the proposed measures. Given that the X
2
 statistic was significant, we follow 
MacCallum’s (1990) advice and evaluate the absolute and incremental fit indices. Using 
EQS version 6.1, we calculate and report several fit measures in Table 4. We compared 
the CFI to the generally accepted guideline value of 0.90. In addition, all of the SRMRs 
were below the best practice standard of 0.08. We also report RMSEA values for each 
construct and note that several are above 0.08, which suggests mediocre fit (MacCallum, 
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Recently, Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, (2011) suggested 
Work Experience (WORK) Mean Std. Dev. t-stat p-value (2-tail)
Early Respondents (N=15) 3.47 1.06
Late Respondents (N=15) 3.87 1.06
Annual Spend (SPD) Mean Std. Dev. t-stat p-value (2-tail)
Early Respondents (N=15) 3.6 0.99
Late Respondents (N=15) 3.27 1.75
Annual Revenue (REV) Mean Std. Dev. t-stat p-value (2-tail)
Early Respondents (N=15) 3.87 0.92
Late Respondents (N=15) 3.27 1.71
Tests of Non-Response Bias
0.31 0.76
0.53 0.6
0.24 0.81
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that RMSEA values should not be computed for low degree of freedom models, as they 
found the incremental fit calculation overinflated the resulting RMSEA values.  
 
 Table 4: Unidimensionality and reliability of warning and recovery capabilities 
 To evaluate the measure’s reliability, we use the CFA standardized factor 
loadings to calculate composite reliability and average variance extracted (AVE) values. 
In this context, “reliability refers to the extent to which the questionnaire is free from 
measurement error” (Baroudi and Orlikowski, 1987, p. 10). Bagozzi and Yi (1988) 
suggest that researchers compare the calculated composite reliability values to a standard 
of 0.70. All measures, including those for warning and recovery capability, exceed this 
guideline. With over 70% of the variance estimating the true score variance, the evidence 
indicates that the measures reliably reflect the constructs of interest. Further, we compare 
the AVE to the best practice value of 0.50 (See Table 5). We surmise that the measures 
account for the constructs variance rather the error. Both the AVE and the composite 
reliability figures suggest that the measures accurately reflect the proposed constructs. 
Item # of items CFI RMSEA SRMR Cronbach's Alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted
Common Vision 4 0.956 0.148 0.035 0.878 0.88 0.695
Organizational 
Learning
4 0.988 0.071 0.025 0.885 0.886 0.705
DSRC 8 0.924 0.108 0.052 0.927 0.928 0.671
Routine Rigidity 4 0.925 0.243 0.07 0.847 0.855 0.657
SCDO 4 1.00 0 0.01 0.847 0.855 0.657
Information Quality 3 1.00 0 0 0.874 0.888 0.757
Warning Capability 4 0.945 0.179 0.062 0.881 0.878 0.693
Recovery Capability 4 0.986 0.090 0.023 0.855 0.862 0.667
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Table 5: Measurement properties of reflective constructs 
  
Items
Common 
Vision
Supply Chain 
Disruption 
Orientation
Org 
Learning
Routine 
Rigidity
Information 
Quality
Warning 
Capability
Recovery 
Capability Performance AVE
Common Vision-1 0.726
Common Vision-2 0.801
Common Vision-3 0.797
Common Vision-4 0.761
SCD0-1 0.68
SCD0-2 0.649
SCD0-3 0.737
SCD0-4 0.674
Organizational Learning-1 0.637
Organizational Learning-2 0.813
Organizational Learning-3 0.766
Organizational Learning-4 0.794
Routine Rigidity-1 0.729
Routine Rigidity-2 0.688
Routine Rigidity-3 0.887
Routine Rigidity-4 0.784
Information Quality-1 0.767
Information Quality-2 0.757
Information Quality-3 0.792
Warning Capability-1 0.645
Warning Capability-2 0.689
Warning Capability-3 0.857
Warning Capability-4 0.9
Recovery Capability-1 0.729
Recovery Capability-2 0.729
Recovery Capability-3 0.722
Recovery Capability-4 0.71
Performance-1 0.626
Performance-2 0.76
Performance-3 0.764
0.634
0.693
0.667
0.695
0.645
0.705
0.657
0.757
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 We evaluate the convergent validity by inspecting the magnitude and sign of the 
standardized loading factors (see Table 6). All loadings factors appear to be directionally 
appropriate (concurrent validity). In addition, the average variance extracted (AVE) for 
each construct is exceeds > 0.50 the suggested guidelines found within literature (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981). This inspection suggests the proposed measures exhibit convergent 
validity.  
 
 
Table 6: Correlations
1
 square root of average variance extracted (AVE)
2
 and chi-square 
differences
3 
 ()
4
  
1. Correlations bottom left triangle 
2. Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) on diagonal. This converts the 
AVE to the standard deviation scale, so it can be compared to correlations located 
in bottom left triangle. 
3. Satorra-Bentler differences top right triangle (SBDIFF.exe) 
4. Negative correlations between factors 
  
  
Items
Composite 
Reliability
AVE #of items Items
Common 
Vision
Organizational 
Learning
Warning 
Capability
Recovery 
Capability
Routine 
Rigidity
SCDO
Information 
Quality
Performance
Common Vision 0.880        0.695    4 CV 0.83          30.31 1.66 36.64 43.93 42.41 37.99 20.31
Organizational Learning 0.886        0.705    4 OL 0.87          0.84                   32.06 38.41 39.14 38.17 27.16 21.36
Warning Capability 0.878        0.693    4 WC 0.76          0.70                   0.83                9.16 61.01 34.95 26.21 36.85
Recovery Capability 0.862        0.667    4 RC 0.81          0.82                   0.92                0.82                40.82 28.68 48.98 16.4
Routine Rigidity 0.855        0.657    4 RR (0.01)         (0.17)                  0.09                0.01                0.81        46.08 30.78 54.27
SCDO 0.846        0.645    4 SCDO 0.73          0.68                   0.72                0.70                0.05        0.80           47.71 38.26
Information Quality 0.888        0.757    3 IQ 0.74          0.59                   0.77                0.78                0.10        0.78           0.87                   35.79
Performance 0.795        0.634    3 PERF 0.84          0.84                   0.75                0.85                0.09        0.69           0.76                   0.80                   
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 Finally, we explore the scale’s discriminant validity.  We assess the multi-items 
scales by estimating 42 models (21 constrained and 21 unconstrained) and calculating the 
X
2
 difference for nested models (Satorra and Bentler, 2001) (See Appendix E for input 
and output variables). Since our data set is non-normal, we use the scaled Satorra-Bentler 
chi-square values (S-B) within the EQS 6.2 software. We calculate the S-B X
2
 differences 
using the scaled difference procedure prescribed by Bryant and Satorra (2012). The S-B 
X
2
 difference tests were executed between the constrained model (correlations between 
factor pairs constrained to one (1)) and the unconstrained model (correlations between 
factor pairs are allowed to correlate freely). We also produced a third set of models to 
estimate the scaling correction factor.  Bryant and Satorra (2012) provide this correction 
to accurately calculate the S-B X
2
 differences.  
 When comparing factor pairs, we expect significant differences between 
constrained and unconstrained models. Two relationships do not show significant 
differences at the P <0.001 value, hence they are not unique constructs (common vision - 
warning capability and warning capability - recovery capability). Particularly concerning 
is the lack of difference (S-B X
2
difference of 9.16) between the warning capability and 
recovery capability constructs. This indicates that the two constructs are not significantly 
different. We further confirm this finding by evaluating the correlation between the 
warning capability and recovery capability constructs. At 0.917, the evidence suggests 
these are not unique measures. Therefore, we cannot conclusively establish discriminant 
validity between the warning capability and recovery capability constructs. 
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Alternate Model 
As the warning and recovery capability constructs are not unique, that is due to a 
lack of discriminant validity, we offer an alternate model (Figure 3). In the new 
representation, warning and recovery represent two dimensions of an organization’s 
disruption sensing and response capability. The warning dimension speaks to the 
organization’s ability to scan the SC for anomalies and then to communicate information 
about threats to partners. The recovery dimension addresses an organization’s response 
capabilities. Specifically, they call attention to preemptive recovery, which takes place 
before an actual disruption occurs, and reactive recovery for response initiatives that 
occur after a SC disruption has manifest. Taken together, disruption sensing and response 
capability reflects a multi-dimensional construct of how an organization addresses SC 
disruption 
 As in the first model, the alternate model also has the same four antecedent 
competencies, one mediating variable, information quality, one capability level construct 
representing disruption sensing and response capability, and organizational performance. 
Specifically, the four competencies, common vision, SCDO, organizational learning, and 
routine rigidity, reflect an organization’s orientation. Disruption sensing and response 
capability is representative of the organizational RM capabilities. Information quality 
mediates the relationships between the intra-organization competencies (common vision, 
SCDO, organizational learning, and routine rigidity) and the organizational RM 
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capabilities. The performance construct represents the practitioners’ perception of 
financial and operational performance. 
  
    
 Figure 3- Alternate Model 
 
Relationship between common vision and disruption sensing and response 
capability (H1A)  
 As noted above, executives use a common vision to provide insight on how to 
manage an organization. The messages should highlight key objectives and show how 
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attaining goals aligns with an employee’s belief system. When managers properly 
communicate the common vision, practitioners are motivated to pursue the organization’s 
objectives without direct incentives. 
 When considering the relationship between the common vision competency and 
disruption sensing and response capability, executives should outline why scanning, 
communicating, and responding to SC disruptions is paramount. This includes written 
and verbal communications about how managing SC risk is good operationally and 
financially. We avow that addressing SC disruption within the common vision allows 
practitioners to understand how RM leads to better service, balanced operations, and 
steady shareholder value (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003, 2009). 
 We suppose that highly reliable organizations seek a more balanced approach 
emphasizing long-term safety, improvisation, and redundancy, along with cost 
management (for non-profits) or profits (for profit organizations). Further, we believe 
that executives must clearly communicate the common vision messages to employees if 
they are to develop a reliable organization. From this position, when organizations 
properly develop the common vision competency, we believe they will have improved 
scanning, communication, and response abilities. Thus, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H1A-Organizaitons with higher common vision levels of will have higher disruption 
sensing and response capability levels. 
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The mediating affects of information quality on the relationship between common 
vision and disruption sensing and response capability (H1B) 
 As executives communicate their vision to employees, they need to insure the 
information quality of the messages. Without high information quality, employees may 
misunderstand the intent and fail to link key objectives to personal beliefs. While 
information quality has been researched as a mediator (e.g. Pearson, Tadisina and 
Griffin, 2012 or McDowell and Karriker, 2009), its affect on abstract communications 
such as a common vision is absent within literature. Therefore, we advise that 
information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and the disruption 
sensing and response capability construct.  
 From a high reliability perspective, employees need a foundation from which to 
act. Executives need to outline, within the common vision, the organization’s goals as 
they pertain to SC disruption. When done, executives empower employees to respond 
quickly and without fear. Ultimately, when quality common vision messages flow 
throughout an organization, we envision that they help reduce confusion and frustration, 
which enhances organizational success (Huber and Daft, 1987). Thus: 
H1B-Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and 
disruption sensing and response capability 
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Relationship between supply chain disruption orientation and disruption sensing 
and response capabilities (H2A) 
 Managers should establish a supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO) to 
ensure that practitioners have a concern for and the motivation to act upon SC disruptions 
(Bode et al., 2011). While stemming from management’s communication, SCDO is an 
operations level posture that affects the culture of an organization. Thus, employees are 
encouraged to think about and seek out behaviors that are disruptive. When viewed with 
an high reliability theory lens, a SCDO is similar to situational awareness. Situational 
awareness refers to an employee’s perception of their environment, which helps 
comprehend the current situation, and envision future states (Endsley, 1995; Weick et al., 
1999)  
 We imagine that a SCDO should complement an organization’s disruption sensing 
and response capability by motivating practitioners to seek out and respond to various SC 
threats. For the warning dimension, we embrace Daft and Weick’s (1984) view that 
organizations can develop competencies to scan their environment, interpret, and then act 
upon various phenomena. When employees understand that uncertainty is present, they 
can tune scanning systems to seek out anomalies.  
 For the disruption sensing and response capability recovery dimension, a SCDO 
motivates an organization towards SC stability using its recovery capabilities. (Bode et 
al., 2011). With this posture, organizations develop abilities to withstand SC disruptions. 
When experienced, employees interpret, adapt, and quickly overcome manifest 
consequences. Thus: 
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H2A-Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher disruption sensing and 
response capability levels. 
 
The mediating affects of information quality on the relationship between SCDO and 
disruption management capabilities (H2B) 
 Messages outlining a SCDO provide guidance to operators on how to perform 
both before and after a SC disruption. Executives should construct these communications 
with high information quality, so practitioners understand and embrace the messages. 
Otherwise, operators may not be motivated to seek out potential threats and quickly 
respond to actual disruptions. 
 From a high reliability theory perspective, SCDO is analogous to mindfulness, 
where practitioners are preoccupied with failure, sensitive to operations, and committed 
to resilience. If mangers fail to outline the organization’s SC goals, then practitioners may 
hesitate and delay actions that either mitigate disruption consequences and/or return the 
SC to normal. Further, the information quality of these messages must be paramount, as 
confusion may drive practitioners to sub-optimal solutions.  
 The existing literature suggests that organizations can enhance performance when 
managers improve the information quality of organizational processes (Preuss, 2003). We 
postulate that this is true within SC networks where practitioners gather information from 
multiples sources and make time sensitive decisions. Hence, we offer the following 
hypothesis: 
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H2B-Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and disruption 
sensing and response capability 
 
Relationship between organizational learning and disruption sensing and response 
capability (H3A) 
 Organizational learning reflects an organization’s ability to extract information 
about a phenomenon, digest it, and alter future behavior. In high reliability theory 
vernacular, organizations learn from experimentation (Rochlin, 1993), trial-and-error 
(LaPorte and Consolini, 1991), and adaptive learning (Weick et al., 1999). We argue that 
organizations with high levels of organizational learning competency will have improved 
disruption sensing and response capability levels.  
  We envision that organizations use experimentation and trial-and-error to 
develop the warning dimension of the disruption sensing and response capability 
construct. Even with routine activities, experimentation and trial-and-error allows 
practitioners to develop their warning tactics as outcomes change over time. This is 
particularly true as managers’ experiment with different SC configurations, changing 
linkages and relationships as needs change. 
 Additionally, we liken adaptive learning abilities to response practices used to 
restore the SC to normalcy. As disruptions occur, SC practitioners should address the 
disruption with mitigation and response tactics.  Adaptive learning allows the 
organization to learn on the fly and adjust, as the situation requires.  
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 Further, as an organization develops its reliability capabilities, it should expect a 
reduction in the number of disruptions. Therefore, highly reliable organizations should 
develop a preoccupation with failure, where practitioners recognize “that all of the 
potential failure modes into which the highly complex technical systems could resolve 
themselves have yet to be experienced” (Schulman, 1993, p. 364). Thus, we imagine that 
managers can develop organizational learning abilities as a means to improve the warning 
and recovery abilities, which develops an organization’s disruption management 
capabilities. Thus: 
H3A-Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher 
disruption sensing and response capability levels. 
 
The mediating affects of information quality on the relationship between 
organizational learning and disruption sensing and response capability (H3B)  
 Organizations use organizational learning techniques to enhance understanding 
(Damanpour, 1991), influence behavior (Huber, 1991), improve problem solving (Senge, 
1990), and boost overall performance (Matsuno and Mentzer, 2000; Hult, Ferrell, and 
Hurley, 2002). Practitioners can then use the knowledge acquired from these processes to 
develop improved disruption scanning and response systems. However, in order to 
benefit from organizational learning initiatives, organizations must be able to gather high 
quality data from different information systems and partners. When high information 
quality material is available, organizational learning practices enhance organizational 
processes and shorten the time associated with learning a new process. If information 
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quality is low, then practitioners and the organization will struggle to learn as information 
becomes available. Thus: 
H3B-Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and 
disruption sensing and response capability. 
 
Relationship between routine rigidity and disruption sensing and response 
capability (H4) 
 The extant literature suggests that employees are subject to routine rigidity when 
embedded processes are hard to amend (Teece et al. 1997). As this construct was born 
from the organizational inertia literature, the strength of routine rigidity grows as an 
organization’s size increases. This occurs as employees become accustomed to a 
particular response, especially during uncertain periods. Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) 
indicate that overcoming routine rigidity is difficult, because employees perceive cultural 
pressure. 
 Previous research also suggests that certain organization types can overcome 
routine rigidity. Bala and Venkatesh (2007), for example, found that nondominant firms 
(compared to dominant firms) experienced less routine rigidity, because the routines used 
depended on the partner’s relationship type. Stated differently, employees changed 
processes when dealing with different partners. They also found that non-adaptive 
organizations were unable to overcome routine rigidity (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). 
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 We speculate that in uncertain times, employees will embrace routine rigidity and 
diminish the disruption sensing and response capability levels within an organization. 
Specifically, we purpose that larger organizations will experience higher levels of routine 
rigidity as social inertia inhibits experimentation. Conversely, smaller organizations, 
adept to adaptation, should experience less routine rigidity as employees are used to 
adaptation. From this rationale, we hypothesize that routine rigidity negatively affects 
disruption sensing and response capability. However, due to the inertia effect on the 
routine rigidity construct, we propose a moderated effect that varies depending on 
organization size. Similar to previous research, we use annual revenue as a proxy for 
organizational size (Bajwa, Lewis, Pervan and Lai, 2005). Hence, we offer the following 
hypothesis: 
H4-Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower – disruption sensing 
and response capability levels. 
 
Relationship between disruption sensing and response capabilities and 
organizational performance (H5) 
 When decomposing the disruption sensing and response capability construct, we 
find that organizations should develop abilities to scan the SC horizon, communicate 
information about threats, and make possible both preemptive and reactive response 
tactics. Leveraging the high reliability perspective, this suggests that by developing 
certain RM practices that organizations can mitigate SC threats and minimize the impact 
of actual SC disruptions. However, in order to manage these competing goals, highly 
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reliable organizations as are preoccupied with failure, sensitive to operations, and 
committed to resilience. We put forward that by doing so, an organization can also 
improve its level of performance. Hence, we offer the following:   
H5-Organizations with higher disruption sensing and response capability levels will have 
higher levels of performance. 
 
 We summarize the proposed hypotheses in Table 7 and discuss the control 
variables in section 5.3. Then, we describe the CFA methodology for operationalizing the 
disruption sensing and response capability construct and conducting tests of the 
hypotheses 
120 
 
 
Table 7: Summary of Hypotheses- alternate model 
 
Control variables 
 We include four control variables in this research: command center 
(COMMAND), organization rank (RANK), years in position (TENURE), and annual 
purchasing spend (SPEND). Participants involved in the exploratory interviews spoke 
regularly about the activation of a COMMAND during SC disruptions. A command 
center allows organizations to respond to SC disruptions in a centralized manner. Within 
a command center environment, we believe that managers can allocate resources and 
make decisions because more and higher quality information is available.  We also 
believe it important to control for RANK and TENURE as it should affect understanding 
of SC disruptions. Previous research suggests that experience affects a practitioner’s 
Item Hypothesis
H1A
Organizaitons with higher common vision levels of will have higher disruption 
sensing & response capability levels
H1B
Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and 
disruption sensing & response capability levels
H2A
Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher disruption sensing & 
response capability levels 
H2B
Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and disruption 
sensing & response capability levels
H3A
Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher 
disruption sensing & response capability levels
H3B
Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and 
disruption sensing & response capability levels
H4
Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower disruption sensing 
& response capability levels 
H5
Organizations with higher disruption sensing & response capability  levels will 
have higher levels of performance
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behaviors and decision making (Daft and Weick, 1984; Roberts, 1990; Bode et al., 2011). 
By extension, we assume that higher ranked and tenured practitioners will have more 
experience with SC disruptions and the tools to manage them. Finally, SPEND is 
included as a proxy for organizational size.  
 
Confirmatory factor analysis for alternate model 
 With the CFA analysis, we assess the unidimensionality, reliability, convergent 
validity and discriminant validity of the proposed measures. See Table 8 for a summary 
of findings Table 9 for specific item measurement properties. We assess the scale’s 
unidimensionality by creating models for each measure. Using the CFI as an indicator of 
fit, we find that all CFIs are greater than the generally accepted cut-off value of 0.90. In 
addition, SRMR values fall below the 0.08 standard. We also report RMSEA values for 
each construct and note that several are above 0.08, which suggests mediocre fit 
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Recently, Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, 
(2011) suggested that RMSEA values should not be computed for low degree of freedom 
(df) models, as they found the incremental fit calculation overinflated the resulting 
RMSEA value. Therefore, the results indicate that all items loaded appropriately. 
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 Table 8- Unidimensionality and reliability of measures including disruption sensing and 
 response capability 
Item # of items CFI RMSEA SRMR
Cronbach's 
Alpha
Composite 
reliability
Average 
variance 
extracted
Common Vision 4 0.956 0.148 0.035 0.878 0.88 0.695
Organizational 
Learning
4 0.988 0.071 0.025 0.885 0.886 0.705
DSRC 8 0.924 0.108 0.052 0.927 0.928 0.671
Routine Rigidity 4 0.925 0.243 0.07 0.847 0.855 0.657
SCDO 4 1.00 0 0.01 0.847 0.855 0.657
Information Quality 3 1.00 0 0 0.874 0.888 0.757
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Table 9: Measurement properties of reflective constructs 
 
 
Items Common Vision
Supply Chain 
Disruption 
Orientation
Org 
Learning
Routine 
Rigidity
Information 
Quality
Disruption 
Sensing and 
Response 
Capability
Performance AVE
Common Vision-1 0.741
Common Vision-2 0.81
Common Vision-3 0.799
Common Vision-4 0.762
SCD0-1 0.697
SCD0-2 0.675
SCD0-3 0.742
SCD0-4 0.679
Organizational 
Learning-1
0.623
Organizational 
Learning-2
0.802
Organizational 
Learning-3
0.755
Organizational 
Learning-4
0.785
Routine Rigidity-1 0.741
Routine Rigidity-2 0.702
Routine Rigidity-3 0.882
Routine Rigidity-4 0.775
Information Quality-1 0.79
Information Quality-2 0.766
Information Quality-3 0.799
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
1
0.664
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
2
0.723
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
3
0.831
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
4
0.864
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
5
0.705
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
6
0.691
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
7
0.705
Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability-
8
0.743
Performance-1 0.649
Performance-2 0.781
Performance-3 0.744
0.695
0.705
0.634
0.757
0.657
0.645
0.671
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 We evaluate the measures’ reliability, using the standardized factor loadings 
provided in the CFA analysis. This method allows us to calculate values for composite 
reliability and the AVE. We compare the measures composite reliability values to a 
standard of 0.70 as discussed by Bagozzi and Yi (1988). All measures, including the 
newly operationalized disruption sensing and response capability, range from 0.855 to 
0.928. Hence, the composite reliability values indicate the measures reliably represent the 
theoretical constructs. Further, we calculate AVE values for each measure and compare 
them to the established cut off value of 0.50. Thus, we are satisfied that the measures 
explain the construct’s variance, rather than error.  
 Thirdly, we assess the measures for convergent validity. To do so, we inspect 
the standardized loading factors to see if they are appropriate (both sign and magnitude). 
See Table 10 for a summary of correlations, square root of AVEs, and S-B differences. 
We found the factor loadings were significantly and directionally appropriate.  
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Table 10: Correlations
1
 square root of average variance extracted (AVE)
2
 and chi-square 
differences
3 
 ()
4
  
1. Correlations bottom left triangle 
2. Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) on diagonal. This converts the 
AVE to the standard deviation scale, so it can be compared to correlations located 
in bottom left triangle. 
3. Satorra-Bentler differences top right triangle (SBDIFF.exe) 
4. Negative correlations between factors 
  
 
 Finally, we assess the discriminant validity of each measure. We used the S-B 
X
2
 difference test for nested models as our data was non-normal (Satorra and Bentler, 
2001). This consists of testing 15 pairs of nested models (15 unconstrained and 15 
constrained). We used Crawford and Henry (2003) SBDIFF.exe to calculate the S-B X2 
differences. The results indicate that each measure demonstrates discriminant validity. 
This leads us to believe that the measures accurately reflect our research constructs. 
Items
Common 
Vision
Organizational 
Learning
Disruption 
Sensing & 
Response 
Capability
Routine 
Rigidity
SCDO
Information 
Quality
Performance
Common 0.83             21.43 56.99 53.7 48.23 40.62 21.29
Organization
al Learning
0.88             0.84                         
36.67 43.48 29.33 21.07 17.15
Disruption 
Sensing & 
Response 
Capability
0.81             0.77                         0.82                     
65.63 44.59 36.11 27.93
Routine 0.00             (0.15)                       0.08                     0.81                     39.07 34.81 54.00                 
SCDO 0.74             0.68                         0.74                     0.07                     0.80          46.39 44.25
Information 
Quality
0.74             0.58                         0.80                     0.13                     0.79          0.85               
31.92
Performance 0.83           0.83                    0.81                 0.11                 0.68         0.75            0.94                    
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Analysis and Findings 
 We provide the minimums, maximums, means, and standard deviations for all 
measures in Table 11. Please note that after the imputation process we adjusted two 
responses to 7.0, which was the maximum of our Likert scale.  
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Model 
 
 
 
Code Question Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev
Common Vision-1 The management team has clearly explained our organization’s vision. 2.00                          7.00                          5.83         1.21                      
Common Vision-2
Most employees are aware of my organization’s primary business goals and 
objectives. 1.00                          7.00                          5.72         1.25                      
Common Vision-3 Most employees value my organization’s goals and objectives. 2.00                          7.00                          5.79         1.13                      
Common Vision-4 When setting goals, most employees consider the organization’s vision. 1.00                          7.00                          5.71         1.09                      
Org Learning-4 Within my organization, learning is key to improvement. 1.00                          7.00                          5.96         1.05                      
Org Learning-5 As an organization, we learn from our experiences. 1.00                          7.00                          5.94         1.11                      
Org Learning-6 Our ability to learn is the key to improving my organization. 3.00                          7.00                          6.02         1.04                      
Org Learning-7 As an organization we learn from our successes. 3.00                          7.00                          5.94         1.06                      
Performance-1 My organization is able to keep operating costs to a minimum. 1.00                          7.00                          5.52         1.22                      
Performance-2 My organization is able to keep out of stocks to a minimum. 1.00                          7.00                          5.59         1.15                      
Performance-3 My organization is able to keep service quality high. 1.00                          7.00                          5.96         1.15                      
DSR-1 My organization has procedures to identify threats. 1.00                          7.00                          5.73         1.22                      
DSR-2
Within my organization, there are systems to warn employees about 
potential threats. 1.00                          7.00                          5.74         1.14                      
DSR-3 Within my organization, the command center identifies actual disruptions. 1.00                          7.00                          5.73         1.20                      
DSR-4 The command center identifies potential threats. 1.00                          7.00                          5.71         1.18                      
DSR-5
When a disruption occurs, my organization immediately starts recovery 
efforts. 2.00                          7.00                          5.91         1.05                      
DSR-6
Once a threat is identified, my organization deploys resources to reduce the 
negative effects. 2.00                          7.00                          5.91         1.07                      
DSR-7
My organization’s command center deploys recovery resources to reduce the 
effects of a disruption. 2.00                          7.00                          5.86         1.13                      
DSR-8 Resources can be deployed before an actual disruption occurs. 1.00                          7.00                          5.74         1.19                      
Info Qual-1
Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is 
reliable. 1.00                          7.00                          5.77         1.24                      
Info Qual-2 Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is timely. 2.00                          7.00                          5.81         1.02                      
Info Qual-3
Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is 
accurate. 1.00                          7.00                          5.84         1.06                      
Routine Rigidity-1
There is resistance within my organization when trying to change existing 
business processes. 1.00                          7.00                          5.05         1.67                      
Routine Rigidity-2 Within my organization, there are many overlapping processes. 1.00                          7.00                          5.13         1.48                      
Routine Rigidity-3
I have a tendency to resist changing how I am used to doing things within my 
organization. 1.00                          7.00                          4.72         1.91                      
Routine Rigidity-4 I find it difficult to learn new processes. 1.00                          7.00                          3.93         2.14                      
SCDO-1
Understanding how supply chain disruptions occur is important to my 
organization. 1.00                          7.00                          5.93         1.20                      
SCDO-2 As an organization, we regularly think about supply chain disruptions. 2.00                          7.00                          5.77         1.13                      
SCDO-3
We think about how supply chain disruptions can be avoided across the 
organization. 2.00                          7.00                          5.89         1.04                      
SCDO-4 Supply chain disruptions show my organization where we can improve. 2.00                          7.00                          5.86         1.05                      
COMMAND
Does your organization have an emergency command / center or disaster 
response center? 1.00                          2.00                          1.21         0.41                      
RANK Position within the firm? 1.00                          7.00                          2.75         1.43                      
TENURE Years / of professional work experience? 2.00                          7.00                          3.94         1.31                      
SPEND Annual purchasing spend (approximate). 1.00                          7.00                          3.89         1.42                      
REVENUE Annual revenues (approximate). 1.00                          7.00                          3.76         1.60                      
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 We then evaluate the model’s overall fit. Because the data is non-normal, we 
utilize the robust fit indices: χ2 = 746.25, df = 500, NNFI = 0.910, CFI = 0.924, and 
RMSEA = 0.049. Robust (maximum likelihood) statistics are appropriate when data 
exhibits non-normality. The structural model (i.e., the combined measurement and path 
model) indicates the data fits well. Existing literature shows that OM researchers use 
robust fit indices (Vickery, Droge, Stank, Goldsby, & Markland, 2004; Kroes & Ghosh, 
2010). Consistent with these works, we report the standardized Betas, S-B χ2 statistic, 
and corresponding fit indices in Table 12. 
   
Table 12: Coefficients and Robust Fit Indices for the Alternate Model 
 
 
Common vision (H1A-B) 
 The evidence indicates the direct path (H1A) from common vision to disruption 
sensing and response capability is not significant, (β = 0.125, p=0.5488). However, we 
Hypothesis Path
Unstandardized b 
(Std Error) Standardized β Confirmed
H1A Common Vision >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability (Direct) 0.125 (0.208) 0.131 No
H1B
Common Vision >> Info Quality >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability 
(Mediated) 0.286 (0.145) 0.299 Yes
H2A
Supply Chain Disruption Orientation >> Disruption Sensing & Response 
Capability (Direct)  -0.051 (0.145) -0.053 No
H2B
Supply Chain Disruption Orientation >> Info Quality >> Disruption Sensing & 
Response Capability (Mediated) 0.250 (0.110) 0.262 Yes
H3A
Organizational Learning >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability (Direct) 0.436 (0.190) 0.456 Yes
H3B
Organizational Learning >> Info Quality >> Disruption Sensing & Response 
Capability (Mediated)  -0.167 (0.109) -0.174 No
Routine Rigidity >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability (Direct) 0.109 (0.049) 0.114 Yes
Routine Rigidity * REVENUE >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability 
(Moderated)  -0.105 (0.044) -0.110 Yes
H5 Disruption Sensing & Response Capability >> Organizational Performance 0.829 (0.085) 0.860 Yes
Control REV= Annual Revenues >> Organizational Performance 0.038 (0.023) 0.064 No
Index
S-B Scaled Chi-Square
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI)
NON-NORMED FIT INDEX (NNFI)
ROOT MEAN-SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA)    
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF RMSEA  
0.049
(0.041, 0.056)
H4
Fit
Alternate Model
746.25
500
0.924
0.91
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find the indirect path (H1B) from common vision to disruption sensing and response 
capability is significant. Upon inspection, we find that information quality fully mediates 
the relationships. Common vision to information quality (β = 0.560, p = 0.0106) and 
information quality to disruption sensing and response capability (β = 0.511, p =0.0051) 
are both significant. Therefore, the resultant indirect effect equals β = 0.2862. Selig and 
Preacher (2008) suggest assessing the indirect effects with a Monte Carlo or bootstrap 
test that estimates the confidence interval for the indirect effect. To confirm a significant 
mediated effect between common vision and disruption sensing and response capability, 
we conduct a bootstrap analysis to determine if the confidence interval includes zero 
(Selig and Preacher, 2008). Based on 20,000 bootstrap samples, the 95% confidence 
interval (CI) ranged from 0.03994 (lower CI) to 0.6363 (upper CI) (see appendix #D for 
distribution of indirect effects). This confirms that the fully mediated relationship is 
significant. We interpret this finding in the following manner. When executives 
communicate the high-level objectives, they should carefully craft the common vision 
messages. This follows Redman’s (1998) assertion that poor information quality can 
undermine an employee’s trust, demoralize the organization, and make strategic 
alignment difficult. 
 
Supply chain disruption orientation (H2A-B)  
 The path coefficient from SCDO to disruption sensing and response capability 
(H2A) is not significant, (β = -0.051, p = 0.7265). However, we find a fully mediated 
relationship between SCDO to disruption sensing and response capability (H2B). 
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Specifically, information quality fully mediates the linkage between the constructs. 
SCDO to information quality (β = 0.489, p = 0.0005) and information quality to 
disruption sensing and response capability (β=0.511, p =0.0051) for an indirect total of β 
= 0.2410. Leveraging best practice, we conduct a bootstrap analysis to verify the 
significant mediated effect between SCDO and disruption sensing and response 
capability. Using 20,000 repetitions, the 95% confidence interval (CI) ranged from 
0.05797 (lower CI) to 0.5101 (upper CI) (see appendix D for distribution of indirect 
effects). The evidence confirms the fully mediated relationship between SCDO and 
disruption sensing and response capability. As SCDO is an operational level construct, we 
envision that employees need quality messages to comprehend SC objectives. 
Operationally, poor information quality leads to increased costs and undermines the 
satisfaction of both employees and customers (Redman, 1998).  
 
Organizational learning (H3A-B)  
 H3A hypothesized a positive relationship between organizational learning and the 
disruption sensing and response capability construct. The findings indicate that the direct 
path is significant and positive (β = 0.436, p = 0.0224). We expected this result, as the 
organizational learning literature suggests that activities such as practice and simulation 
affect SC capabilities. For example, Ngai, Chau, and Chan (2010) linked organizational 
learning to SC agility. In addition, research has also linked organizational learning to 
productivity and cost improvements (Hatch and Mowery, 1998) and product quality 
capabilities (Fine, 1986; Linderman et al., 2004). 
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 With a significant direct relationship established in H3A, we can only test for a 
partially mediated relationship through information quality. The analysis, however, shows 
that linkage between the organizational learning and information quality construct to be 
non-significant (b = -0.327. When factoring in the relationship between information 
quality and disruption sensing and response capability (b = 0.511), we find the indirect 
total to be b=-0.167. Therefore, only the direct relationship exists between organizational 
learning and the disruption sensing and response capability construct. We confirm that the 
indirect relationship is non-significant using a bootstrap analysis (see appendix D for 
distribution of indirect effects). Using 20,000 repetitions, the 95% confidence interval 
(CI) ranged from -0.4404 (lower CI) to 0.0263 (upper CI). Since this range included zero 
(0), the indirect relationship is not significant. 
 
Routine rigidity (H4)  
 For hypothesis #4, we proposed a negative relationship between routine rigidity 
and the disruption sensing and response capability construct. However, to determine the 
impact we include REVENUE, a proxy for organizational size. We believe a moderated 
relationship exists as the effect of routine rigidity depends on the organization size. Stated 
differently, as organization size increases, the effect of routine rigidity will also change. 
Both routine rigidity (IV) and REVENUE (moderating variable) were mean centered for 
the analysis. Upon examination, we find that the interaction routine rigidity X 
REVENUE negatively affects the direct relationship. Stated differently, there is a 
moderated relationship between routine rigidity and disruption sensing and response 
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capability when we account for REVENUE. Hence, we see a decrease in the slope by -
0.105 for every unit increase for REVENUE. Thus, we find support for H4A.. While 
informative, this does not provide a complete understanding of what is occurring.  
    . To facilitate interpretation, we report simple slopes as suggested by Aiken and 
West (1992). As part of the analysis, we find a significant and positive direct relationship 
(β = 0.109, p =0.0272) between routine rigidity and disruption sensing and response 
capability 
 Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at +3 standard deviations 
of REVENUE = 0.109+(-0.105 * +3* 1.601) = -0.3953 
 Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at +1 standard deviations 
of REVENUE = 0.109+(-0.105 * 1* 1.601) = -0.05910 
 Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at its mean = 0.109 
 Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at -1 standard deviations 
of REVENUE = 0.109+(-0.105 * -1* 1.601) = 0.27710 
 
 This indicates that at high REVENUE levels (larger organizations); a one-unit 
increase in routine rigidity decreases disruption sensing and response capability by 
0.05910 units. At moderate levels of REVENUE, a one-unit change in routine rigidity 
slightly improves the disruption sensing and response capability by 0.104. Finally, when 
REVENUE levels are low (small organizations), a one-unit increase in routine rigidity 
improves the disruption sensing and response capability by 0.27710. Bala and Venkatesh 
(2007) had similar results in their study of routine rigidity and the dominance of firms. 
They found that non-dominant organizations are immune to routine rigidity effects, by 
developing a range of routines for different trading partners. Figure 4 illustrates the slope 
of the interaction at high (+1 standard deviations), medium (at mean), and low levels (-1 
standard deviations). We also provide the simple slopes at +3 standard deviations to 
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illustrate extremely large organizations were the inertia literature suggests routine rigidity 
would be most prevalent. 
 
 
Figure 4: Simple Slopes for routine rigidity x REVENUE interaction 
 
Disruption sensing and response capability to organization performance (H5)  
 The path coefficient from disruption sensing and response capability to 
organization performance is positive, (β = 0.829, p > 0.0001). This suggests that 
managers can develop disruption sensing and response capabilities as a method to 
improve performance. This result also supports the assertions within the existing RM 
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literature suggesting that warning and recovery capabilities enhance performance 
(Craighead et al., 2007). 
 
The effect of control variables 
 We tested the effect related to several control variables: command center 
(COMMAND), experience (TENURE), position (RANK), and annual purchasing spend 
(SPEND) (See Table 13). None of the controls, COMMAND, TENURE, RANK, or 
SPEND, significantly altered the relationships found within the alternate model.  
 
Table 13: Control variable betas, standard errors, and fit indices 
COMMAND RANK TENURE SPEND
Disruption Sensing 
& Response 
Capability
 -0.267 (0.037)***  -0.011 (0.050)  -0.063 (0.059)  -0.143 (0.169)
Information 
Quality
 0.127 (0.034)** 0.015 (0.067) 0.075 (0.062) 0.046 (0.056)
Organizational 
Performance
0.041 (0.043) 0.012 (0.067) 0.003 (0.076) 0.035 (0.092)
S-B Scaled Chi-
Square
948.22 796.16 787.76 769.48
DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM
526 526 526 526
COMPARATIVE FIT 
INDEX (CFI)
0.882 0.916 0.919 0.925
NON-NORMED FIT 
INDEX (NNFI)
0.859 0.899 0.903 0.91
ROOT MEAN-
SQUARE ERROR OF 
APPROXIMATION 
(RMSEA)    
0.063 0.05 0.049 0.048
90% CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL OF 
RMSEA  
(0.056-0.069) (0.043-0.057) (0.042-0.056) (0.040-0.054)
Notes: *** Significant to 0.0001; ** Significant to 0.001; 
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Implications for Research and Practice 
 Research into SCR and RM continues to expand as organizations realize the 
vulnerabilities of their elongated supply chains. While many studies examine operational 
mitigation techniques like buffers and capacity, there is scant research into organizational 
RM practices. In particular, there is a dearth of behavior-based RM techniques (Zsidisin, 
2003; Simchi-Levi et al., 2010). Recognizing how organizations develop and embed 
these RM competencies and capabilities into the organization’s culture is central to 
understanding future RM initiatives. By developing and empirically validating the 
disruption sensing and response capability measure, this study enhances future SCRM 
research in three ways. First, we provide an empirically valid and reliable measure that 
organization can use to measure and benchmark their RM capabilities. Second, the study 
confirms that organizations should develop their common vision, SCDO, and 
organizational learning competencies to enhance their RM capabilities. Third, the 
evidence implies that large organizations must manage their routine rigidity levels; 
otherwise, they may experience a degradation of their disruption sensing and response 
capabilities. Fourth, by teasing out the effect of information quality on the different 
relationships, managers understand the importance of quality communications. Lastly, the 
study provides empirical evidence, illustrating how managers can use behavior-based RM 
techniques.  
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Discussion 
 While practitioners may suggest that an organization’s common vision, SCDO, 
organizational learning, and routine rigidity competencies may affect its RM capabilities, 
there is scant evidence confirming the relationships. To fill this gap, we empirically test 
the effect of four antecedent competences and one mediating variable on the disruption 
sensing and response capability measure and organization performance. We provide 
confirmation that organizations can develop their common vision, SCDO, and 
organizational learning competencies as a way to address SC risk. These competencies 
allow managers to develop their employees and their abilities rather than just investing in 
redundancies such as inventory or capacity.  
 In addition, we offer a new multi-dimensional RM measure, which enables 
academics and practitioners to evaluate and compare a key RM capability. The measure 
uses Craighead’s, (2007) definition and accounts for both a warning and recovery 
dimension. However, the evidence suggests that practitioners have a difficult time 
separating the warning and recovery dimensions. We recognize that we tested the 
constructs across multiple industries. Future research, where industry variance is 
controlled may lead to different results.  
 
Limitations 
 We acknowledge several methodological and conceptual limitations. The primary 
limitation of this work is that we derive our findings from 206 procurement directors and 
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managers. While we believe these respondents represent the larger population of 
procurement professionals, we suggest caution when interpreting the results.  
 Second, using a sample composed of organizations from different industries may 
be problematic. The sample’s diversity may have caused the strength of specific 
relationships to be attenuated by industries with stronger or weaker relationships. We 
suspect that if this study focused on a single industry that the path coefficients found 
could be slightly different.   
 Third, while we triangulate this study with qualitative data from multiple rounds 
of item-to construct sorting procedures and interview feedback, we believe additional 
research is necessary. Researchers need to confirm the validity and reliability of the 
measurement items and this survey instrument. 
 A fourth limitation is that while our conceptualization of the disruption sensing 
and response capability measure advances our understanding of SCRM, we concede that 
other factors also influence an organization’s RM capabilities. In particular, we did not 
test the manager’s risk perception about how a threat affects an organization’s disruption 
sensing and response capability. As this investigation’s original objective was to 
operationalize the warning and recovery constructs, as proposed by Craighead et al. 
(2007), we felt appropriate to test the predictive validity of the newly proposed behavior-
based RM tactic. 
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Future Research Opportunities 
 We note three potential research opportunities that stem from this analysis.  First, 
and most logical, is to investigate other organizational competencies, such as external SC 
integration or vertical information systems (Galbraith, 1974), which can be linked to an 
organization’s disruption sensing and response capability. Second, we believe there is a 
wealth of opportunity to explore the proactive and reactive recovery capabilities that are 
proposed within our manuscript. Results from these opportunities will further augment 
the extant knowledge of SCRM frameworks and risk management practices. Third, we 
would like to see these same constructs tested within a single industry.  We believe the 
results and supporting theory could provide additional insight into how an organizations 
and its industry deal with SC disruptions. 
 
Conclusions 
 Our results indicate that organizations can manage behavior-based competencies 
as a mechanism to improve their SCRM capabilities. We show, in particular, the value of 
developing an organization’s common vision and SCDO. Managers use these 
competencies to outline the goals of an organization and provide energy and guidance as 
practitioners work to achieve these objectives. The evidence also suggests that enhanced 
organizational learning abilities allow practitioners to learn from and better prepare for 
SC disruption. With expanding supply chains and more complexity between the various 
nodes, SC practitioners need to be able to convert what they learn into new RM practices. 
At the same time, we found that controlling routine rigidity levels is important so 
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employees do not inhibit their adaptation and improvisation abilities, which help address 
unpredictable SC threats. The evidence suggests this is a significant issue within larger 
organizations. Managers need to prepare SC practitioners for disruption so they can 
respond quickly and adapt when necessary.  
 Beyond the findings specific to behavior-based competencies, this study 
contributes to the OM and RM literature in four ways. First, it validates a theory-based 
SCRM measure. The disruption sensing and response capability construct addresses both 
the warning and recovery dimension as proposed by Craighead et al., (2007). However, 
by confirming that the warning capability and recovery capability measures are not 
different, we provide evidence about how practitioners view SCRM. Specifically, the 
evidence indicates that while warning and recovery are conceptually different, that in 
practice, they are actually one RM concept. Second, we provide evidence of the 
connection between internal competencies, RM capabilities, and operating performance. 
This confirms high reliability theory theorists’ belief that organizations can 
simultaneously focus on several objectives, such as performance and safety. Third, by 
studying the moderating effects of firm size and the mediating effects of information 
quality, we provide direction to managers as they develop RM strategies. As stated by 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008), “Managers must understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various risk management strategies, and when they are appropriate” 
(p. 216). Lastly, by studying the behavior-based competencies and capabilities, we 
further the principle that organizations should embed an understanding of RM and risk 
assessment into their culture (Simchi-Levi, 2010). Managers should design daily 
140 
 
activities that enhance organizational learning, information quality, and communication 
with RM initiatives in mind. Otherwise, SC practitioners and the organization will not be 
prepared for the next inevitable SC disruption. 
 By developing behavior based competencies and capabilities to the arsenal of RM 
tactics, organizations can better protect their supply chains from inevitable disruptions. 
These RM techniques are particularly helpful for when SC threats rarely occur and when 
they do, they manifest in unpredictable ways. We hope managers embed these behaviors 
into the culture of an organization so practitioners can adapt and overcome any type of 
SC threat, large or small. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Survey questions 
Common vision 
1. The management team has clearly explained our organization’s vision. 
2. Most employees are aware of my organization’s primary business goals and 
objectives. 
3. Most employees value my organization’s goals and objectives. 
4. When setting goals, most employees consider the organization’s vision. 
Supply chain disruption orientation 
5. Understanding how supply chain disruptions occur is important to my 
organization. 
6. As an organization, we regularly think about supply chain disruptions. 
7. We think about how supply chain disruptions can be avoided across the 
organization. 
8. Supply chain disruptions show my organization where we can improve. 
Organizational learning 
9. Within my organization, learning is key to improvement. 
10. As an organization, we learn from our experiences. 
11. Our ability to learn is the key to improving my organization. 
12. As an organization, we learn from our successes. 
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Routine rigidity 
13. There is resistance within my organization when trying to change existing 
business processes. 
14. Within my organization, there are many overlapping processes. 
15. I have a tendency to resist changing how I am used to doing things within my 
organization. 
16. I find it difficult to learn new processes. 
Information quality 
17. Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is reliable. 
18. Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is timely. 
19. Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is accurate. 
Warning capability 
20. My organization has procedures to identify threats. 
21. Within my organization, there are systems to warn employees about potential 
threats. 
22. Within my organization, the command center identifies actual disruptions. 
23. The command center identifies potential threats. 
Recovery capability 
24. When a disruption occurs, my organization immediately starts recovery efforts. 
25. Once a threat is identified, my organization deploys resources to reduce the 
negative effects. 
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26. My organization’s command center deploys recovery resources to reduce the 
effects of a disruption. 
27. Resources can be deployed before an actual disruption occurs. 
Performance 
28. My organization is able to keep operating costs to a minimum. 
29. My organization is able to keep out of stocks to a minimum. 
30. My organization is able to keep service quality high. 
Control questions 
31. Does your organization have an emergency command / center or disaster response 
center? 
32. Position within the firm? 
33. Years / of professional work experience? 
34. Annual purchasing spend (approximate). 
35. Annual revenues (approximate). 
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Appendix B: Data collection procedures 
 In this study, we used Empanelonline.com to administer the data collection 
process. With access to 1.3 million potential respondents, Empanelonline.com, uses a 
“double opt-in” procedure to register and survey qualified panelists. Initially, prospective 
respondents join various panels by registering at Empanelonline.com. Respondents 
identify panels for which they are qualified, by answering questions about their 
credentials (experience, job title, household income, etc.)   Once qualified 
Empanelonline.com invites respondents to complete questionnaires that pertain to certain 
topics (i.e. the join certain panels. Empanelonline.com does conduct verification checks 
to determine if respondents’ are genuine. This includes validating address and email 
information and verifying respondents against third-party databases when possible.  
Further, Empanelonline.com periodically reviews the quality of respondents to ensure 
that panelists are qualified to answer survey. This includes monitoring how many surveys 
the panelist has completed and qualification questions about certain topics. Lastly, 
Empanelonline.com does monitor professional survey takers and removes them from all 
available panels. 
 The population of interest for our study was procurement/purchasing decision 
makers such as procurement director, purchasing managers and procurement analysts. 
Empanelonline.com invited respondents from a random sample of qualified panel 
members: procurement/purchasing professionals. The email invitation explained the 
research objective, presented a hyperlink to the actual survey, offered a time estimate to 
complete the survey, provided contact information pertaining to the primary researcher, 
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described the incentive to complete the survey, and offered opt-out information. 
Empanelonline.com offers respondents incentive points to complete the survey. 
 We targeted respondents who devoted 50% or more of their time to 
procurement/purchasing activities and were from organizations with at least 50 
employees. To ensure that panelists matched this frame, we embedded two screening 
questions into the survey.  These were the first two questions asked. If panelists 
responded that less than 50% of their time was devoted to procurement/purchasing 
activities or they worked for organizations with less than 50 employees, the survey 
concluded and thanked respondents for their participation.  All others respondents were 
allowed to continue answering survey questions. 
Qualification #1  
How much time on a weekly basis do you spend with procurement/purchasing duties? 
Less than < 50% -(Survey concluded and thanked respondents for their participation) 
Between 50 and 75% -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey 
questions) 
Between 75 and 90% -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey 
questions) 
Greater than >90% -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions) 
Qualification #2 
How many employees in your organization? 
< 50% -(Survey concluded and thanked respondents for their participation) 
50-999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions) 
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1,000-9,99 9-(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions) 
10,000-49,999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions) 
50,000-99,999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions) 
100,000-249,999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions) 
>250,000 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions) 
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Appendix C: Latent factor and marker variable test  
 
 
Factor Item Trait Loading Trait Loading Sqd Method Loadings Trait Loading Sqd Marker Loadings
CV1 0.827 0.741 0.174                        0.757 0.095                        
CV2 0.813 0.81 0.030                        0.734 0.104                        
CV3 0.818 0.799 0.039                        0.756 0.086                        
CV4 0.752 0.762 0.013                        0.671 0.096                        
OL1 0.757 0.623 0.212                        0.717 0.050                        
OL2 0.837 0.802 0.048                        0.808 0.048                        
OL3 0.849 0.755 0.135                        0.798 0.070                        
OL4 0.803 0.785 0.030                        0.757 0.061                        
PER1 0.648 0.649 0.026                        0.513 0.114                        
PER2 0.757 0.781 0.011                        0.63 0.132                        
PER3 0.799 0.744 0.051                        0.737 0.102                        
WC1 0.807 0.664 0.311                        0.732 0.104                        
WC2 0.793 0.723 0.114                        0.713 0.104                        
WC3 0.819 0.831 0.019                        0.73 0.115                        
WC4 0.808 0.864 0.001                        0.706 0.125                        
RC1 0.787 0.705 0.088                        0.687 0.127                        
RC2 0.828 0.691 0.142                        0.763 0.100                        
RC3 0.814 0.705 0.132                        0.719 0.129                        
RC4 0.706 0.743 0.019                        0.582 0.129                        
IQ1 0.918 0.79 0.289                        0.85 0.123                        
IQ2 0.808 0.766 0.077                        0.72 0.110                        
IQ3 0.79 0.799 0.039                        0.699 0.109                        
RR1 0.725 0.741 0.027                        0.681 0.050                        
RR2 0.684 0.702 0.034                        0.655 0.025                        
RR3 0.894 0.882 0.000                        0.875 0.037                        
RR4 0.774 0.775 0.023                        0.73 0.066                        
SCD1 0.868 0.697 0.329                        0.798 0.119                        
SCD2 0.778 0.675 0.176                        0.661 0.137                        
SCD3 0.727 0.742 0.033                        0.624 0.106                        
SCD4 0.649 0.679 0.020                        0.559 0.081                        
0.677
894.68
602.61
377
0.918
0.054
0.048
Routine 
Rigidity
Supply 
Chain 
Disruptio
n 
Informati
on 
Quality
Disruptio
n 
Manage
ment 
Capabiliti
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Common 
Vision
Organizat
ional 
Learning
Performa
nce
0.049
0.041
RMSEA (S-B)
RSMR
AVE
Chi-square
Chi-square (S-B)
df
CFI (S-B)
0.632
718.65
516.44
347
0.938
0.055
0.072
0.594
912.64
612.36
377
0.915
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Appendix D: Bootstrap tests for indirect effects 
Distribution of indirect effect for the common vision – information quality – disruption 
sensing and response capability relationship 
 
 
149 
 
Distribution of Indirect Effect for the SCDO – information quality – disruption sensing 
and response capability relationship 
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Distribution of Indirect Effect for the organizational learning – information quality – 
disruption sensing and response capability relationship 
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Appendix E: Satorra-Bentler difference input & output variables 
Common vision and organizational learning 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 555.92 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 758.63 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 758.639 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 555.872 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 30.3126186 
 
Common vision and PERF 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 540.3314 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 746.252 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
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Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 746.260 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 540.311 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 20.30977216 
 
Common vision and warning capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=594.9573 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 795.502 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 795.509 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 594.9518 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 1.656345401 
 
Common vision and recovery capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=559.2729 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 774.131 
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 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 774.138 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 559.4283 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 36.64751981 
 
Common vision and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 526.9013 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 778.294 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.2784 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.675 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 778.297 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 526.998 
DF =347 
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 37.99411042 
 
Common vision and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=517.97 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 779.48 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 779.484 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 517.8528 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 43.93457245 
 
Common vision and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 563.4334 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 783.997 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
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 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 784.005 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 563.6130 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 42.40656099 
 
Organizational learning and PERF 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=544.5128 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 744.750 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 744.756 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 544.3480 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.36980586 
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Organizational learning and warning capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=511.767 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 767.120 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 767.126 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 511.7825 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 32.06967312 
 
Organizational learning and recovery capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 550.23 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 771.88 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
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Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 771.88 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 550.21 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.41208166 
  
Organizational learning and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=508.9184 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 759.199 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 759.1992 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 508.9184 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 27.16536529 
 
Organizational learning and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=515.20 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 780.35 
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 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 515.7481 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.658 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 780.355 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 515.2626 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 39.14806243 
 
Organizational learning and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=529.0177 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 777.754 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 777.76 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 529.1026 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.17300317 
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PERF and warning capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 567.55 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 769.24 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 769.24 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 567.57  
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 36.85723134 
 
PERF and recovery capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 537.8265 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 739.744 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 739.749 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 537.7272 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =  877128 
 
PERF and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 554.7522 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 764.886 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 764.887 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 554.6510 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 35.79916029 
 
PERF and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=546.8164 
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 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 797.850 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 797.857 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model =546.821  
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 54.27522009 
 
PERF and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=553.5108 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 772.355 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 515.7481 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.658 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 772.363 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 553.5256 
DF =347 
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =38.26464361 
 
Warning capability and recovery capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 528.7864 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 732.579 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 515.7481 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.658 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 732.583 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 528.9370 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 9.160674837 
 
Warning capability and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=510.1897 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 760.114 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
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 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 760.120 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 510.2841 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 26.21433738 
 
Warning capability and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=548.9498 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 797.376 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 797.378 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 548.7743 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 61.01737605 
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Warning capability and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=518.9067 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 769.093 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 769.095 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 518.8685 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 34.95294823 
 
Recovery capability and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=569.7315 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 788.710 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
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Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 788.712 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 569.7873 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 48.98127499 
 
Recovery capability and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=519.5856 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 781.188 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 781.190 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 519.6151 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 40.82216157 
 
Recovery capability and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=509.4189 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 759.960 
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 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 759.964 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 509.3705 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 28.68384106 
 
Information quality and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=511.3064 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 763.065 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 763.069 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 511.2599 
DF =347 
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 30.78329397 
 
Information quality and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=564.6754 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 787.591 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 787.597 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 564.7379 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 47.71625524 
 
Routine rigidity and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=528.2703 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 779.084 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674 
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 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 779.088 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 528.1042 
DF =347 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 46.08455649 
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Appendix F: Difference input & output variables-amended model 
Common vision and organizational learning 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 563.2584 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 782.230 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 782.233 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 563.2083 
DF =354 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.43247838 
 
Common vision and PERF 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 564.0833 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 780.354 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 780.356 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 564.1165 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.29363171 
 
Common vision and disruption sensing and response capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 619.0092 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 834.593 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 834.597 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 618.8700 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 56.99258656 
 
Common vision and information quality  
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 551.6694 
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 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 814.253 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 814.258 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 551.6002 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 40.62832603 
 
Common vision and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 553.5034 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 826.172 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 826.175 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 553.6120 
DF =355 
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 53.70839089 
 
Common vision and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 584.8063 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 814.209 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 814.212 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 584.9173 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 48.23821762 
Organizational learning and PERF 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 562.8300 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 775.823 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 775.828 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 562.7870 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 17.15182138 
 
Organizational learning and disruption sensing and response capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 541.4671 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 807.015 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 807.017 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 541.4443 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 36.67732463 
 
Organizational learning and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 529.1605 
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 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 785.731 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 785.735 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 529.0224 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.07248324 
 
Organizational learning and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 548.7043 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 815.818 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
175 
 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 815.819 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 548.7128 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 43.48943649 
 
Organizational learning and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 532.9881 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 795.971 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 795.973 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 532.9665 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 29.3398602 
PERF and Disruption sensing and response capability 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 577.5904 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 788.827 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
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 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 788.839 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 577.6336 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =27.9331226 
 
PERF and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=580.1387 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 800.582 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 800.586 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 579.9547 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =31.92555118 
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PERF and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=579.1166 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 835.613 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 835.614 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model =   
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =54.00036943 
 
PERF and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=577.8011 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 805.368 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 805.372 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 578.0100 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =44.2580408 
 
Disruption sensing and response capability and information quality 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=543.9091 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 803.219 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 803.221 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 543.9561 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =36.10791978 
 
Disruption sensing and response capability and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=552.1511 
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 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 841.459 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 841.462 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 552.3095 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =65.63925219 
 
Disruption sensing and response capability and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=545.5732 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 814.523 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 814.527 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 545.6578 
DF =355 
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =44.60035413 
 
Information quality and routine rigidity 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=540.5755 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 802.196 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 802.199 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 540.6051 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =34.80287969 
 
Information quality and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=557.2890 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 817.699 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
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 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 817.704 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 557.3354 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =46.39760723 
 
Routine rigidity and SCDO 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=541.9344 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 809.503 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354 
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0 
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 809.506 
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 541.9454 
DF =355 
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =39.0711807 
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND WARNING AND RECOVERY 
CAPABILITIES- A HOSPITAL PERSPECTIVE 
Abstract 
 Risk experts suggest that organizations employ an array of mitigation techniques 
to manage supply chain risk. However, most studies focus on buffers and/or capacity as 
the primary risk management instrument. Therefore, following the recommendation of 
Zsidisin (2003) and Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi (2010), we investigated 
behavior-based capabilities, such as supply chain risk management tactics. To do this, we 
operationalized the warning and recovery measures proposed by Craighead, Blackhurst, 
Rungtusanatham, and Handfield (2007). We used a judgment-based sorting process, 
factor analysis, and survey data from hospital material managers to establish the 
measure’s unidimensionality, reliability, and validity. 
 Furthermore, we studied how three competencies, internal integration, training, 
and information sharing, affect the warning and recovery constructs. These competencies 
provide structure, allow practitioners to connect and share information, and enable 
backup systems during SC disruptions (Bellamy, Crawford, Marshall, & Coulter, 2005; 
Reason, 2000; Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987). 
 The results indicated that internal integration and training positively affect the 
warning and recovery constructs. Our findings also indicated that managers should 
develop risk management capabilities, such as warning and recovery. First, the new 
measures allow practitioners and academics to assess an organizations’ warning and 
recovery capabilities. Second, our study provides evidence that the two risk management 
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measures positively affect an organization’s performance. Both findings are important for 
managers who seek alternative risk management techniques that would have a positive 
effect on performance. 
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Introduction 
 Organizations develop complex and extended supply chains to reduce costs, 
connect with suppliers, and offer products and services to customers. However, as 
managers experiment with different supply chain (SC) configurations, they must consider 
that the risk of disruption rises as complexity increases (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). Risk 
management (RM) experts also suggest that the probability of disruption increases as the 
SC becomes more integrated (Handfield, Blackhurst, Craighead, & Elkins, 2006; 
Norrman & Jansson, 2004). In such coupled networks, disruption consequences can 
travel quickly throughout a SC network. We believe that most organizations expend 
resources to reduce the negative effects of disruption consequences. 
 We argue that organizations should develop behavior-based capabilities and 
competencies to manage supply chain risk (SCR). Warning and recovery capabilities are 
proposed to enable rapid disruption identification and response while organizational 
competencies, such as information sharing (INFOSHR), internal integration, and training 
(TRAIN), provide structure, enhance internal connectedness, and enable backup system 
initiation (Bellamy et al., 2005; Reason, 2000; Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987).  
 The extant literature suggests that organizations can use behavior-based RM 
techniques to mitigate and even eliminate SC threats (Cheng, Yip, & Yeung, 2012; 
Simchi-Levi et al., 2010; Zsidisin, 2003). However, only a few researchers investigated 
the use of behavior-based tactics, such as RM mechanisms, directly. Examples include 
supplier certification (Lockhart & Ettkin, 1993; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003), supplier 
development (Hartley & Choi, 1996; Watts & Hahn, 1993), target costing (Zsidisin & 
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Ellram, 2003), and quality development programs (Choi & Liker, 1995; Zsidisin & 
Ellram, 2003). 
 Following the logic espoused by high reliability theory (HRT), we argue that 
hospitals can use behavior-based tactics to reduce SCR by enhancing the internal 
coordination and structural coupling within the SC (Smart, Tranfield, Deasley, Levene, 
Rowe, & Corley, 2003). With this theoretical frame, we address three questions. First, 
can we develop psychometrically valid measures for warning and recovery capabilities? 
Second, do certain structural competencies improve a hospital’s warning and recovery 
capabilities? Third, do enhanced warning and recovery capabilities lead to improved 
performance?  
 To answer these questions, we collected survey data from 215 hospital material 
and risk managers with an aim to investigate the relationships among various 
competencies, capabilities, and performance measures. We sought to understand the 
relationship among specific antecedent competencies and the warning and recovery 
constructs. Warning capabilities (WARN) reflect an organization’s ability to scan for and 
communicate information about SC threats while recovery capabilities (RECOVR) refer 
to the pre-emptive and reactive response practices (Craighead et al., 2007). 
 We employed Noar’s (2003) construct development process to operationalize the 
warning and recovery measures proposed by Craighead et al. (2007). We used qualitative 
feedback, judgment-based sorting processes (Q-sort), and confirmatory factor analysis to 
establish unidimensionality, reliability, and validity of the measures. 
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 This study’s aim was to gather insight on RM and SCRM practices within 
hospitals. With mandates to simultaneously reduce costs and improve quality, healthcare 
managers are actively seeking methods to minimize inventory and risk while delivering 
world-class service. McKone-Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis (2005) indicated that nearly 
40% of a hospital’s budget, in general, supports SC expenditures. Therefore, by 
developing behavior-based techniques, hospitals can improve their RM capabilities by 
enhancing their organization rather than investing in dollar intensive inventory. 
 This contribution is unique, as it suggests that organizations can develop 
competencies to improve their RM capabilities. Within healthcare operations, 
competencies, including internal integration, TRAIN, and INFOSHR, are necessary 
practices. Further, managers can justify investment in competencies rather than tangibles, 
such as inventory or capacity (Jüttner, Peck, & Christopher, 2003), as a way to reduce 
disruption risk. 
 
Outline of the manuscript  
 First, we review high reliability theory along with the relevant SC and RM 
literature in section 2. In section 3, we discuss the proposed model and hypotheses. 
Section 4 addresses methodological and statistical issues. Section 5 discusses the research 
findings. Further, in section 6 and 7, we discuss the limitations of our study and potential 
future research avenues. 
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Literature Review 
 Within this section, we review conceptual tenets of high reliability theory that are 
pertinent to this research. In addition, we differentiate between several key components 
of risk and risk management. Lastly, discuss the dimensions of warning and recovery 
capabilities and establish their importance to this research.       
 
High reliability theory (HRT) 
 High reliability theory (HRT) postulates that an organization can avoid accidents 
indefinitely by designing systems that emphasize reliability rather than efficiency. HRT 
theorists describe how highly coupled and complex systems regularly face catastrophic 
disasters yet thrive over time (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987; Weick & Roberts, 
1993). Initial research venues included aircraft carriers (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 
1987), submarines (Bierly & Spender, 1995), nuclear power plants (Roth, 1997), and 
space shuttles (Marais, Dulac, & Leveson, 2004). These concepts have evolved and are 
now applied to product safety within supply chains (Speier, Whipple, Closs, & Voss, 
2011), lean management (Marley, 2006), and emergency decision-making (White, 
Turoff, & Van de Walle, 2007).   
 While others have used HRT to frame RM research within healthcare settings, no 
one has used the theory to investigate SC risk within hospitals. Carroll and Rudolph 
(2006) sought to improve safety performance within healthcare organizations by using 
design principles from HRT. Similarly, Tamuz and Harrison (2006) framed their patient 
safety investigations using HRT tenets. Therefore, we seek to determine how hospital 
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supply chains use behavior based RM techniques to mitigate risk within the hospital 
supply chain. We argue that hospitals foster a culture of reliability, encourage 
practitioners to learn from accidents and near misses (La Porte & Consolini, 1991), and 
value redundancy (Rochlin et al., 1987). Further, while advocates pontificate that system 
reliability is above all else, we find that most highly reliable organizations value both 
performance and reliability equally (La Porte & Consolini, 1991).  
 Managers should draw on decoupling design principles, reliability oriented 
management practices, and a mindful organizational culture to sustain a highly reliable 
organization over time. Decoupled design principles refer to structures that seamlessly 
enable backup processes and systems (Bellamy et al., 2005; Reason, 2000; Rochlin, 
LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987). This includes practices that integrate and share information 
from multiples sources simultaneously. Reliability oriented management practices refer 
to a decentralized system where employees are empowered to make quick decisions 
rather than escalating to a centralized hierarchy (Bellamy et al., 2005). In the HRT 
environment, employees should be able to make timely decisions to maintain safety and 
save lives. “Mindful” practitioners are oriented towards learning from failures; they are 
committed to resilience and avoid simple interpretations that may lead to mishaps and 
near misses (Bellamy et al., 2005; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Mindfulness 
equates to a preoccupation with avoiding failure and latitude for individual improvisation 
(Bellamy et al., 2005; Beyea, 2004).  
 We adopt the conceptual tenets of HRT, as it advocates how to operate a complex 
system, such as a hospital SC. Several tenets of the theory align with the aims of our 
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investigations. In particular, we seek to understand the effects of organizational 
structures, such as internal integration and training, on certain RM capabilities. Training, 
for instance, illustrates how practitioners respond to threats while internal integration 
reflects a connectedness tactic that enables employees and systems to work together.  
 To anchor our investigation to current risk and SC management thinking, we 
review existing risk, SCR, and SCRM literature. We then discuss warning and recovery 
capabilities before we operationalize the constructs and developed related hypotheses. We 
also segregate the two RM capability constructs into various dimensions and adopt 
appropriate definitions.  
 
Risk 
 Risk refers to unplanned variability associated with an outcome, and it “can be 
viewed as an expected value - the product of impact and probability” (Zsidisin, Melnyk, 
& Ragatz, 2005, p.3403). Previous research suggests that organizations should develop 
strategies to manage risk, absorb disruption consequences, or enable quick recovery 
(Tang, 2006). By developing these tactics proactively, organizations can prepare for an 
inevitable SC disruption (Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu, 2009). 
 Only a few operations management researchers have developed risk measures. 
Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) operationalized the measures of the magnitude and the 
probability of supply disruption along with providing details about the overall level of 
disruption risk.  Several measures of operational failures associated with nurses are 
germane to the hospital context (Tucker, 2004). This research categorizes interruption, 
201 
 
delay, risk, and losses as dimensions of failure and measures actions that affect patient 
outcomes. 
 
Supply chain risk  
 According to Juttner et al. (2003), supply chain risk (SCR) describes risks 
associated with the movement of information, raw materials, or finished product as they 
flow from suppliers to consumers. Understanding that variability exists within all 
systems, SCR describes threats that create variability beyond planned levels. We believe 
that variability negatively affects operations and forces managers to expend resources to 
return the SC to normal (Tang, 2006). 
 
Supply chain risk management  
 Supply chain risk management (SCRM) alludes to the coordination resources and 
the collaboration of SC partners to ensure continuity and profitability. The RM literature 
suggests four SCRM strategies, avoidance, mitigation, transference, or acceptance (Piney, 
2003). Avoidance argues for organizations to discontinue the use of risky practices. 
Mitigation suggests engaging in activities that reduce consequential effect. Practitioners 
employ transference by shifting risk and the resulting consequences to a third party, such 
as a vendor or insurer. Acceptance advocates for developing systems to absorb the 
consequences of SC disruption. 
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Warning capability 
 Warning capabilities (WARN) refer to “interactions and coordination of SC 
resources to detect a pending or realized disruption and to subsequently disseminate 
pertinent information about the disruption to relevant entities within the SC” (Craighead 
et al., 2007, p. 146). The term detection represents an ability to recognize a hazard. 
Organizations that detect SC disruptions before they occur have time to evaluate them 
and respond. Without detection, there is no signal indicating that a response is necessary. 
 The terms pending and realized illustrate that a disruption can take varied forms. 
A pending disruption is one that has not yet occurred. Here, warning indicators, such as a 
delayed shipment or poor quality raw materials, may indicate that a SC disruption is 
possible. Conversely, in situations such as earthquakes, disruptions can occur without 
warning. Therefore, identification occurs after a disruption happens. Within the business 
context, realized consequences include quality issues, unplanned outages, and delayed 
deliveries from suppliers.   
 Organizations must also “disseminate pertinent information about the disruption 
to relevant entities within the SC” (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 146).  This reflects a firm’s 
INFOSHR and communication abilities. During a disruption, communication channels 
may break down or become inefficient. Therefore, redundant systems insure that 
communication is possible. 
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Recovery capability 
 Recovery capability (RECOVR) refers to “interactions of SC entities and the 
corresponding coordination of SC resources to return the SC to a normal and planned 
level” (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 144). Organizations use pre-emptive recovery to initiate 
response efforts before an actual disruption occurs and reactive capabilities to respond 
after a SC disruption occurs. Normal and planned levels allude to a steady state of 
production or service. 
 
Pre-emptive recovery 
 When organizations identify a SC threat before its manifestation, they may be 
able to mitigate the threat. Mitigation refers to actions taken to reduce disruption 
consequences. The reduction potential depends on the type of disruption, consequences 
created, resources marshalled, and the amount of time until the disruption occurs. 
 By understanding the source of a risk, potential consequences, and the resources 
available, organizations can preemptively prepare for a SC disruption.  The opportunity 
to mitigate the disruption effects increases if the warning window expands.  The warning 
window represents the time between when practitioners acknowledge a SC threat and 
when the disruption actually occurs (Riley, Miller, & Sridharan, 2012).  
 
Reactive recovery 
 Practitioners should use reactive recovery capabilities after an actual SC 
disruption occurs. “These purposive interactions and coordination of resources allow 
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interventions to be designed and implemented to overcome the slowing or stoppage of 
planned product flow within the SC” (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 144).  We argue that 
most organizations will attempt to reduce the amount of time associated with recovery 
efforts.    
 By reviewing the many characteristics of risk as they pertain to SC management 
and SCRM, we are able to ground our thinking as we develop new models, hypotheses, 
and measures. In section 3, we propose a model that links three antecedent competencies, 
to measures for warning and recovery capabilities, and organizational performance. We 
then develop new hypothesis framed by HRT thinking. Then in section 4, we test the 
validity and reliability of the two new RM measures along with existing measures for the 
antecedent competencies and organizational performance. The intent is to operationalize 
measures and a measurement instrument that researchers can use when investigating 
future SC and RM topics.    
 
Proposed Model and Hypothesis Development 
 Drawing on HRT, this research aims to show that behavior based RM techniques 
can mitigate risk with hospitals. To do so, we intend to illustrate how three antecedent 
competencies affect two RM capabilities and the organization’s business performance. 
We propose a conceptual model (Figure 1) based on the SC and RM literature and several 
qualitative interviews. 
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Figure 1: Proposed Model  
 
Theoretical model 
 The objective of this research is to validate measures of the WARN and 
RECOVR constructs. We use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to establish the 
instrument’s unidimensionality and reliability along with the convergent and discriminant 
validity. To achieve this goal, we developed a structural model to define the relationships 
between three antecedent competencies and the proposed RM capabilities. To test the 
relationships, we collect and analyze survey data from U.S. hospitals. 
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 Internal integration, TRAIN, and INFOSHR are structures that provide 
connectedness by influencing an organization’s ability to align priorities and 
communicate those ideals. In the proposed model, we represent these organizational 
structures as antecedent competencies. Like Sinkula (1994), we argue that managers can 
manipulate these structures to create a positive change in behavior. This thinking 
complements HRT, which suggests that managers can manipulate competencies to affect 
an organization’s ability to learn from mistakes and near misses (Weick et al., 1999).  
 We included the interaction TrainingXLicensed beds (TRAINxBEDS) to test the 
moderating effect of organization size. We believe organization size or hospital size is 
important to the study of training since larger organizations typically will have more 
employees who could benefit from additional formal training. Previous research supports 
our assumption about training and organization size (Frazis, Herz, & Horrigan, 1995. 
Additionally, OM researchers regularly use licensed beds to characterize hospital size 
(Goldstein & Naor, 2005; Tucker, 2004). 
 The WARN and RECOVR constructs represent organizational RM capabilities. 
Researchers have postulated that these RM capabilities moderate the severity of a SC 
disruption by lessening the effect of SC density, complexity, and node criticality 
(Craighead et al., 2007). We extend this thinking and suggest that both WARN and 
RECOVR positively affect organizational performance. Because these RM capabilities 
reduce the timing associated with detecting and responding to SC disruptions, we 
anticipate that organizations will be able to lessen the effect of an actual disruption. By 
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extension, we expect that improved responsiveness would decrease expenditures, 
improve profitability, and increase customer satisfaction levels. 
 We treated both WARN and RECOVR as intermediate outcomes while considering 
organizational performance as the final performance outcome. WARN serves as an 
intermediary between the antecedent capability and the organizations response and 
recovery capabilities. In this research, we tested the relationships among the antecedent 
competencies and RECOVR. We aimed to determine whether the relationships are direct, 
indirect (i.e., completely mediated by WARN), or both direct and indirect (i.e., partially 
mediated by WARN). Next, we put forth our research hypotheses. 
 
Proposed relationships 
 In the following section, we identify key terms used within the formal hypotheses. 
This includes definitions for three competencies, internal integration, information 
sharing, and training. Additionally, we give details to the two capability constructs, 
warning and recovery, and the moderating variable licensed beds. 
 
Internal integration 
By definition, internal integration suggests that managers can unify processes and 
functions within an organization to accomplish higher-level goals and objectives 
(Germain & Iyer, 2006). In this research, SC functions such as procurement and logistics 
are able to internally integrate and support key hospital objectives.  Key dimensions to 
this definition include coordination, collaboration, and interconnectedness. 
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Information sharing 
 Li et al. (2005) defined INFOSHR as “the extent to which critical and proprietary 
information is communicated to one’s supply chain partner” (p. 621). As this research 
investigates internal connectedness, we seek to understand information sharing as data 
and knowledge, including proprietary information, is communicated between individuals 
and departments. We envision that people, processes, and systems help distribute 
information. 
 
Training 
 Training refers to the formal and informal processes of teaching practitioners 
within an organization job-related skills and knowledge (Kaynak, 2002).  Training may 
be necessary for specific tasks or functions, general knowledge, certification, or a as a 
refresher concerning a previously studied topic.  
  
Licensed beds 
 The number of licensed beds refers to “the maximum number of beds for which a 
hospital holds a license to operate (ahrq.gov). While the term alludes to a maximum 
number, some hospitals do not operate to this number.  
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Formal hypotheses: Relationships with SCRM capabilities  
 Below are the formal hypotheses of this study.  We proposed each relationship a-
priori and under the purview of HRT. For each competency-capability linkage, we offer 
two direct relationships and one mediated relationship that work through the intermediary 
warning capabilities. 
 
Relationship between internal integration and the organizational SCRM capabilities 
(H1A-C) 
 Experts agree that the first principle of managing risk is to organize one’s affairs 
before requiring others to do so (Handfield & Nichols, 1999; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; 
Swink, Narasimhan, & Kim, 2002). Thus, organizations should integrate their own SC 
functions before integrating externally. Internal integration refers to practices that enable 
and encourage interaction between internal processes and partners. From the HRT 
perspective, internal integration is akin to structural coupling, a mechanism that enables 
dependence between internal functions (Smart et al., 2003). In our investigation, internal 
integration details the extent to which organizations collaborate across internal 
boundaries to provide a refined customer experience (Chen & Paulraj, 2004). Integrating 
activities include cross-functional cooperation (Ballou, Gilbert, & Mukherjee, 2000) and 
information system integration (Sahin & Robinson, 2005). If managers develop this 
competency properly, internal integration reduces information uncertainty and 
equivocality (Koufteros, Vonderembse, & Jayaram, 2005) and improves practitioner 
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decision making. Without internal integration, practitioners may form functional silos, 
which optimize divisional processes rather than organization. 
  
Warning capability 
 Internal integration also empowers employees without direct supervision to 
interpret and respond to SC threats. Stated differently, internal integration should also 
speak to the willingness to cooperate, not just the requirement of compliance (Chen & 
Paulraj, 2004). HRT theorists call this mindfulness and use this term to describe 
employees that make operational decisions without formal structure or authority (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001, 2006). Jun, Qiuzhen, and Qingguo (2011) found that internal 
integration enhances communication between team members. The ability to communicate 
quickly and clearly is important for practitioners within complex organizations. 
Otherwise, misinformation leads to sub-optimal solutions. Thus, we hypothesized: 
H1A-Organizations with higher levels of internal integration competence will have 
higher warning capability levels. 
 
Recovery capability 
 As an antecedent to RECOVR, internal integration enables high information 
processing capabilities and allows organizations to address risk systematically (Jun et al., 
2011). Preemptively, managers employ information from internally integrated systems 
and processes to position resources. Rapid deployment of resources and personnel 
improves the opportunity to lessen the effect of pending SC disruptions. Examples of 
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resource placement include sand bags and storm shutters deployed before a flood or 
hurricane. When positioned, these resources enable organizations to minimize SC 
damage.  
 Internal integration also allows organizations to respond to disruptions after they 
occur. Emergency command centers and deployment support systems are examples of 
internal integration mechanisms designed specifically for reactive RM activities. 
Command centers enable decision makers to centralize information about disparate 
events and make decisions about response efforts and resource placement. Managers can 
deploy disaster recovery teams and activate redundant systems to lessen consequential 
effect. Ad-hoc committees and project managers enable cross-functional integration and 
combat compartmentalization within organizations (Germain & Droge, 1997). Hence, 
internal integration should enable response efforts. Leveraging this rationale, we 
developed the following hypothesis:  
H1B-Organizations with higher internal integration competence levels will have higher 
recovery capability levels. 
 
Mediated relationship 
 We also hypothesized a mediated relationship between internal integration and 
RECOVR, where WARN serves as an intermediate step. See Figure 2. Using the 
Craighead et al.’s (2007) definition, WARN allows for the “coordination of supply chain 
resources to detect a pending or realized disruption” (p 146). Hence, organizations use 
their scanning abilities to accumulate information about SC threats and disruptions. With 
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this information, managers can properly integrate systems and position response teams 
and resources to hasten recovery efforts. In this capacity, WARN enhances organizational 
connectedness, which enables response and recovery capabilities. Leveraging this logic, 
we offer the following: 
H1C- Warning capability mediates the relationship between internal integration and 
recovery capability. 
 
Figure 2: Warning mediates the internal integration-recovery capability relationship 
 
Relationship between Information Sharing and the Organizational SCRM 
Capabilities  (H2A-C) 
 We define INFOSHR as the act of and the willingness to make information 
available to other employees, departments, and partners. Research suggests that 
organizations embrace this competence when practitioners exhibit a willingness to share 
information (Spekman, Kamauff, & Myhr, 1998). Willingness to share information 
alludes to an organization’s commitment and the level of trust associated with actually 
sharing information. In this research, we extend current thinking and investigate 
INFOSHR from an intra-organizational perspective. Therefore, INFOSHR enables 
employees within an organization to heedfully interrelate and emphasize alertness (Smart 
et al., 2003; Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
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Warning capability 
 Evidence demonstrates that INFOSHR amongst SC participants is essential for 
organizations that want to identify and prepare for vulnerabilities (Kleindorfer & Saad, 
2005). This occurs as INFOSHR allows practitioners to collect information from multiple 
sources and then engage in coordinated decision-making efforts (Sahin & Robinson, 
2005).  
 We put forth that INFOSHR improves WARN and creates a state of alertness 
when processes allow employees to share data about threats throughout the organization. 
After practitioners identify a threat, INFOSHR permits mangers to communicate 
response strategies. Cachon and Fisher (2000) supported this claim and showed how 
INFOSHR allows organizations to flow goods through the SC more quickly and evenly. 
Further, INFOSHR enables the interdependence and coupling of internal functions. 
Therefore, this structural mechanism is an important connectedness practice, which is 
common in highly reliable organization (Smart et al., 2003). Thus, we offer the 
following:  
H2A-Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have 
higher warning capability levels. 
 
Recovery capability 
 Organizations should also use INFOSHR practices to develop their RECOVR by 
providing details on how to respond to actual SC disruptions. Practitioners who share 
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information about disruption consequences are able to prescribe specific 
countermeasures. Managers can first direct responders towards stabilization efforts, 
shutting down affected systems or mitigation practices designed to prevent further 
damage (Sheffi & Rice, 2005). We hypothesize that customized response tactics are more 
appropriate compared to generic efforts, as they enable faster recovery and help minimize 
SC damage. 
 We argue that when organizations identify threats preemptively, practitioners 
can share information to develop and deploy an appropriate mitigation strategy. For 
instance, in 2002, Dell’s management was evaluating the possibility that 29 West Coast 
ports would close due to a pending dockworker strike. Before the labor strike occurred, 
managers moved raw materials from Asia to US via airfreight. In this case, Dell uses 
information to plan and avoid a SC disruption due to the strike (Breen, 2004). 
 Additionally, organizations may use the INFOSHR competency also when 
reactively responding to a SC disruption. Here, INFOSHR improves practitioners’ 
decision-making processes. For example, if an organization experiences a quality issue, 
shared data about the  extent and expected duration of the disruption provides 
information on how to speed recovery efforts. This follows the HRT premise that 
employees should gather information from multiple sources when making response 
decisions. From this perspective, we offer the following hypothesis: 
H2B-Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have 
higher recovery capability levels. 
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Mediated relationship 
 We further hypothesized that WARN mediates the INFOSHR – RECOVR 
relationship. See Figure 3 for an illustration. WARN, as an intermediate step, bolsters the 
INFOSHR competency by enhancing communication abilities. We believe that response 
agents benefit when practitioners exploit their communication abilities and share 
strategic, tactical, and operational information (Bharosa, Van Zanten, Zuurmond, & 
Appelman, 2009). Stated differently, practitioners responsible for recovery efforts need to 
share information, including information gathered during the WARN processes, in order 
to prescribe context specific response tactics. Hence, we predict a mediated effect: 
H2C- Warning capability mediates the relationship between information sharing and 
recovery capability.
 
Figure 3: Warning mediates the information sharing-recovery capability relationship. 
 
Relationship between Training and the Organizational SCRM Capabilities (H3A-C) 
 Practitioners draw on the TRAIN competency to learn about disruptions and 
appropriate management tactics. Research indicates that TRAIN enables practitioners to 
convert a topic’s conceptual understanding into actual practice. Therefore, TRAIN refers 
to formal activities, which facilitate learning (McGehee & Thayer, 1961). From a HRT 
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perspective, organizations derive new knowledge from formal TRAIN activities and 
informal socialization activities. 
 
Warning capability 
 When TRAIN levels are low, organizations are passive to uncertainty and “accept 
whatever information the environment gives them” (Daft & Weick, 1984, p 288). 
Practitioners feel immune to threats or believe that alternative mechanisms, such as SC 
partners, enable them to mitigate the disruption consequences. Active organizations, in 
contrast, aspire to protect themselves from uncertainty. Thus, active organizations expect 
disruptions to occur and embrace TRAIN as a method to prepare for the inevitable. By 
doing so, managers assume that employees can mitigate uncertainty with detection 
practices that reduce the probability of occurrence and response tactics that lessen the 
disruption’s effect and recovery time. 
 In the RM context, TRAIN is important both before and after a disruption occurs. 
Classroom instruction, practice, and exercising typically occur before a disruption (Ford 
& Schmidt, 2000). This pre-emptive TRAIN allows employees to understand the utility 
and limitations of existing RM tactics. This occurs as TRAIN provides understanding and 
creates a permanent change in knowledge and attitude (Ford & Schmidt, 2000). Hence, 
we hypothesize the following relationship: 
H3A- Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher warning 
capability levels. 
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Recovery capability 
 RM experts also suggest that TRAIN enables practitioners to respond during 
periods of uncertainty, such as a SC disruption (Ritchie & Brindley, 2007). However, we 
recognize that TRAIN conditions can vary significantly from those experienced during an 
actual disruption. Therefore, we agree with previous research and suggest that post-
disruption TRAIN is also necessary (Ford & Schmidt, 2000). Practitioners develop 
detailed response procedures to address disruption circumstances that have already 
occurred. Automotive recalls are actions taken to repair or remove products from the 
marketplace after a disruption has occurred. Once a manufacturer identifies a recall, 
employees respond by completing repairs or replacing the defective component. The 
TRAIN procedures instruct employees on how to correct prescribed problems. This leads 
to the following hypothesize: 
H3B- Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher recovery 
capability levels. 
 
Mediated relationship  
 We also envision that the WARN construct affects the linkage between TRAIN 
and RECOVR. Figure 4 depicts the mediated model. When responding to a SC 
disruption, practitioners should apply information about the type of threat. This includes 
information obtained from scanning activities, a dimension of the WARN construct. In 
this perspective, practitioners seek out signs indicating a pending or actual SC disruption. 
218 
 
Warning details should inform the organization on how to best respond to and/or mitigate 
SC threats. For instance, Oloruntoba (2005) argued that public officials need information 
pertaining to tsunamis (or other natural disasters) to raise awareness and improve 
logistics coordination. When warning agents communicate information pertaining to the 
tsunami’s impact zones ahead of time, officials can preemptively respond by evacuating 
the population or prepositioning resources. Reactively, WARN information should 
provide details on how to minimize the disruption’s influence and/or shorten recovery 
times associated with SC disruptions that has already happened. For example, Zhang, 
Chai, Yang, and Weng (2011) found that warning information improves the organizations 
ability to execute recalls within a food SC. Specifically, traceability systems use warning 
information that enable managers to “effectively and speedily determine material or 
production stages having problems” (Zhang et al., 2011, p. 2507). On this basis, we 
suggest the following mediated relationship. 
H3C- Warning capability mediates the relationship between training and recovery 
capability.
 
Figure 4: Warning mediates the training-recovery capability relationship. 
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 Moderating relationship of organization size on the training competence (H4A-C) 
 The human resource literature consistently confirms that firm or organization size 
moderates the effects of training on performance (e.g., Guest 1997; Guest, Mitchie, 
Conway, & Sheeham 2003; Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006; Lee 2012). Several 
theories offer explanations as to why this interaction exists; however, a full review of 
these perspectives is out of scope for this research. While this stream of literature about 
potential interactions between TRAIN and organization size is informative, most studies 
adopt a human resources perspective.  
 When reviewing the SC and SCR literature, we found that only few researchers 
have investigated the abovementioned interaction. Manuj and Mentzer (2008) identified 
this gap and encouraged researchers to test moderating (and mediating) effects in the 
SCRM context. Thus, we sought to understand whether organization size moderates the 
relationship between TRAIN and the two RM capabilities and how. 
 We hypothesize a positive relationship between TRAIN-WARN (H3A) and 
TRAIN-RECOVR (H3B). Using HRT as our theoretical frame, we speculate that TRAIN 
activities, such as simulation and practice, prepare the organization for SC disruption. In 
essence, training allows practitioners to think about potential threats and consequences 
before they occur. This happens as managers establish norms, enable self-direction, and 
motivate employees to act (Batt & Moynihan 2006). We believe that these norms and the 
motivation to act are characteristics of mindful employees who operate complex systems. 
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 In the healthcare context, organization size relates to the number of licensed beds 
(BEDS) (Kaczmarek et al., 1991; Kaczmarek et al., 1992).We suppose that as BEDS 
increases, so does the need for training (TRAINxBEDS). Stated differently, TRAIN 
needs increase as managers bring more service products into the hospital. However, we 
note that training effectiveness may diminish as organization size grows, because it 
would become difficult to deliver a consistent level of training. Based on this logic, we 
hypothesized the following moderated relationships: See Figure 5 for an illustration of 
the moderated relationships for hypotheses H4A and H4B. 
H4A – The effect of training on warning capability diminishes as BEDS increases 
(TRAINxBEDS –WARN).  
H4B– The effect of training on recovery capability diminishes as BEDS increases 
(TRAINxBEDS –RECOVR). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: BED moderates the TRAIN-WARN and TRAIN-RECOVR relationships 
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 We also believe that WARN moderates the mediated relationship between 
TRAINxBEDS and RECOVR. See Figure 6 for an illustration of mediated-moderation. 
Here WARN serves as an intermediate step between the antecedent competency and the 
capability construct.  
 
Figure 6: WARN mediates the TRAINxBEDS-RECOVR relationship. 
 
 We suggest that the TRAINxBED –RECOVR relationship improves when 
WARN is included in the analysis. As BEDS increases, so does the number of 
practitioners available to scan for an identify SC threats. When practitioners identify a SC 
threat, they can provide response agents with information, which may help reduce the 
probability of a disruption. Additionally, practitioners responsible for recovery activities 
may glean information from WARN practices and subvert consequential effects or 
improve recovery times by suggesting methods that can be used to respond during 
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disruption. We believe some suggestions will stem from TRAIN and practice activities, 
which we consider a key WARN antecedent. Using this logic, we offer the following:  
H4C- Warning capability positively mediates the moderated relationship between 
TRAINxBED and recovery capability. 
 
Relationship between warning and recovery capabilities (H5) 
 If WARN is properly employed, organizations have information and time to 
determine an appropriate course of action. Thus, when practitioners identify a threat 
before it occurs, the organization may be able to minimize or even avoid a SC disruption. 
In the case of a delayed shipment of raw materials, an alternative vendor may be able to 
supply replacement product. When disruption is unavoidable, WARN capabilities allow 
managers to muster resources and proactively mitigate consequences. For example, when 
experts predict a hurricane, large home improvement retailers preposition inventory to 
suppress the storms effect with storm shutters and speed recovery efforts with cleaning 
supplies (Lodree, Ballard, & Song, 2012). Therefore, when organizations have high 
levels of warning capabilities, they may be able to jumpstart recovery efforts and reduce 
the consequences and recovery time associated with a disruption. Hence, we hypothesize 
the following: 
H5-Organizations with high warning capability levels will have high recovery capability 
levels. 
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Relationship between the RM capabilities and organizational performance (H1A-C) 
 We evaluated performance with three perceptual measures: operating cost, out-of-
stocks, and service quality. Most practitioners consider out-of stocks and operating costs 
as an indicator of business success (Challis & Samson 1996). In addition, researchers use 
service quality as a measure of success within the operations management literature when 
studying hospital environments (Marley, Collier, & Goldstein 2004).  
 
Relationship between warning capabilities and organizational performance 
 Organizations with strong WARN should be able to scan the SC horizon and 
identify threats before they happen. Peck (2005), for example, illustrated how news 
service scanning activities enabled German beverage manufactures and suppliers to avoid 
disruption associated with environmental legislation. Early identification provides time in 
which the organization can reconfigure tactics and position resources to thwart pending 
disruptions.  
 Further, we believe that once an organization identifies a threat, managers can use 
their communication skills to disseminate information about threats to partners. When 
organizations enhance their communication abilities, it improves understanding, builds 
trust, increases confidence, and reduces the risk exposure (Ritchie & Brindley 2000). 
Thus, when practitioners communicate information about risk sources and potential 
consequences properly, they are able to mitigate the disruptions effects, minimize SC 
downtime, and focus on long-term organizational goals, such as safety and profitability.  
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 Lastly, in certain situations, practitioners will identify a SC disruption only after it 
occurs. Both manmade and natural disasters can occur with no warning. Practitioners in 
addition, may miss warning signs altogether. When such disruptions occur, organizations 
must work quickly to understand the source and resulting consequences to help managers 
develop appropriate response tactics.  
 When organizations have time and are able to communicate information about 
threats, they should be able to reduce the probability, effect, and recovery times of a SC 
disruption. Essentially, managers are removing the uncertainty associated with their 
operating environment by lowering the overall level of exposure to disruption. With less 
exposure resulting from better WARN, organizations should be able to improve 
organizational performance. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis concerning 
warning capabilities: 
H6A-Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher performance 
levels. 
 
 Besides the direct effect between WARN and PERF, we envision that RECOVR 
capabilities mediate the relationship and creates a positive indirect linkage. Figure 7 
illustrates this effect. The indirect effect suggests that an organization has both strong 
warning and recovery capabilities. However, if only the indirect linkage is present, the 
organization needs both RM capabilities to affect positively the outcome construct PERF. 
Additionally, the direct effects are present between WARN and PERF, then a partially 
mediated relationship exists. We initially hypothesized a direct relationship between 
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WARN and PERF (H6A); however, we also suggest that a partially mediated linkage 
through RECOVR (H6B). This occurs as practitioner use information gleaned from 
WARN practices to enhance the organization’s response capabilities, which improves the 
level of PERF. From the HRT perspective, highly reliable organizations develop both 
WARN and RECOVR capabilities and cooperatively share information regarding the two 
functions. This line of reasoning allows us to hypothesize the following:  
H6B- Recovery capability partially mediates the relationship between warning capability 
and organizational performance. 
 
Figure 7: Recovery mediates the warning capability-performance relationship. 
 
Relationship between recovery capabilities and organizational performance 
 Practitioners should use RECOVR to deploy resources and develop tactics to 
mitigate the effects of a SC disruption. Highly reliable organizations are able to learn 
from environmental queues and adapt to the changing business environment. To this end, 
organizations can build and defend their competitive advantage by developing recovery 
capabilities. 
 Pre-emptive recovery allows organizations to reduce the probability of occurrence 
and lessen the actual influence. Once an organization understands how a threat will 
manifest, managers can reconfigure resources and tactics. This allows organizations to 
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either avoid the threat prior to disruption or gather resources for response tactics that 
address the consequences that emanate from a disruption.  
 Reactive RECOVR enables organizations to react to disruptions. The ability to 
react quickly is important when a disruption event offers no warning or when 
practitioners are unable to foresee an occurrence. During reactive periods, practitioners 
evaluate how a threat has manifested and then marshals the appropriate resources to 
counteract consequences. For example, in 1989, work crews repaired the eastern span of 
the Bay Bridge after the Loma Prieta earthquake damaged it just over a month earlier 
(Citizendia.org).  California department of transportation (CDOT) executives worked to 
determine the quickest way to reopen the earthquake-damaged bridge that transported 
thousands of commuters daily. In this case, no one was able to stop the disruption from 
happening. Therefore, the best solution was to react quickly and reduce the time the 
bridge was unavailable. Using large financial incentives, the CDOT encouraged workers 
to repair the bridge. The bridge reopened on November 18, 1989, one month and one day 
after the earthquake. From this position, we offer the following hypothesis.  
H6C-Organizations with higher levels of recovery capabilities will have higher 
performance levels. 
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 In Table 1, we summarize the hypotheses used within this research. We then 
precede the methodology section and describe procedures used to operationalize the 
various constructs. Within this section, we discuss specifically the warning and recovery 
capability constructs, as these are paramount to our research.  Finally, we review our 
qualitative and quantitative testing procedures. 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Item Hypothesis
H1A
Organizations with higher levels of internal integration competence will have 
higher warning capability levels
H1B
Organizations with higher internal integration competence levels will have higher 
recovery capability levels
H1C
Warning capability mediates the relationship between internal integration and 
recovery capability
H2A
Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have 
higher warning capability levels
H2B
Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have 
higher recovery capability levels
H2C
Warning capability mediates the relationship between information sharing and 
recovery capability
H3A
Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher warning 
capability levels
H3B
Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher recovery 
capability levels
H3C
Warning capability mediates the relationship between training and recovery 
capability.
H4A 
The effect of training on warning capability diminishes as BEDS increases 
(TRAINxBEDS –WARN). 
H4B
The effect of training on recovery capability diminishes as BEDS increases 
(TRAINxBEDS –RECOVR).
H4C
Warning capability positively mediates the moderated relationship between 
TRAINxBED and recovery capability
H5
Organizations with high warning capability levels will have high recovery 
capability levels.
H6A
Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher performance 
levels.
H6B
Recovery capability partially mediates the relationship between warning 
capability and organizational performance.
H6C
Organizations with higher levels of recovery capabilities will have higher 
performance levels.
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Instrument Development 
 We put to use Noar’s (2003) approach to develop the warning and recovery 
measures. Initially, we reviewed the literature to identify potential definitions and 
measurement items. We also reviewed tangential literature, such as business continuity 
management, crisis management, and SC complexity, to identify complementary 
operationalizations. See Table 2 for a list of constructs, dimensions and originating 
authors. 
 We employed multiple iterations of item-to-construct sorting procedures (Q-sort) 
to purify questions and definitions. Utilizing several samples of convenience, 
undergraduate students, graduate students, and industry experts matched measurement 
items with construct definitions (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). The Q-sorting process 
allowed us to refine measurement items and the accompanying definitions by assessing 
the face validity, inter-rater reliability, and construct validity (Menor & Roth, 2007). 
 For internal integration and TRAIN, the literature provided acceptable starting 
points. Few words were adapted during refinement process. For INFOSHR, we adapted 
measures from Li, Rao, Ragu-Nathan and Ragu-Nathan (2005). However, during the Q-
sort process, many respondents failed to match INFOSHR questions to the construct 
definitions provided. Therefore, we further adapted questions included in the final survey 
instrument. 
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Table 2: Constructs, dimensions, and originating authors. 
 
Warning and recovery capabilities 
 For the two organizational RM measures, warning and recovery capability, we 
adapted the construct definitions from Craighead et al. (2007). Initially they proposed the 
two measures in the risk mitigation context. However, as far as we can discern, Craighead 
and colleagues or other authors did not operationalize these constructs within literature. 
For WARN, we developed an exhaustive list of potential measurement questions from the 
RM, scanning, sense making, and communication literature. For RECOVR, we adapted 
measures from business continuity, SC agility, and the crisis management literature. We 
utilized these literature streams to insure coverage of the construct domain and centroid 
Construct Dimension Authors
Internal Integration Integration dimensions of design knowledge intensity Germain, Dröge and Christensen, 2001
Statistical training and training resources Saraph, Benson, and Schroeder, 1989;  
Statistical training and training resources Forker, 1997; 
Cross training Ahmad and Schroeder 2003; 
Information Sharing 
Exchanging information
Li, Rao, Ragu-Nathan, and Ragu-Nathan, 
2005
Identify and communicate Craighead et al., 2007; 
Early and late warning Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998; 
Discovery Hays and Hill, 2000; 
Monitoring Grover and Malhotra, 2003; 
Communication Chen and Paulraj, 2004; 
Communication Chen, Paulraj, and Lado, 2004; 
Identify/mitigate threats in advance Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2009 
Proactive and reactive response Craighead et al., 2007; 
Engaging responses, assets and capabilities Olavarrieta and Ellinger, 1997
Response agility Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998
Recovery expectations and performance McCollough, Berry, and Yadav, 2000;
Early involvement Koufteros, Vonderembse, and Doll, 2002;
Practice recovery behaviors de Jong and de Ruyter, 2004;
Scenario planning and simulations Smith, 2011
Training
Recovery Capabilities
Warning Capabilities
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(Little, Lindenberger, & Nesselroade, 1999). See Appendix A for item correlations. See 
survey questions 7-12 in appendix B. 
 
Internal integration 
 For questions about internal integration, we adapted measures from Germain, 
Dröge, and Christensen (2001). Their research studied cross-functional integration to 
determine how organizations collect, process, and integrate design knowledge. Like 
Germain et al. (2001), we envisioned that connectivity and coupling mechanisms are 
necessary to integrate different SC functions. Therefore, we developed our internal 
integration questions to address both SC integration activities and mechanisms that 
encourage connectivity. See questions 1-3 in appendix B. 
 
Information sharing 
 We started with the INFOSHR measures proposed by Li et al. (2005) and then 
adapted them to address INFOSHR from an internal perspective. Their questions 
addressed the external information exchange. We amended questions so they would tap 
INFOSHR concepts from both a management and practitioners’ perspective. In addition, 
we also tried to gauge the importance of internal INFOSHR. Consequently, we developed 
10 questions used within Q-sort procedures. These sorting exercises enabled us to select 
three appropriate questions. See questions 16-18 in appendix B. 
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Training 
 Questions pertaining to TRAIN were adapted from Saraph, Benson, and 
Schroeder (1989), Forker (1997), and Ahmad and Schroeder (2003). We amended the 
Saraph et al. (1989) and Forker (1997) questions to address organization wide TRAIN 
initiatives. We also drew statistical TRAIN questions from these articles; however, the Q-
sorting results encouraged us to drop these questions from the final survey instrument. 
Lastly, we developed several questions that addressed cross-training practices. We 
adapted these questions from measures designed to tap multiple functions of TRAIN 
(Ahmad & Schroeder, 2003). We believe that both TRAIN and cross-training principles 
are important within an organization supported by a complex SC. See questions 13-15 as 
described in appendix B. 
 We reviewed several drafts of our proposed model with academic and practitioner 
experts. They provided qualitative feedback on both the antecedent competencies and the 
proposed RM capabilities. Appendix B lists the final survey questions.  
 
Research Methodology 
Expert review 
 Once we created an initial set of construct definitions and measurement items, we 
reviewed the concepts, the proposed model, and the survey instrument with seven 
practitioners familiar with SC and RM concepts. This allowed us to establish the 
construct or face validity (Anastasi, 1988). Four of the interviewees worked within the 
healthcare industry. This includes a procurement director, hospital administrator, retired 
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risk executive, and a senior vice president of a non-profit hospital group. The primary 
investigator also conducted three interviews with non-hospital procurement experts to 
confirm the generalizability of the concepts. Two experts worked for a large retail chain 
while the other worked as a procurement director for a large public university. 
 
Unit of analysis 
 The unit of analysis is the business unit within a hospital. We selected hospital 
materials managers and directors as they are likely familiar with the antecedent 
competencies and the RM capabilities included in the study. After reviewing the concepts 
with interviewees, we believe the target respondents have sufficient knowledge to 
complete the survey. Thus, we suggest that data collected will provide enough variance to 
test the proposed relationships.   
 
Data collection 
 We collected pilot data from an evening Master of Business Administration 
(MBA) operations management class. These respondents had professional work 
experience and had knowledge of procurement and operations activities. The MBA 
instructor offered respondents extra credit to complete the pilot survey. From this sample, 
we were able to use 54 of 57 responses. We discarded three responses due to large 
amount of missing data.  
 We then collected pre-test data from 49 hospital procurement managers and 
directors in July and August 2012. Using an email survey (Qualtrics.com), we collected 
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data in two phases. Initially, a vice president at a non-profit hospital organization (name 
of organization is withheld for confidentially) sent the survey to 150 procurement 
directors. We were able to use 16 of the completed responses. Second, we purchased an 
email list of 839 potential respondents from SK&A (SKA.COM). We received 33 
completed responses. In this case, we sent each respondent a $25 gift card. The data from 
the pilot and pretest informed us about how to adjust the final survey instrument. 
 We conducted the full survey in the winter of 2012/2013 in three phases. Initially, 
we distributed the questionnaire to customers of a non-profit group purchasing 
organization (GPO) (name of organization is withheld for confidentially). The GPO sent 
out nine hundred and thirty surveys via email without incentives. After reviewing 72 
potential responses, we discarded 10 due to major omissions. Therefore, we used 62 or 
6.7% of the responses in the final analysis.  
 During the second phase, we purchased an email list from SK&A (SKA.COM). 
They emailed the survey to 1,600 procurement managers and directors working in US 
hospitals. With a $10 gift card as incentive, we received responses from 5.5% of the 
respondents. After a review, we were able to keep 88 of the completed surveys.  
 Finally, we mailed a paper survey to approximately 297 hospitals located 
throughout the US. In this case, we gave potential respondents a one-dollar bill as an 
incentive. We used names and addresses as listed on 
http://www.hospitalvendorcredentialing.com. Twelve surveys were returned due to an 
incorrect address or because hospital policy forbid employees from participating in 
235 
 
surveys. Therefore, out of 287 eligible surveys, we received 65 completed surveys 
representing a 22.1% response rate.  
 Using all three methods, we collected 215 total responses reflecting a response 
rate of 7.6%. Table 3 identifies the method used and final response rates. While these 
response rates may be slightly lower than those of other surveys within OM, we believe 
the sample is adequate, as there is limited number of hospitals within the US. According 
to the American Hospital Association, there are 5,724 hospitals in the US (AHA.ORG). 
Method Sent 
Not 
valid Usable % 
GPO 937 10 62 6.70% 
SKA 1600 0 88 5.50% 
Mail 297 12 63 22.10% 
Total 2827 22 213 7.60% 
Table 3: Method Response Rates  
 
Sample size 
 Following Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001) we calculated the required 
minimum sample size for this investigation. Based on the Bartlett et al.’s equation, three 
factors are necessary to compute the minimum sample size: alpha level (t), an estimate of 
the population’s standard deviation (s), and an acceptable margin of error for the 
estimated mean (d). This allows researchers to account conservatively for risk. Hence, we 
use an alpha level of 0.01. For standard deviation, Bartlett et al. (2001) suggested an 
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estimate of 1.167. This estimate is appropriate for a 7-point Likert scale. Third, we 
estimated 0.21 as an acceptable margin of error. This number is the product of the 
number of options within our scale and the margin of error a researcher is willing to 
accept. When using the three input variables in the Bartlett et al.s’ equation, we 
calculated no to be 204.925. 
   = 
           
    
 = 
                   
         
 = 204.925 or approximately 205 respondents. 
 Following Cochran (1977), we adjusted the above equation to account for the 
small population size. With 5,724 hospitals in the U.S. (AHA.com), we corrected the 
minimum required sample size.  
n= 
   
   
  
          
 
 =
       
   
       
    
 
 = 197.842 or approximately 198 respondents.  With 215 
responses, we had acceptable amount of data to analyze using the structural equation 
modeling software EQS 6.2. 
 
Missing data 
 We excluded the control variables from the missing data analysis, since we 
replaced missing control variables with data from hospitalvendorcredentialing.com 
(2013). For the remaining variables, we used EQS version 6.2 to impute missing data. 
Out of 3,824 response variables, only 26 were missing. Since this accounted for less than 
1%, we tested the data to determine if it was missing completely at random (MCAR). 
Using Little’s MCAR test, we found the missing variables to be MCAR (P=0.520). We 
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then used expectation-maximization (EM) imputation to estimate the missing variables 
(Allison, 2003). 
 
Preliminary analysis  
 We conducted a preliminary analysis to test for outliers, influential responses, 
skewness, kurtosis, and inappropriate responses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Specifically, we tested for univariate outliers by examining the standardized residuals as 
well as minimum and maximum values. See Table 4 for descriptive statistics. We used 
EM imputation to reproduce missing data points. We rounded a few imputed data up to 
the minimum of 1.0 or down to the maximum of 7.0. Two data points exceeded the 7.0 
maximum by less than 0.2 points and 1 data point was below the 1.0 minimum by less 
than 0.1 points. The only exceptions to the minimum and maximum rules described 
above are the four control variables. Both university affiliated (UNIV) and teaching 
facility (TEACH) are dichotomous, hospital type (TYPE) was on a 4 point scale (1.0-
4.0), and hospital class (CLASS) was on a 8 point scale (1.0-8.0). None of the control 
variables need to rounded. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Before transformation procedures  
 
 For multivariate outliers, we calculated Mahalanobis distances, DFBETAs, and 
DFIT values. Response #135 exceeded the Mahalanobis distances, DFBETAs, and DFIT 
cutoffs suggested by SC literature. After review, we retained the observation response, as 
it only marginally exceeded the calculated cutoff values.  
NAME CASES MEAN StdDev Min Max Range Skewness Kurtosis
Internal integration 1 215 5.17         1.35         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.00)       1.04         
Internal integration 2 215 4.91         1.31         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.85)       0.39         
Internal integration 3 215 4.51         1.60         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.54)       (0.52)       
INFORSHR 1 215 5.68         1.21         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.30)       2.01         
INFORSHR 2 215 5.59         1.39         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.30)       1.41         
INFORSHR 3 215 5.73         1.25         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.41)       2.28         
TRAIN 1 215 5.05         1.45         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.82)       0.24         
TRAIN 2 215 5.42         1.35         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.03)       0.78         
TRAIN 3 215 5.19         1.37         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.99)       0.66         
WARN1 215 5.54         1.16         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.36)       2.85         
WARN2 215 5.58         1.27         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.51)       2.74         
WARN3 215 5.35         1.51         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.19)       1.05         
RECOVR1 215 5.88         1.14         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.55)       3.82         
RECOVR2 215 5.96         1.12         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.86)       5.50         
RECOVR3 215 5.78         1.28         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.53)       2.74         
PERF1 215 5.01         1.33         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.09)       1.05         
PERF2 215 5.78         1.23         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.82)       4.07         
PERF3 215 5.83         1.20         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.97)       5.11         
BED 215 3.05         2.10         1.00         7.00         6.00         0.78         (0.74)       
UNIV 215 1.74         0.43         1.00         2.00         1.00         (1.12)       (0.72)       
TEACH 215 1.60         0.48         1.00         2.00         1.00         (0.42)       (1.79)       
TYPE 215 1.33         0.64         1.00         4.00         3.00         2.56         6.69         
CLASS 215 2.50         1.13         1.00         8.00         7.00         2.27         7.31         
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 We also used Mardia’s coefficient to identify observations that exhibit excessive 
multivariate kurtosis (Mardia, 1976). Three participants, #89, #106, and #123, had highly 
unsual response patterns resulting in extreme values, as measured by the Mardia 
coefficient. We removed these participants from further analysis. This left us with 212 
observations for the final analysis. The corresponding normalized estimate for the Mardia 
coefficient was 32.2574. 
 Further, we identified four variables, PERF2, PERF3, RECOVR1, and RECOVR 
2 that were highly kurtotic. Using PERF2 as an example, 195 of 214 respondents 
answered with a 5.0, 6.0, or 7.0. (See Figure 8) Conversely, only 19 respondents 
answered with a Likert value of 1.0 to 4.0.While no absolute kurtosis figure indicates 
non-normality, Bentler (1995) suggested that large kurtosis values of + three (3) indicate 
a leptokurtic distribution, where the data has higher peaks and longer tails than when 
compared to normally distributed data. No variables exhibited platykurtic kurtosis (values 
of less than –three). 
 We approached data transformations conservatively (Osborne 2002; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). To improve normality, we transformed the measures by squaring each 
PERF1, PERF2, PERF3, RECOVR1, RECOVR 2, and RECOVR 3 data point. Once 
transformed, kurtosis and skewness values were within acceptable ranges. See Appendix 
C for mean, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums figures before and after the 
data transformation process. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of responses for PERF2 
 
Common method bias 
 Common method bias (CMB) refers to variance introduced into an investigation 
by the method of measurement (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). Experts 
suggest this phenomenon can bias construct parameter estimates (Podsakoff et al., 2012) 
or reliability and validity estimates (Bagozzi, 1984).  
 Podsakoff et al. (2012) suggested addressing CMB during the instrument design 
phase. By changing the anchors within the instrument, investigators are able to lessen the 
influence of the measurement method procedurally. This helps eliminate common scale 
properties (Podsakoff et al., 2012). Besides changing the anchors within our survey, we 
used multiple rounds of Q-sorting and several preliminary tests (pilot and pre-test) to 
eliminate wording ambiguity.   
 -    
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241 
 
 Further, as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2012) and Lindell and Whitney (2001), 
we statistically evaluated the survey with a latent factor where a directly measured item 
served as an indicator. Here the bias is controlled for with the communality of the latent 
factor (Meade,Watson, and Kroustalis, 2007). In addition, we also used an unmeasured 
latent method factor to control for method bias. For this, we added GREEN, a question 
about environmentally friendly purchasing habits, to the final survey instrument. The 
findings suggested that CMB is not present in our dataset. See Appendix D for details. 
 
Non-response bias 
 Lambert and Harrington (1990) indicated that non-response bias identifies 
differences between respondents and non-respondents. To assess the non-response bias, 
we compared early and late respondents. Specifically, we looked at responses we 
received by mail, as it was possible to determine when surveys were initially sent and 
when respondents returned the completed survey. The evidence indicates that non-
response bias is not present in this study. See Appendix E for details. 
 
Validation of survey instrument 
 To establish reliability of the survey instruments, we estimated the internal 
consistency using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The reliability coefficients of 0.70 
or higher are typically meaningful cutoffs (Cronbach, 1951; Nunnally, 1978). Table 5 
shows that the Cronbach’s alpha values for the various constructs exceeded the suggested 
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cut-off value and ranged from 0.737 to 0.927. These results suggest that the constructs 
exhibit good psychometric properties. We report Cronbach’s alpha as it allows us to 
estimate the variance associated with a set of results. It tells us that a construct or a set of 
questions is consistently measuring the topic of interest.  
 
Table 5: Standardized path loadings from CFA and descriptive statistics 
 
Content validity 
 Content validity describes how well a measurement instrument, such as a survey, 
measures the proposed construct domain (Churchill, 1979). When content validity is 
high, the instrument is capturing the essence of the construct appropriately. Before we 
collected any data, we established the content validity of our survey by linking the 
Construct
Std 
Loadings
Cronbach's 
Alpha
Composite 
Reliability
AVE
0.914
0.756
0.666
0.829
0.839
0.899
0.722
0.69
0.804
0.844
0.938
0.747
0.908
0.922
0.872
0.641
0.653
0.776
0.737          0.740         
0.83
0.577     
0.784         
0.7470.860          0.881         
0.927          0.930         
Information Sharing 0.621     
Performance
Recovery Capabilities
Warning Capabilities
0.670.826         0.812          Internal Integration
Training 0.888          0.891         0.761
0.776          
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concepts to existing SC and RM literature. We also asked academic and practitioner 
experts to validate the measures during pre-test and pilot stages. Following Dillman 
(1978) and Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2008), we amended questions and the 
measurement instrument based on the feedback about the questionnaire’s readability, 
structure, and completeness. 
 
Unidimensionality and construct reliability 
 We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the scale’s 
unidimensionality and construct reliability. Table 5 reports the Cronbach’s Alpha, 
composite reliabilities, and the average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor. To 
determine the reliability of each measurement instrument, we evaluated the composite 
reliability. All scales had acceptable composite reliability estimates greater than 0.70 (See 
Table 5) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). We also calculated the AVE for each construct to 
determine the amount of true score variance captured by the latent variables. 
Accordingly, each item set should ideally have an AVE greater than 0.50. We do not 
report the X
2
 or fit indices as each was set to the respective maximum or minimum, 
indicating a perfect fit. When using CFA perfect, researchers can get perfect fit scores 
when their model is “just identified” as it has zero degrees of freedom.   
 
Criterion and concurrent validity 
 Criterion-related validity indicates how well measurement scales represent the 
proposed constructs. To establish criterion-related validity of the constructs, we examined 
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the correlation of the scales with warning and recovery measures. We employed 
Pearson’s correlation test to determine the relationships between the antecedent 
constructs and the outcome variables. Table 6 illustrates the correlations among various 
relationships. Each is statistically significant at p < 0.05. Based on the results of the 
correlation analysis, we concluded that the antecedent constructs have an acceptable 
criterion-related validity. 
 In addition, when constructs are highly correlated and directionally appropriate, 
they are said to have concurrent validity. When reviewing Table 6, we notice that all the 
construct appear to be directionally appropriate, as they are all positive and statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. Thus, we conclude that our data is concurrently valid. 
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Table 6: Correlations
1
 square root of average variance extracted (AVE)
2
 and chi-square 
differences
3 
  
1. Correlations bottom left triangle 
2. Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) on diagonal. This converts the AVE 
to the standard deviation scale, so it can be compared to correlations located in 
bottom left triangle. 
3. Satorra-Bentler differences top right triangle (SBDIFF.exe) 
 
Discriminant validity 
 As the data in our study were not normally distributed, we calculated a Satorra-
Bentler (S-B) difference for each pair of constructs (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). This 
resulted in 30 models (15 constrained and 15 unconstrained) that we used to evaluate the 
measurement scale’s discriminate validity. Using Bryant and Satorra’s (2012) scaled 
difference procedure, we compared a constrained model (correlations between factor 
pairs constrained to one (1)) to the unconstrained model (correlations between factor 
pairs are allowed to correlate freely).  
 When running a CFA on the various pairs, we expected a S-B X
2
 difference of at 
least 10.83 (P<0.001) in order to establish discriminant validity between constructs. The 
results indicate that each construct represents a unique construct and therefore has 
Items #of items
Internal 
Integration
TRAIN INFOSHR WARN RECOVR PERF
Internal Integration 3           0.82             28.67 29.29 34.57 78.39 26.47
TRAIN 3           0.48             0.87     38.93 35.18 55.02 20.67
INFOSHR 3           0.53             0.67     0.79          38.55 33.35 14.32
WARN 3           0.51             0.49     0.44          0.86       16.03 45.43
RECOVR 3           0.42             0.48     0.42          0.74       0.91       43.37
PERF 3           0.60             0.55     0.51          0.45       0.54       0.91        
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discriminant validity (See Appendix F for input and output variables for each construct 
pair). 
 
Analysis and Findings 
Respondent profile 
 According to the AHA, there are 5,724 hospitals within the United States. Table 7 
shows the respondent profiles, including percentage by type of care and hospital type. 
When considering type of hospital (bottom right portion of Table 7), 59% of respondents 
were from Nongovernment Not-for-Profit Community Hospitals. This differs significantly 
from the total population of hospitals. Therefore, we interpret the results cautiously. 
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Table 7: Respondent Profile 
  
<100 Beds 68 33%
Primary health care (i.e. broad 
range of ambulant and inpatient 
treatments) 122 82%
101-200 Beds 44 21%
Secondary care (i.e. partially 
specialized) interdisciplinary and 
mainly inpatient treatments) 12 8%
201-300 Beds 25 12%
Tertiary care (i.e. special clinics, 
incl. non-somatic care) 10 7%
301-400 Beds 18 9%
Non-acute care (i.e. rehabilitation 
chronic care) 5 3%
401-500 Beds 16 8% Total 149 100%
501-600 Beds 7 3%
>601 Beds 28 14%
Total 206 100%
Non-government Not-for-Profit 
Community Hospital (religious 
affiliated) 18 12% 2,903 51%
Yes 52 25%
Non-government Not-for-Profit 
Community Hospital (secular not 
religious affiliated) 87 59% 1,025 18%
No 154 75%
Investor-Owned (For-Profit) 
Community Hospital 12 8% 1,045 18%
Total 206 100%
State/Local Government 
Community Hospital 23 16% 208 4%
Federal Government Hospital 0 0% 421 7%
Non-federal Long Term Care 
Hospital 2 1% 112 2%
Yes 79 39%
Other (Prison Hospitals, College 
Infirmaries, Etc.) 5 3% 10 0%
No 125 61% Total 147 100% 5,724 100%
Total 204 100%
Sample Total Population2
Type of Hospital 1
1. First 62 respondents were not asked about type of hospital.     
2.Hosptial fast facts retrieved from AHA.ORG 3/31/2013. 
Licensed Beds
College or University Affiliation
Teaching Hospital
Type of Care 1
1. First 62 respondents were not asked about type 
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 Initially, we evaluated the overall fit of the structural model (i.e., path and 
measurement model combined). Using EQS version 6.2 for Windows, we found that the 
model fits the data well. Table 8 presents the estimated loading and fit indices: Satorra-
Bentler X
2
 = 308.52, df = 186, CFI = 0.926, and NNFI = 0.908. Furthermore, the 
RMSEA was 0.056 with a 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.044 to 0.067. When 
compared to standards established within OM literature, these relative and absolute 
statistics indicate acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Balla, & McDonald, 1988). 
 
 Table 8: Coefficients and robust fit statistics. 
Path
Unstandardized b 
(Standard Error) Standardized β Hypthosis tested
Internal integration --> WARN 0.338 (0.142) 0.347 H1A - Supported
Internal integration --> RECOVR  -0.227 (0.765) -0.026 H1B - Not supported
Internal integration --> WARN--> RECOVR (Mediated) 2.05 (0.915) 0.235                        H1C - Supported
INFOSHR --> WARN 0.050 (0.178) 0.043 H2A - Not supported
INFOSHR --> RECOVR  0.549 (1.065) 0.052 H2B - Not supported
INFOSHR --> WARN --> RECOVR  (Mediated) 0.303 (1.08) 0.029                        H2C - Not supported
TRAIN --> WARN 0.314 (0.128) 0.335 H3A - Supported
TRAIN --> RECOVR 0.815 (1.193) 0.086 H3B - Not supported
TRAIN --> WARN --> RECOVR  (Mediated) 1.905 (0.827) 0.227                        H3C - Supported
TRAINxBEDS --> WARN 0.058 (0.045) 0.12 H4A - Not supported
TRAINxBEDS --> RECOVR  -0.441 (0.216) -0.105 H4B - Supported
TRAINxBEDS --> WARN --> RECOVR  (Mediated) 0.351 (0.278) 0.081                        H4C - Not supported
WARN --> RECOVR 6.067 (0.913) 0.677 H5 - Supported
WARN --> PERF 1.398 (1.039) 0.173 H6A - Not supported
WARN --> RECOVR --> PERF  (Mediated) 2.317 (0.790) 0.287                        H6B - Supported
RECOVR --> PERF 0.382 (0.117) 0.424 H6C - Supported
BEDS --> WARN 0.001 (0.035) 0.002 Not Supported
BEDS --> RECOVR 0.682 (0.218) 0.136 Supported
BEDS --> PERF 0.107 (0.321) 0.024 Not Supported
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI)
Control Variable
ROOT MEAN-SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA)
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF RMSEA
Value
308.52
186
0.917
0.056
(0.044 - 0.067)
Absolute and Incremental Fit
SATORRA-BENTLER-X2
Degrees of Freedom
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Internal integration (H1A-C) 
 The relationship between internal integration and WARN (H1A) was positive and 
significant (β = 0.347, p= 0.0184). This suggests that organizations can improve their 
scanning and communication abilities by developing internal systems and processes to 
connect with other employees and departments. Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) found 
similar results when linking internal integration with SC agility. In their study, they 
investigated the antecedent competencies that enable SC agility in the mitigation context. 
From an HRT perspective, internal integration is similar to the concept of coupling. Tight 
coupling enables practitioners to exercise control over operational processes (Roe & 
Schulman, 2008). Without control, practitioners would find it difficult to develop highly 
reliable organizations. 
 The path coefficient from internal integration to RECOVR (H1B) was not 
significant (β = -0.026 p= 0.7676). This finding surprises us since other risk mitigation 
research has shown how internal integration can enhance connectivity and coordination 
(Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009). While similar, the Braunscheidel and Suresh research 
linked internal integration to SC agility, which practitioners used to mitigate and respond 
to SC disruptions. We believe our results indicate that when responding to a SC 
disruption that responders may need to decouple themselves from existing procedures 
and adapt to the surrounding environment. HRT proponents call the decoupling process 
latitude for improvisation (Weick, 1987). Improvisation may not be necessary with every 
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type of SC disruption; however, when needed, it allows a practitioner to create unique 
response tactics. 
 We also found that internal integration has a mediated relationship with RECOVR 
via the WARN construct (H1C). The relationship from WARN to RECOVR was 
significant (β = 0.677, p < 0.0001). Therefore, the resultant indirect effect equals 
β=0.235. To confirm the fully mediated effect between internal integration and 
RECOVR, we followed Selig and Preacher’s (2008) recommendation and conducted a 
bootstrap analysis to determine whether the relationship is significant. Using 20,000 
bootstrap estimates, we identified a significant relationship. The 95% confidence interval 
(CI) ranged from 0.3321 to 3.985 (see Appendix G for distribution of indirect effects).  
 As the bootstrapping process did not capture zero within the 95% confidence 
interval, we acknowledged that the fully mediated relationship (as opposed to a partially 
mediated) is significant. Thus, internal integration is positively associated with WARN 
which in turn is positively associated with RECOVR. 
 
Information sharing (H2A-C)  
 Both pathways INFOSHR to WARN (H2A) (β = 0.043, P= 0.7767) and 
INFOSHR to RECOVR (H2B) (β = 0.052, p= 0.6072) were not significant. These 
findings are surprising, since existing research repeatedly demonstrated that INFOSHR 
significantly affects an organization’s RM and risk mitigation efforts (Chopra & Sodhi, 
2004; Faisal, Banwet, & Shankar, 2006; Speckman & Davis, 2004). We suspect the 
relationships are non-significant due to the context of the investigation. Perhaps hospital 
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material managers do not rely on INFOSHR abilities as much as managers in other 
industries do. Researchers have previously found that “information sharing is especially 
difficult among companies that are remotely located in the supply chain” (Ahn & Lee, 
2004, p. 18). During initial interviews, one hospital procurement director indicated that it 
was common to locate procurement functions at offsite locations.  
 As both direct relationships were insignificant, we presumed that the indirect 
relationship from INFOSHR through WARN to RECOVR would also be insignificant. 
Using the bootstrap methodology, we confirmed that the 95% confidence interval 
includes zero values (See Appendix H for the distribution of indirect effects). This 
suggests that the indirect effects are non-significant, β=0.029. 
 
Training (H3A-C) 
 The coefficient between TRAIN and WARN (H3A) was positive and significant 
(β = 0.335 p= 0.0157). This evidence implies that managers can train practitioners to scan 
for and communicate information about SC disruptions. Sheffi, Rice, Fleck, & Caniato 
(2003) confirmed that TRAIN activities, such as simulation and gaming, help 
organizations build resilience. When viewed through the HRT lens, training enhances 
reliability, which is used to combat SC disruption (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006).  
 When evaluating the relationship between TRAIN and RECOVR (H3B), we 
found that their direct association was not significant (β = 0.086 p= 0.4955). Following 
HRT logic, we expected TRAIN activities to support and enhance pre-emptive and 
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reactive response tactics. However, the insignificant findings suggest that training alone 
will not improve or worsen an organization’s response capabilities. We believe that 
because SC disruptions vary widely in makeup and consequences, therefore, practitioners 
need more diverse types of training activities if managers expect TRAIN to affect 
RECOVR. 
 For hypothesis 3C, we anticipated the WARN construct to mediate the link 
between TRAIN and RECOVR. Our results indicated that a construct within a chain of 
events could be important yet have a minimal direct effect on specific construct (Vickery, 
Jayaram, Droge, & Calantone, 2003). Specifically, we found the indirect relationship to 
be significant (β = 0.086) and fully mediated. We used the bootstrapping methodology to 
confirm the significance. See Appendix I for distribution of indirect effects. The 95% 
confidence interval (CI) ranged from 0.4046 to 4.146. Since the CI did not include zero, 
the results indicated that TRAIN-RECOVR relationship is significant and fully mediated 
by the WARN construct. 
 
The moderating effect of organization size on training (H4A-C)  
 Following the recommendation of Marsh, Wen and Hau (2004), we mean-
centered both independent and moderating variables prior to creating the interaction 
variable. This allows us to avoid multi-collinearity between constructs (Venkatraman, 
1989). We then tested the relationship between TRAINxBEDS and WARN (H4A). We 
originally hypothesized that training would augment the WARN construct positively 
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when moderated by organization size (BEDS). Our analysis indicated that the hospital 
size does not significantly moderate the TRAIN-WARN relationship (β = 0.012, p= 
0.2053).  
 In hypothesis 3A, we found that TRAIN significantly and positively affects the 
WARN construct. When combined with the insignificant results from H4A, we 
concluded that BEDS, a proxy for organization size, does not interact and alter the 
relationship. Thus, this seems to imply that WARN related training is important 
regardless of organization size.  
 The path coefficient from TRAINxBEDS to RECOVR (H4B) was significant (β = 
- 0.105 p =0.0425). This indicates that the TRAIN-RECOVR relationship does lessen as 
organization size increases. To interpret this result, we report simple slopes, as prescribed 
by Aiken and West (1992). (See Figure 9) 
 Simple slope for TRAIN at +1 standard deviations of BEDS = 0.815+(-0.441 * 1* 
2.10) =   -0.1111 
 Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at mean of recovery 
capability = 0.815 
 Simple slope for TRAIN at -1 standard deviations of BEDS = 0.815+(-0.441 * -1* 
2.10) = 1.7411 
 
 This evidence suggests that a one-unit increase in TRAIN increases the RECOVR 
by -0.1111 units as the number of BEDS increases (larger organizations). At the average 
number of BEDS, a one-unit increase of TRAIN abilities marginally improves the 
response capabilities by 0.815. Lastly, when a hospital has a small number of BEDS 
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(small organizations), a one-unit increase in TRAIN improves the organization’s 
RECOVR by 1.7411.  
 
 
Figure 9: Simple Slopes for TRAIN x BEDS interaction 
 Lastly, in H4C we proposed that the moderating effect of TRAINxBEDS on 
RECOVR was mediated by WARN. In testing the mediated moderation effect 
(TRAIN*BEDS) >> WARN >>RECOVR), the point estimate (0.351) is the product of 
the estimates for the effect of WARN on the TRAIN*BEDS interaction term (0.058) and 
the effect of RECOVR on WARN (6.067) (Tein, Sandler, MacKinnon, & Wolchik, 
2004). The standard error of this effect is 5.539 = [(0.058
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Thus we conclude that the mediated moderation effect was not significant [0.351 (5.539), 
Z=0.07].  
 
 However, to illustrate the moderating effects of BEDS, we also calculate the 
conditional mediation effects using the simple slopes from the three “a” coefficients and 
then multiplying by the single “b” coefficient (WARN >> RECOVR) (Preacher, Rucker, 
& Hayes, 2007). The results indicate that TRAIN may indirectly improve RECOVR 
within small and medium hospitals. In particular, training activities have a positive 
indirect effect (10.56), in hospitals with a small number of BEDS. Likewise, in medium 
size hospitals, we find a positive indirect effect, however the overall effect is reduced 
(4.94). The impact of TRAIN continues to diminish as hospital size increases. Thus, in 
large hospitals we found that TRAIN has a slight negative indirect effect (-0.674). 
Overall, these results suggest that as hospital size increases, the mediated influence of 
TRAIN on RECOVR decreased. 
 
Warning capabilities to recovery capabilities (H5) 
 When Craighead et al. (2007) defined warning and recovery capabilities; they 
postulated that the constructs were related. Following this thinking, we proposed a 
positive relationship from WARN to RECOVR (H5A). After analyzing the pathway, we 
found a positive and significant (β = 0.677, p < 0.0001) relationship. This supports 
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previous research asserting that warning capabilities, such as prevention and detection, 
are antecedents to response and recovery efforts (Price, 2004).   
 
The effect of warning and recovery capabilities on organizational performance 
(H6A-C) 
 When analyzing the relationship between WARN to PERF (H6A), we found a 
non-significant effect (β = 0.173, p=0.1799). This finding surprised us, as WARN was 
hypothesized to improve both scanning and communication capabilities. With this non-
supportive evidence, we assume that while useful the WARN are costly to the 
organization. Stated differently, managers must expend financial and physical resources 
to enable WARN tactics. We suspect that some organizations, perhaps entrepreneurial 
firms, are able to make use of these competencies. For example, Shepherd et al. (2007) 
found that environmental scanning activities helped generate entrepreneurial ideas. 
Within an entrepreneurial firm, we would expect scanning abilities to enhance 
performance. 
 When considering the WARN – PERF relationship, we must account for the 
RECOVR construct as an intermediary (H6B). The evidence suggests that RECOVR 
mediates the relationship and creates an indirect effect (β = 0.287). We confirmed the 
relationship using bootstrapping. See Appendix J for the distribution of indirect effects. 
This augmented relationship demonstrates that organizations should develop WARN as a 
means to enhance performance. However, managers will need to develop both warning 
and recovery capabilities to see improvement.  
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 The relationship between RECOVR and PERF (H6C) is significant (β = 0.424, 
p=0.0013). This confirms our thinking that organizations can develop proactive and 
reactive response capabilities as a means to improve performance. When designing 
recovery capabilities, managers should develop processes that jumpstart response efforts. 
Documented processes and a clear chain of command enable first responders to initiate 
recovery with a clear line of authority (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2002). Yet both the processes 
and the supporting hierarchy need to allow practitioners to adapt when necessary. 
Responders should apply problem-solving skills and adapt to the disruption within the 
confines of their position (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2002). 
 
Control variables 
 We test four control variables within this research: university affiliated (UNIV), 
teaching hospital (TEACH), type of care (TYPE), and organization class (CLASS). 
While, neither UNIV nor TEACH had any significant effects, both TYPE and CLASS 
warranted further investigation (See Table 8). When evaluating both TYPE and CLASS 
we found the influence was not meaningful, as it did not change the significance of any 
relationships initially identified in the base model.   
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Table 9: Control variables with Fit, unstandardized betas and standard errors 
  
Conclusions 
 This research contributes to the SC and RM literature in several ways. First, the 
results suggest that by developing a reliable SC, managers can enhance the organization’s 
RM capabilities and performance. To achieve improved performance, managers should 
design reliability-oriented systems that are decentralized in nature and run by mindful 
practitioners who understand and care for the organization. 
 Second, we developed new measures to assess organizational warning and 
recovery capabilities. While originally defined by Craighead et al. in 2007, we 
operationalize them within the SC and RM context. Using interviews, sorting procedures, 
and confirmatory factor analysis, we developed valid and reliable measures that both 
academics and practitioners can use to benchmark and understand an organization’s RM 
capabilities. For WARN, our evidence suggests that managers can scan for SC anomalies 
and then communicate information about SC threats to partners within an organization. 
Control Variables Yes or No Yes or No 4 Choices 8 Choices
Absolute and Incremental Fit UNIV TEACH TYPE CLASS
WARN  0.160 (0.158)  0.115 (0.146)  0.234 (0.093)***  0.005 (0.101)
RECOVR  -1.568 (1.202) 1.031 (1.069)  -1.658 (0.567)***  -0.652 (0.351
PERF 0.053 (1.257) 0.724 (1.142) 0.777 (0.777)  -1.317 (0.484)**
SATORRA-BENTLER-X2 376.6 374.4306 339.8301 331.9441
Degrees of Freedom 205 205 205 205
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) 0.89 0.892 0.913 0.915
ROOT MEAN-SQUARE ERROR 
OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA) 0.063 0.063 0.056 0.054
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF 
RMSEA (0.053 - 0.073) (0.052 - 0.072) (0.045 - 0.066) (0.043 - 0.064)
Notes: *** Significant to 0.0001; ** Significant to 0.001; 
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Our study also confirmed that RECOVR allows the organization to address SC disruption 
both before (pre-emptive) and after (reactive) a disruption occurs.  
 Third, the findings indicated that several competencies positively affect an 
organization’s RM capabilities. For example, both internal integration and TRAIN affect 
WARN directly and RECOVR indirectly. Our evidence suggests that managers can 
develop organizational structures as a means to combat SC risk. We advocate the use of 
these behavior-based RM competencies because they develop the employees and the 
organization itself rather than just investing in resources and buffers that may never be 
used.  
 Fourth, we found that both warning and recovery capabilities affect organizational 
performance. Our findings indicate a direct connection between RECOVR and PERF. 
This suggests that managers can develop response capabilities to mitigate a SC 
disruption’s influence and/or lessen the time it takes for the SC to return to a steady state. 
This is important, as organizations compete on the speed of their operation functions, 
especially in the face of a SC disruption. Ensuring that the organization can quickly 
recover from a SC disruption should help the organization retain existing customers and 
acquire new customers when the competition is struggling to recover.  
 Although we found no direct relationship between WARN and PERF, the 
evidence indicates an indirect effect when RECOVR serves as a mediator. This signifies 
that managers should develop scanning and communication competencies within an 
organization, as a method to enhance performance. However, to benefit from the 
improved abilities, the organization must develop both the warning and recovery 
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capabilities, as WARN depends on RECOVR. Stated differently, warning capabilities 
alone without recovery capabilities is not sufficient. 
 Fifth, the research explored organization size (BEDS) as a moderator of the 
relation between TRAIN and PERF. The results show that as the number of licensed beds 
increases, the rate at which TRAIN affects PERF diminishes. Stated differently, as a 
hospital grows in size, training becomes less effective at improving PERF. This implies 
that procurement managers of large hospitals must work harder for TRAIN to influence 
an organization’s RM capabilities. 
 
Limitation and Future Research Opportunities 
 As with any investigation, our research has limitations. First, we collected data 
from 215 hospital procurement professionals. Choosing one industry allows us to control 
for variation associated with different industries (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, it limits 
the generalizability of the findings (Cool & Schendel, 1987; Safizadeh, Ritzman, & 
Mallick, 2000). Replicating this research within other industries would add to our 
understanding of the values of behavioral-based risk management techniques. Second, we 
drew inferences from cross sectional data. Longitudinal data would improve our 
understanding of these RM phenomenons and the discussion concerning causality 
(Rosenzweig, Roth, & Dean, 2003). Third, we were also concerned with the utility of the 
warning and recovery measures. Since this is one of the first studies to operationalize 
these constructs, it would be beneficial to strengthen these measures with additional 
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testing. Lastly, we were concerned about using single respondents to answer our survey. 
This issue has been widely discussed in the literature (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). To 
address potential problems, we structured our survey according to the best practices and 
tested for common method bias. Additional studies could collect data from multiple 
respondents and sources. 
 During this investigation, we obtained several interesting results that spur future 
research. Initially, we envisioned improvement in the WARN and RECOVR constructs. 
Using the new constructs in follow-up studies provides additional validity and reliability 
testing. Second, while our research looks at structural competencies, future studies should 
test other antecedents. Examples include information system integration, managerial 
attitudes towards improvisation, and quality management systems. Finally, we used 
perceptual measures for organizational performance. While these are helpful for 
interpretation and measurement, objective outcomes, like gross earnings, actual profit, 
and in-stock level would be more definitive outcome variables. During this research 
process, we found that some hospitals regularly publish profit and loss data. However, 
many private and non-profit hospitals provide very little information about financial 
performance.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Correlations, means, and standard deviations for each item 
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Appendix B: Survey questions 
Internal integration 
1. Within my organization, there are mechanisms in place to encourage internal 
integration. 
2. I believe different departments within my organization are properly integrated. 
3. We have project managers who integrate activities across the organization. 
Performance 
4. My organization is able to keep operating costs to a minimum. 
5. My organization is able to keep out of stocks to a minimum. 
6. My organization is able to keep service quality high. 
Warning capabilities 
7. My organization has procedures to identify threats.  
8. Within my organization, there are systems to warn employees about potential 
threats. 
9. Within my organization, the command center identifies actual disruptions. 
Recovery capabilities 
10. When a disruption occurs, my organization immediately starts recovery efforts. 
11. Once a threat is identified, my organization deploys resources to reduce the 
negative effects. 
12. My organization’s command center deploys recovery resources to reduce the 
effects of a disruption. 
Training 
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13. Within my organization, employees are cross-trained so they can fill in for others 
if necessary. 
14. Within my organization, there are employee training resources available. 
15. Employees receive training to perform multiple tasks. 
Information sharing 
16. Most people within my organization believe that sharing information is important. 
17. In my opinion, finance shares information with operations. 
18. Managers from departments across the organization are expected to share 
information with others. 
Control variables 
19. How many beds does your organization have? 
20. Is your organization affiliated with a college or university? 
21. Is your organization a teaching facility? 
22. What type of care does your organization provide? 
a. Primary health care (i.e. broad range of ambulant and inpatient treatments) 
b. Secondary care (i.e. partially specialized) interdisciplinary and mainly 
inpatient treatments) 
c. Tertiary care (i.e. special clinics, incl. non-somatic care) 
d. Non-acute care (i.e. rehabilitation chronic care) 
23. How would you classify your organization? 
a. Non-government Not-for-Profit Community Hospital (religious affiliated) 
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b. Non-government Not-for-Profit Community Hospital (secular not 
religious affiliated) 
c. Investor-Owned (For-Profit) Community Hospital 
d. State/Local Government Community Hospital 
e. . Federal Government Hospital 
f. Non-federal Long Term Care Hospital 
g. Other (Prison Hospitals, College Infirmaries, Etc.) 
h. Nonfederal Psychiatric Hospital 
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics before transformation 
  
NAME CASES MEAN StdDev Min Max Range Skewness Kurtosis
Internal integration 1 215 5.17         1.35         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.00)       1.04         
Internal integration 2 215 4.91         1.31         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.85)       0.39         
Internal integration 3 215 4.51         1.60         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.54)       (0.52)       
INFORSHR 1 215 5.68         1.21         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.30)       2.01         
INFORSHR 2 215 5.59         1.39         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.30)       1.41         
INFORSHR 3 215 5.73         1.25         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.41)       2.28         
TRAIN 1 215 5.05         1.45         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.82)       0.24         
TRAIN 2 215 5.42         1.35         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.03)       0.78         
TRAIN 3 215 5.19         1.37         1.00         7.00         6.00         (0.99)       0.66         
WARN1 215 5.54         1.16         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.36)       2.85         
WARN2 215 5.58         1.27         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.51)       2.74         
WARN3 215 5.35         1.51         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.19)       1.05         
RECOVR1 215 5.88         1.14         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.55)       3.82         
RECOVR2 215 5.96         1.12         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.86)       5.50         
RECOVR3 215 5.78         1.28         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.53)       2.74         
PERF1 215 5.01         1.33         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.09)       1.05         
PERF2 215 5.78         1.23         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.82)       4.07         
PERF3 215 5.83         1.20         1.00         7.00         6.00         (1.97)       5.11         
BED 215 3.05         2.10         1.00         7.00         6.00         0.78         (0.74)       
UNIV 215 1.74         0.43         1.00         2.00         1.00         (1.12)       (0.72)       
TEACH 215 1.60         0.48         1.00         2.00         1.00         (0.42)       (1.79)       
TYPE 215 1.33         0.64         1.00         4.00         3.00         2.56         6.69         
CLASS 215 2.50         1.13         1.00         8.00         7.00         2.27         7.31         
Original Data Set: 215 responses before tranformation
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Appendix C (continued): Descriptive statistics after transformation 
 
 
  
NAME CASES MEAN StdDev Min Max Range Skewness Kurtosis
IIMC1 215 -           1.35         (4.16)       1.83         6.00         (1.00)       1.04         
IIMC2 215 -           1.31         (3.91)       2.08         6.00         (0.85)       0.39         
IIMC3 215 -           1.60         (3.51)       2.49         6.00         (0.54)       (0.52)       
ISMC1 215 -           1.21         (4.67)       1.32         6.00         (1.30)       2.01         
ISMC2 215 -           1.39         (4.58)       1.41         6.00         (1.30)       1.41         
ISMC3 215 -           1.25         (4.72)       1.27         6.00         (1.41)       2.28         
TRNMC1 215 -           1.45         (4.04)       1.95         6.00         (0.82)       0.24         
TRNMC2 215 -           1.35         (4.41)       1.58         6.00         (1.03)       0.78         
TRNMC3 215 -           1.37         (4.19)       1.81         6.00         (0.99)       0.66         
BEDMC 215 -           2.10         (2.04)       3.95         6.00         0.78         (0.74)       
BEDXTRN1 215 0.08         2.88         (12.05)     8.28         20.34      (0.32)       2.32         
BEDXTRN2 215 0.42         2.81         (13.51)     9.04         22.56      (0.52)       5.14         
BEDXTRN3 215 0.25         2.74         (12.61)     8.57         21.19      (0.27)       3.35         
WC1SQRD 215 31.98      11.25      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.42)       0.06         
WC2SQRD 215 32.79      12.04      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.63)       0.06         
WC3SQRD 215 30.93      13.77      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.44)       (0.59)       
RC1SQRD 215 35.90      11.61      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.61)       (0.02)       
RC2SQRD 215 36.74      11.27      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.74)       0.40         
RC3SQRD 215 35.02      12.53      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.72)       (0.05)       
PER1SQRD 215 26.89      11.66      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.28)       (0.18)       
PER2SQRD 215 34.92      11.75      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.85)       0.68         
PER3SQRD 215 35.45      11.46      1.00         49.00      48.00      (0.88)       0.86         
Transformed Data Set: 215 responses after transformation
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Appendix D: Common method bias: Method factor and marker variable 
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Appendix E: Non-response bias results 
 
 
  
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
1.00 15 2.133333 1.3020131 .3361783
2.00 15 3.000000 1.6903085 .4364358
1.00 15 1.866667 .3518658 .0908514
2.00 15 1.800000 .4140393 .1069045
1.00 15 1.677327 .4738894 .1223577
2.00 15 1.800000 .4140393 .1069045
Lower Upper
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.070 .793 -1.573 28 .127 -.8666667 .5509011 -1.9951365 .2618032
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-1.573 26.288 .128 -.8666667 .5509011 -1.9984576 .2651242
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.924 .345 .475 28 .638 .0666667 .1402945 -.2207135 .3540469
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
.475 27.290 .638 .0666667 .1402945 -.2210507 .3543841
Equal 
variances 
assumed
2.072 .161 -.755 28 .457 -.1226733 .1624807 -.4555000 .2101533
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed
-.755 27.505 .457 -.1226733 .1624807 -.4557703 .2104236
Independent Samples Test
Group Statistics
Group
BED
UNIV
TEACH
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
BED
UNIV
TEACH
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df
Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
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Appendix F: Satorra-Bentler difference results 
Internal integration & TRAIN 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 117.42 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 187.02 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.67 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.75 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 28.6774  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
Internal integration & INFOSHR 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 84.21 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 128.03 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.87 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 9.48 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
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 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 29.2955  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
Internal integration & WARN 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 115.78 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 185.77 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 17.96 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.77 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 34.5738  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
Internal integration & RECOVR 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 160.98 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 198.59 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 5.46 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 5.9 
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 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 78.3932  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
Internal integration & PERF 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 79.11 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 102.45 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 14.84 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 15.53 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 26.4732  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
TRAIN & INFOSHR 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 69.20 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 125.09 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
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 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 23.74 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 41.94 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.9311  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.00000 
 
TRAIN & WARN 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 144.00 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 304.73 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 20.56 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 28.79 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 35.1817  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
TRAIN & RECOVR 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 234.06 
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 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 423.15 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 15.56 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 17.30 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 55.0214  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
TRAIN & PERF 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 86.37 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 125.00 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.22 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.24 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 20.6783  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000005 
 
INFOSHR & WARN 
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INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 111.00 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 165.53 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.19 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 8.40 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.5592  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
INFOSHR & RECOVR 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 106.76 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 163.38 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 8.39 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 9.61 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 33.3569  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
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INFOSHR & PERF 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 68.09 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 125.59 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.11 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 25.34 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 14.3272  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000154 
 
WARN & RECOVR 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 83.16 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 182.93 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 36.15 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 52.78 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
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 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 16.0335  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000062 
 
WARN & PERF 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 121.85 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 156.60 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 30.87 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 34.24 
 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
 OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 45.4306  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
 
RECOVR & PERF 
INPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 101.09 
 Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 129.92 
 Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9 
 Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 22.64 
 Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 25.95 
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 Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8 
OUTPUTS: 
 Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 43.3730  df =  1 
 Chi Square probability = 0.000000 
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Appendix G: Distribution of indirect effects for internal integration and RECOVR 
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Appendix H: Distribution of indirect effects for INFOSHR and RECOVR 
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Appendix I: Distribution of indirect effects for TRAIN and RECOVR 
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Appendix J: Distribution of indirect effects for WARN and PERF 
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